N37435:20
The justice of God in the damnation of sinners. Illustrated in a sermon
The justice of God in the damnation of sinners. Illustrated in a sermon. : To which is added a farewell sermon; by Jonathan Edwards, A.M. Delivered at Northampton, June 22d, 1750. After the people's public rejection of him as their minister, and renouncing their relation to him as pastor of the church.
Northampton: printed by Daniel Wright & Co for Simeon Butler, 1797
Title page typeset from the transcription.
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Every crime or fault deserves a greater or lesser punishment, in proportion as the crime itself is greater or less. If any fault deserves punishment, then so much the greater the fault, so much the greater is the punishment deserved. The faulty nature of any thing is the formal ground and reason of its desert of punishment; and therefore the more any thing hath of this nature, the more punishment it deserves. And therefore the terribleness of the degree of punishment, let it be never so terrible, is no argument against the justice of it, if the proportion does but hold between the heinousness of the crime and the dreadfulness of the punishment; so that if there be any such thing as a fault infinitely heinous, it will follow that it is just to inflict a punishment for it that is infinitely dreadful.
A crime is more or less heinous, according as we are under greater or lesser obligations to the contrary. This is self-evident; because it is herein that the criminalness or faultiness of any thing consists, that it is contrary to what we are obliged or bound to, or what ought to be in us. So the faultiness of one being's hating another, is in proportion to his obligation to love him. The crime of one being's despising and casting contempt on another, is proportionably more or less heinous, as ⟨p. 10⟩he was under greater or lesser obligations to honour him. The fault of disobeying another, is greater or less, as any one is under greater or lesser obligations to obey him. And therefore if there be any being that we are under infinite obligations to love, and honour, and obey, the contrary towards him must be infinitely faulty.
Our obligation to love, honour, and obey any being, is in proportion to his loveliness, honourableness, and authority; for that is the very meaning of the words. When we say any one is very lovely, it is the same as to say, that he is one very much to be loved: Or if we say, such a one is more honourable than another, the meaning of the words is, that he is one that we are more obliged to honour. If we say any one has great authority over us, it is the same as to say that he has great right to our subjection and obedience.