Two dissertations, I. Concerning the end for which God created the world. II. The…

THUS I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supreme arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom ⟨p. 18⟩and rectitude, to state all rules and measures of proceedings. And seeing these attributes of God are infinite, and most absolutely perfect, they are not the less fit to order and dispose, because they are in him, who is a being concerned, and not a third person that is disinterested.—For being interested unfits a person to be an arbiter or judge, no otherwise than as interest tends to blind & mislead his judgment, or incline him to act contrary to it. But that God should be in danger of either, is contrary to the supposition of his being possessed of discerning and justice absolutely perfect. And as there must be some supreme judge of fitness and propriety in the universality of things, as otherwise there could be no order nor regularity, it therefore belongs to God whose are all things, who is perfectly fit for this office, and who alone is so to state all things according to the most perfect fitness and rectitude, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person. We may therefore be sure it is and will be done.

THUS I have gone upon the supposition of a third person, neither creator nor creature, but a disinterested person stepping in to judge of the concerns of both, and state what is most fit and proper between them. The thing supposed is impossible; but the case is nevertheless just the same as to what is most fit and suitable in itself. For it is most certainly proper for God to act, according to the greatest fitness, in his proceedings, and he knows what the greatest fitness is, as much as if perfect rectitude were a distinct person to direct him. As therefore there is no third being, beside God and the created system, nor can be, so there is no need of any, seeing God himself is possessed of that perfect discernment and rectitude which have been supposed. It belongs to him as supream arbiter, and to his infinite wisdom