D. We do see it in the nature of God, as it hath been already touched. For that which God can not be necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all just, all good, & all perfect, infinite, eternal & immortal, doth not carry with it a necessity of lack, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish the power, the glory, & majesty of him, but on the contrary it doth magnify & declare the great excellency & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true liberty & commendation to be able to sin & to do evil: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodness, that it doth hold in it continually that goodness which it naturally hath, in such sort that it can not by any accident whatsoever it be, be changed, diminished or abolished, it is as if we should say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and just. Who would not conclude then by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more strong than he, because we may be wicked, untrue, unjust, & liars, the which he can not be? For goodness is in him a thing which hath ⟨p. 481⟩subject & substance, & the accidents agreeable to the same, as we do see in the sun & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the evil is nothing else, but a privation, lack & want of the good which ought to be, even as the darknesses are nothing else than privation & lack of light. Or if thou haddest rather to have it spoken in other terms: it is nothing but a corrupted quality & a vicious accident, which are come upon a good substance & creature of God, & have corrupted it: the fault whereof may not be sought in God, albeit that nothing can come to pass without his providence & his eternal counsel: but it must be sought in causes more near unto us, leaving a part the secrete counsels & judgments of God, which is in such sort the cause of causes, that no fault may be imputed unto him, or that he can do any thing other than justly. For he hath in such sort disposed the second causes, that when the evil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Devil or man, cometh between, in such sort that that fault resteth in them, albeit that God doth cause their wicked work and will to serve him, and make the worker good, ⟨p. 482⟩in so much as God is served therewith.
D. We doe sée it in the nature of God, as it hath bene already touched. For yt which God can not bée necessarily but all mighty, all wise, all iust, all good, & al perfect, infinite, eternal & immortall, doth not carrie with it a necessitie of lacke, nor constraint, nor yet doth in any respect diminish ye power, the glory, & maiestie of him, but on the cō trary it doth magnifie & declare the great excellencie & perfection of his nature. For it is not a true libertie & cōmendation to be able to sinne & to doe euill: but it is a token of an excellent nature to be so perfect in goodnesse, that it doth holde in it cō tinually that goodnesse which it naturally hath, in such sorte that it cā not by any accident whatsoeuer it be, be chaunged, diminished or abolished, it is as if we shold say, that it is impossible that God should not be God, & good, and iuste. Who would not cōclude thē by that same, that God is not all mighty, & that there is something impossible to him. Are we more stronge than he, bicause we may be wicked, vntrue, vniust, & liers, ye which he cā not be? For goodnes is in him a thing which hath ⟨p. 481⟩subiect & substāce, & the accidēts agreable to the same, as we do sée in the sunne & in his light, which doth light all the world: for the euil is nothing els, but a priuatiō, lacke & want of ye good which ought to be, euen as the darkenesses are nothing els than priuation & lacke of light. Or if thou haddest rather to haue it spoken in other termes: it is nothing but a corrupted qualitie & a vicious accident, which are come vpō a good substance & creature of God, & haue corrupted it: the faute whereof may not be sought in God, albeit that nothing cā come to passe without his prouidence & his eternal counsell: but it must be sought in causes more neare vnto vs, leauing a parte the secrete counselles & iudgments of God, which is in such sorte the cause of causes, yt no fault may be imputed vnto him, or that he cā do any thing other than iustly. For he hath in such sort disposed ye secōd causes, that when ye euil is a doing, the wicked will either of the Deuill or man, cōmeth betwéene, in such sorte that that fault resteth in thē, albeit that God doth cause their wicked worke and will to serue him, and make the worker good, ⟨p. 482⟩in so much as God is serued therewith.