§. 46. I conclude with this repeated profession, that I am fully satisfied, that all the rest of the Controversies, about Grace and Nature, and Predestination and Redemption, as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians, are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book, nor worthy any of that stir and contention, which men that sufficiently difference not Words, Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church: And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties, is in this controversy between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination, and of Free-will; that is, (not, What free-will sinners have left, but) [Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man, there was such a thing, as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morally, without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause?] or as Hobbes speaketh, Whether ever a created will, did act, without a necessitating premotion? And whether to will and to will freely, be all one? And whether the will (except as to the kind of action) be not as much necessitated to will or not will, as my Pen to write or not write? are we call not its acts Contingent or free, either because they are what they are (Volitions,) or though Ignorance, because we see not the moving Causes?
§. 46. I conclude with this repeated profession, that I am fully satisfied, that all the rest of the Controversies, about Grace and Nature, and Predestination and Redemption, as they stand between the Synod of Dort and the Arminians, are of no greater moment than I have oft expressed in this Book, nor worthy any of that stir and contention, which men that sufficiently difference not Words, Methods and Matter have made to the mischievous injury of the Church: And that the true life of all the remaining difficulties, is in this controversie between the defenders of Necessary Predetermination, and of Free-will; that is, (not, What free-will sinners have left, but) [Whether ever in Angels or Innocent man, there was such a thing, as a will that can and ever did determine it self to a Volition or Nolition in specie morali, without the predetermining efficient necessitating premotion of God as the first Cause?] or as Hobbes speaketh, Whether ever a created will, did act, without a necessitating premotion? And whether to will and to will freely, be all one? And whether the will (except as to the kind of action) be not as much necessitated to will or not will, as my Pen to write or not write? are we call not its acts Contingent or free, either because they are what they are (Volitions,) or though Ignorance, because we see not the moving Causes?