The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in extreme necessity; and this is (*)only when it is apparent ⟨p. 403⟩they will dye for want of necessaries, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in public places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not. the judgment of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, (*)or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation (e)which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to (f)Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not ⟨p. 404⟩required to relieve the Necessitous, (g)by giving them any thing; but it is sufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navarre concludes it lawful (h)to buy persons in extreme Necessity, and lawful for them to consent to it; his reasons among others, are, because a Father in time of extreme Hunger, may sell his Son; also, because no man is bound to relieve one, though in extreme Necessity gratis, if he can do it sufficiently by loan, exchange, &c.
The other case will make Charity no more necessary; it is when the Poor are in extream necessity; and this is (*)only when it is apparent ⟨p. 403⟩they will dye for want of necessaries, if we relieve them not. Now such a case rarely happens, and a man may never meet with one in such extremity, all his life; but if he do, yet he may be excused for want of evidence that his necessity is so great, he need not take the party's word for it, no, not though in publick places there seem to be also clear signs of it; he need not take the word of any other, no not. the judgment of his parish Priest, or Confessor (though upon their opinion he may safely venture upon acts of wickedness) unless they can assure him thereof as eye witnesses, (*)or if he be morally certain of the extremity; yet if there be a probability that any other will relieve the person ready to starve, he may leave him to the mercy of others, without doing any thing himself towards his relief (for that is another limitation (e)which they add in the case). For example, if he thought it likely, that a Protestant would relieve the perishing party, a Papist by their doctrine of good works might reserve his Money and Charity for another world; nor would it be necessary to exercise one act thereof while he lives. Or amongst themselves, while each one expects that another may do it, the Poor may perish, and all that might relieve them are excused. Besides, in this case, they conclude it lawful for the person in extremity to (f)Steal, either secretly or openly from those that have enough; so that acts of Charity will not be necessary among them, but when Theft is Lawful; and no man need to relieve the Indigent with any thing he hath, till they may justly take it from him. But if it were possible, in these cases, whereto they confine it, to find any place for the necessity of this duty; yet one thing more, added by their prime Doctors, dashes all, for they teach that it is not ⟨p. 404⟩required to relieve the Necessitous, (g)by giving them any thing; but it is sufficient to Let, or Sell, or Lend to them. Navar concludes it lawful (h)
- (*)In sententiam Cajetan. & Navarre. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosgu. dub. 3. n. 20. Asserunt non esse praecepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremae necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturae, sed statui etiam congruae sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson—reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus. Durandus asserit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempu• praecepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne •ot divites condemnet, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elecmosyn.In sententiam Cajetan. & Navar. inclinant Sotus & Sarmientus. Vasques. Opusc. Moral. de Eleemosgu. dub. 3. n. 20. Asserunt non esse praecepti obligationem ullam, extra tempus extremae necessitatis proximi, quantumvis divitiae superfluant non tantum naturae, sed statui etiam congruae sustentationi, Gabriel, Alexander, Major, Gerson—reputant probabilem Antoninus, Conradus, Durandus. Durandus asserit se non audere dicere esse aliud tempu• praecepti extra extremam necessitatem, ne •ot divites condemnet, Idem. ibid. n. 11. & Jo. Medina. in Sa. v. Elecmosyn.
- (*)Bonacin. 1. precept d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.Bonacin. 1. praecept d. 3. q. 4. p. 6. n. 3.
- (e)Extreme egere dicitur, non solum qui jam animam agit vel spirat: sed etiam cum indicia probabilia apparent eo deventurum, nisi ei subveniatur, & non se offert nec expectatur probabiliter alius, qui ei subveniat, juxta S. Thom. & declarat Cajetan. Idem cap. 24. n. 5.
- (f)Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navarre, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navarre. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Res. 29. Bannes in 2. 2. q. 66. art. 7.Soto de just. & jur. l. 4. q. 7. art. 1. Licet alienum arripere sine peccato in extrema necessitate. Sotus, Cajetan, Navar, Adrian. Armilla. Covarruvius. Et in urgenti Sylvest. Angelus. in Vasq. ibid. dub. 7. n. 28. in gravi licitum esse. Sylvest. Medina. Angel. Navar. Pet. Navarra, Malderus & plures alij apud Dian. p. 2. tr. 3. Res. 29. Bannes in 2. 2. q. 66. art. 7.
- (g)