Of almsdeeds and first of the action of giving.Of almesdeeds and first of the action of giuing.
pp. 23–242 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Sect. 1. Of almsdeeds and first of the action of giving.
Sect. 1. Of almesdeeds and first of the action of giuing.
And so I come from the general duty of beneficence, to the more special duty of alms deeds, expressed in these words, he hath given to the poor. In which consider two things; the action, and the object. Of which I will entreat, ⟨p. 24⟩first severally, then jointly. The action is giving, which is a free and liberal contract, whereby the property and use of some good thing, is alienated from one and conferred upon another, out of the good will and bounty of the benefactor. And it hath two extremes, the one, in excess, lavish prodigality; and the other in defect, base niggardliness. Between which extremes this virtuous action holdeth the mean, being guided with true wisdom, judgement and discretion (as all other virtues are, according to that, Psal. 112. 5. A good man 1showeth favour and lendeth; he will guide his affairs with discretion.) And in respect of the quantity of the gift, it keepeth a good proportion, both in respect of his ability, who giveth, and his necessity, who receiveth. And hereof it is that these almsdeeds are called righteousness in the Scriptures (as hereafter we shall see) to teach us, that they are to be done justly, according to the rule of equity; due respect being had both to our own state and means, and the necessities and wants of our poor brethren.
ANd so I come from the generall dutie of beneficence, to the more speciall duetie of almes deedes, expressed in these words, hee hath giuen to the poore. In which consider two things; the action, and the obiect. Of which I wil intreate, ⟨p. 24⟩first seuerally, then iointly. The action is giuing, which is a free and liberall contract, whereby the propertie and vse of some good thing, is alienated from one and conferred vpon another, out of the good will and bountie of the benefactour. And it hath two extreames, the one, in excesse, lauish prodigality; and the other in defect, base niggardlinesse. Betweene which extreames this vertuous action holdeth the meane, being guided with true wisdome, iudgement and discretion (as all other vertues are, according to that,