Chapter 2
pp. 23–5342 passagespart 2 of 2
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
So that your argument rightly accommodated should run thus, It is as impossible that the World was without beginning, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginning should have any limits of being, and be finite. Now this they would maintain to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of it self. And you have hitherto afforded no evidence at all to justify it. And again there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of being, or no beginning of being, yet can it not be infinite, because that implieth manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have been found to justify, that a body might have been everlasting, by the power of God, and consequently without beginning. And again, if the World hath a beginning (as we believe it hath) it must necessarily follow, that some thing should be made out of nothing, which not only Philosophers conceived to be impossible, but the H. Ghost also professeth it to be a truth so far overreaching the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faith, saying, By faith we believe that the World was made. What I think of your models I have already signified. 1In fine you tell us, whereto they tend, which you express im pomp, saying, They are destinated to the erection of an everlasting edifice. And that is a certain proposition concerning the nature of God, namely, that God is such a one, ⟨p. 53⟩as he should have been, if he had had beginning of himself. Which assertion of yours how well it becometh the honour of God, let every sober Reader judge. For you affirm that God is of such a nature, as should be existent, upon supposition of a thing impossible; namely, The taking of beginning of being from ones self. By the way I observe, that though you maintain God to have no beginning of being, yet you deny him to take beginning of himself; and thereby distinguish between such things upon the confusion whereof alone, the plausibility of your former discourse did wholly depend. For whereas Aristotle maintained that the World was without beginning;
So that your argument rightly accommodated should runne thus, It is as impossible that the World was without beginninge, as it is impossible that, that which is without beginninge shoulde have any limits of being, and be finite. Nowe this they woulde maynteyne to be utterly untrue; and were it true, yet is it not so true, as to be evident of it selfe. And you have hitherto affoorded no evidence at all to justifye it. And agayne there is both reason, why, whether a body have beginning of beinge, or no beginninge of beinge, yet can it not be infinite, because that implyethe manifest contradiction: and on the other side, Divines have bene founde to justify, that a body might have bene everlastinge, by the power of God, and consequently without beginninge. And agayne, if the World hathe a beginninge (as we believe it hathe) it must necessarily followe, that some thinge shoulde be made out of nothinge, which not only Philosophers conceaved to be impossible, but the H. Ghost allso professethe it to be a truthe so farre overreachinge the ordinary capacity of man, that he imputes it unto faithe, sayinge, By faith we believe that the World was made. What I thinke of your modells I have allready signified.