The second Chapter. That man is new spoiled of the Freedom of will, and made subject to miserable bondage.The seconde Chapter. That man is newe spoyled of the Freedome of wyll, and made subiecte to myserable bondage.
pp. 1744 passagespart 2 of 2
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Now is Will to be examined, wherein standeth the chief liberty §26of free choice, for it hath ben already seen, that choice doth rather belong to Will, than to understanding. First that this thing which the Philosophers have taught, and is received with common consent, that is, that all things by natural instinction desire that which is good, may not seem to belong to the uprightness of mans will: Let us mark that the force of free will, is not to be considered in such appetite, as rather proceedeth of the inclination of the essence, than of the advisement of the understanding mind. For even the Schoolmen do confess, that freewill hath no action, but when reason turneth it self to objects, whereby they mean that the object of appetite must be such▪ as may be subject to choice, and go before deliberation, which prepareth the way for choice. And truly, if a man consider what is that natural desire of good in man, he shall find that it is common to him with beasts. For they also desire to be well, and when any show of good appeareth that moveth their sense, they follow it. But man doeth neither choice by reason, that he may follow with diligence that thing, which is in deed good for him, according to the excellence of his immortal nature, nor taketh reason to counsel, nor bendeth his mind, but without reason, without counsel, like a beast, followeth the inclination of nature. This therefore maketh nothing for the freedom of will, if a man by sense of nature be carried to desire that which is good: but this is requisite, that he discern good by right reason, and when he hath known it, that he choose it, and when he hath chosen it, that he follow it. But lest any man should doubt, there is to be noted a double Sophistical argument. For Appetite is not here called the proper manner of will, but a natural inclination: and Good is called not as of virtue or justice, but of estate, ⟨image 96⟩as we say, This man is well, or in good case. Finally, although a man •o never so much desire to attain that is good, yet he followeth it not. As there is no man to whom eternal blessedness is not pleasant, yet is there none that aspireth unto it, but by the moving of the holy ghost.
Nowe is Will to be examined, wherein standeth the chiefe libertie §26