Text
pp. 524916 passagespart 19 of 23
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Predestination may thus be defined: It is a part of the counsel of God, whereby he hath before all times purposed in himself to show mercy on some men, & to pass by others, showing his justice on them for the manifestation of the glory of his own name. First, I say, it is a part of his counsel, because the counsel or decree of God, universally extends it self to all things that are: and Predestination is Gods decree so far forth as it concerns the reasonable creatures, especially man. Now in every purpose or decree of God, three things must be considered; the beginning, the matter, the end. The beginning is the will of God whereby he willeth and appointeth the estate of his creatures: & it is the most absolute, supreme, and sovereign cause of all things that are, so far forth as they have being: having nothing either above it self or out of it self, to be an impulsive cause to move or incline it; and to say otherwise, is to make the will of God to be no will. Indeed mens wills are moved and disposed by external causes, out of themselves borrowed from the things whereof deliberation is made, because they are to be ruled by equity and reason: and a mans bare will without reason is nothing. Now Gods will is not ruled by another rule of reason or justice, but it self is an absolute rule both of justice and reason. A thing is not first of all reasonable and just, and then afterward willed by God: but it is first of all willed by God, and thereupon becomes reasonable and just. The matter of his purpose is a decreed manifestation of two of the most principal attributes of the godhead, mercy and justice: and that with a limitation or restraint of mercy to some of the creatures, and justice to some others, because it was his good will and pleasure. And we are not to imagine that this is a point of cruelty in God: for his very essence or nature is not justice alone or mercy alone, but justice and mercy both together: and therefore to purpose the declaration of them both upon his creatures over whom he is a sovereign Lord; and that without other respects, upon his very will and pleasure, is no point of injustice. The supreme end of the counsel of God is the manifestation of his own glory partly in his mercy, and partly in his justice.
Predestination may thus be de•ined: It is a part of the counsell of God, whereby he hath before all times purposed in himselfe to shewe mercy on some men, & to passe by others, shewing his iustice on them for the manifestation of the glorie of his owne name. First, I say, it is a part of his counsell, because the counsell or decree of God, vniuersally extends it selfe to all things that are: and Predestination is Gods decree so farre forth as it concernes the reasonable creatures, especially man. Nowe in euery purpose or decree of God, three things must be considered; the beginning, the matter, the ende. The beginning is the will of God whereby he willeth and appointeth the estate of his creatures: & it is the most absolute, supreame, and soueraigne cause of all things that are, so farre forth as they haue beeing: hauing nothing either aboue it selfe or out of it selfe, to bee an impulsiue cause to mooue or incline it; and to say otherwise, is to make the will of God to be no will. Indeede mens wils are mooued and disposed by externall causes, out of themselues borrowed from the things whereof deliberation is made, because they are to be ruled by equitie and reason: and a mans bare will without reason is nothing. Nowe Gods will is not ruled by another rule of reason or iustice, but it selfe is an absolute rule both of iustice and reason. A thing is not first of all reasonable and iust, and then afterward willed by God: but it is first of all willed by God, and thereupon becomes reasonable and iust. The matter of his purpose is a decreed manifestation of two of the most ptincipall attributes of the godhead, mercy and iustice: and that with a limitation or restraint of mercy to some of the creatures, and iustice to some others, because it was his good will and pleasure. And we are not to imagine that this is a point of crueltie in God: for his very essence or nature is not iustice alone or mercy alone, but iustice and mercy both togither: and therefore to purpose the declaration of them both vpon his creatures ouer whome hee is a soueraigne Lord; and that without other respects, vpon his very will and pleasure, is no point of iniustice. The supreame end of the counsell of God is the manifestation of his owne glorie partly in his mercy, and partly in his iustice.