Chapter 7
pp. 185–256123 passagespart 2 of 4
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Touching the manner of Examination, ⟨p. 204⟩there be two kinds of proceeding; either by a single Question, or by some Torture. A single question is, when the Magistrate himself only maketh enquiry, what was done or not done, by bare and naked interrogations. A torture is, when besides the enquiry in words, he useth also the rack, or some other violent means to urge confession. This course hath been taken in some countries, and may no doubt lawfully and with good conscience be used, howbeit not in every case, but only upon strong and great presumptions going before, and when the party is obstinate. And thus much for Examination: now followeth Conviction.
Touching the manner of Examination, ⟨p. 204⟩there be two kinds of proceeding; either by a single Question, or by some Torture. A single question is, when the Magistrate himselfe onely maketh enquirie, what was done or not done, by bare and naked interrogations. A torture is, when besides the enquirie in words, he vseth also the racke, or some other violent meanes to vrge confession. This course hath beene taken in some countries, and may no doubt lawfully and with good conscience be vsed, howbeit not in euery case, but onely vpon strong and great presumptions going before, and when the partie is obstinate. And thus much for Examination: now followeth Conuiction.
§ 2. Conviction, is an action of the Magistrate, after just examination, discovering the Witch. This action must proceed from just & sufficient proofs, and not from bare presumptions. For though presumptions give occasion to examine, yet they are no sufficient causes of conviction. Now in general the proofs used for conviction are of two sorts, some be less sufficient, some be ⟨p. 205⟩more sufficient.
§ 2. Conuiction, is an action of the Magistrate, after iust examination, discouering the Witch. This action must proceed from iust & sufficient proofes, and not from bare presumptions. For though presumptions giue occasion to examine, yet they are no sufficient causes of conuiction. Now in generall the prooses vsed for conuiction are of two sorts, some be lesse sufficient, some be