Some think,1 the only way to deal with such temptations to Blasphemy, is to cast them away, and not to dispute them. And I think the direction is very good, so it be used with some distinction and caution. The Rule holds good against real Blasphemy, known to be such; but if the person know it not, how shall he make use of this Rule against it? Further, it is supposed, that he who knows it to be Blasphemy, hath Arguments whereby to prove it such; else how doth he know it? Therefore here lies the sin; when a man is by sufficient evidence convinced, (or at least hath Evidence sufficient for conviction) that it is a Divine Testimony, and yet is still cherishing doubts, or hearkening to temptations which may feed those doubts: when a man (like Balaam) will take no answer. But he who will therefore cast away all doubts, before he hath Arguments sufficient against them, or could ever prove the thing in Question, he doth indeed cast aside the temptation, but not overcome it, and may expect it should shortly return again: It is a methodical cure which prevents a relapse. Such a neglecter of temptations may be in the right, and may as well be in the wrong, but however, it is not right to him, because not rightly believed. Faith always implies a Testimony, and the knowledge usually of ⟨p. 180⟩the matter and Author of that Testimony: Divine Faith hath ever a Divine *Testimony, and supposeth the knowledge of the matter (when the Faith is particular) but always of the Author of that Testimony. An implicit Faith in God, that is, a believing that all is true which he testifieth, though we see no reason for it from the evidence of the matter, this is necessary to every true Believer: But to believe implicitly, that the Testimony is Divine, or that Scripture is the Word of God, this is not to believe God, but to resolve our faith into some humane Testimony; even to lay our foundation upon the sand where all will fall at the next assault.
Some think,1 the onely way to deal with such temptations to Blasphemy, is to cast them away, and not to dispute them. And I think the direction is very good, so it be used with some distinction and caution. The Rule holds good against reall Blasphemy, known to be such; but if the person know it not, how shall he make use of this Rule against it? Further, it is supposed, that he who knows it to be Blasphemy, hath Arguments whereby to prove it such; else how doth he know it? Therefore here lyes the sin; when a man is by sufficient evidence convinced, (or at least hath Evidence sufficient for conviction) that it is a Divine Testimony, and yet is still cherishing doubts, or hearkning to temptations which may feed those doubts: when a man (like Balaam) will take no answer. But he who will therefore cast away all doubts, before he hath Arguments sufficient against them, or could ever prove the thing in Question, he doth indeed cast aside the temptation, but not overcome it, and may expect it should shortly return again: It is a methodicall cure which prevents a relapse. Such a neglecter of temptations may be in the right, and may as well be in the wrong, but however, it is not right to him, because not rightly believed. Faith alwayes implies a Testimony, and the knowledg usually of ⟨p. 180⟩the matter and Author of that Testimony: Divine Faith hath ever a Divine *Testimony, and supposeth the knowledg of the matter (when the Faith is particular) but always of the Author of that Testimony. An implicite Faith in God, that is, a believing that all is true which he testifieth, though we see no reason for it from the evidence of the matter, this is necessary to every true Believer: But to believe implicitly, that the Testimony is Divine, or that Scripture is the Word of God, this is not to believe God, but to resolve our faith into some humane Testimony; even to lay our foundation upon the sand where all will fall at the next assault.
- 1Impias argumentationes si ratio refutare non possit, fides irridere debet, quae ratiocinationes evertit, & in captivitatem redigit omnem intellectum in Christi obsequium. August.
- *Though […] extend […] far as […].Though 〈…〉 extend 〈…〉 far as 〈…〉.