2. Proposition.
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2. Proposition.
The Acts of the Will (in specie morally) derive their goodness or viciousness partly from the nature of the Object, upon which they are fixed. I do not assert this to be the only ground, whence they are concluded good or evil, for the Principle, and the End, and sometimes the degree of the Act are all necessary thereto, but only that this is one thing necessary. Thus the willing of God, or any of those things, which are in a direct order to his glory, is that, we call the Grace of Love: As on the other side, when the Will moveth towards any thing, which standeth in opposition thereto; This is that we call sinful Concupiscence.
The Acts of the Will (in specie morali) derive their goodness or vitiousness partly from the nature of the Object, upon which they are fixed. I do not assert this to bee the onely ground, whence they are concluded good or evil, for the Principle, and the End, and sometimes the degree of the Act are all necessary thereto, but onely that this is one thing necessary. Thus the willing of God, or any of those things, which are in a direct order to his glory, is that, wee call the Grace of Love: As on the other side, when the Will moveth towards any thing, which standeth in opposition thereto; This is that wee call sinful Concupiscence.