for infused and supernatural virtues and graces (to which therefore humane nature is not inclined) are (as Vasquez truly and strongly maintains) in some sense natural and good in themselves, not because humane nature is inclined to them, but because they are very congruous and consentaneous thereunto, and perfecting humane nature, as such, and consequently suitable thereunto: A good is said to be utile & delectabile in respect of some profit or delight ⟨p. 12⟩which comes to man by it,1 but bonum honestum in genere morris (as Suarez and his fellows call it) consists in a kind of decency, comeliness and sweet proportion between such an act, and such a nature as acts by right reason; to which nature it is exceeding comely and suitable, whether any profit or delight come thereby yea or no. As now in the divine nature, it's exceeding beautiful and comely for it (and therefore good in it self) to be bountiful and merciful, and to do good unto the creature, although no profit could come to him thereby: It is Gods nature, as I may so say, so to do; so 'tis in humane nature, it's a comely thing to honour parents, reverence Gods Name, to be loving and merciful to all men, in heart, word and deed; to give God a fit and the most meet proportion of time for solemn service of him, who allows us many days to serve our own good; this is good nature, and being thus seemly and suitable to it, this and such like things are therefore good in themselves, though perhaps neither profit or pleasure should come unto man hereby: And hence it's well observed by some of the Schoolmen, that right reason doth not make a thing moral, but only judgeth and discerneth what is moral; for right reason doth not make a thing suitable, but only seeth whether it be so or no, a thing may be suitable before right reason see it, yet when 'tis presented to reason it sees it suitable, as the wall is white before the eye see it, yet when the eye doth see it, it appears white also: It may be a meet and comely thing to give God a seventh part of our time, though no mans reason can of it self find out such a meet proportion, yet when reason sees it, it's forced to acknowledge a comeliness of equity, and suitableness therein, as shall hereafter appear.
for infused and supernaturall vertues and graces (to which therefore humane nature is not inclined) are (as Vasquez truly and strongly maintaines) in some sense naturall and good in themselves, not because humane nature is inclined to them, but because they are very congruous and consentaneous thereunto, and perfecting humane nature, as such, and consequently sutable thereunto: A good is said to be utile & delectabile in respect of some profit or delight ⟨p. 12⟩which comes to man by it,1 but bonum honestum in genere moris (as Suarez and his fellowes call it) consists in a kinde of decency, comlinesse and sweet proportion between such an act, and such a nature as acts by right reason; to which nature it is exceeding comely and suitable, whether any profit or delight come thereby yea or no. As now in the divine nature, it's exceeding beautifull and comely for it (and therefore good in it selfe) to bee bountifull and mercifull, and to doe good unto the creature, although no profit could come to him thereby: It is Gods nature, as I may so say, so to doe; so 'tis in humane nature, it's a comely thing to honour parents, reverence Gods Name, to bee loving and mercifull to all men, in heart, word and deed; to give God a fit and the most meet proportion of time for solemne service of him, who allowes us many dayes to serve our owne good; this is good nature, and being thus seemly and suitable to it, this and such like things are therefore good in themselves, though perhaps neither profit or pleasure should come unto man hereby: And hence it's well observed by some of the Schoolemen, that right reason doth not make a thing morall, but only judgeth and discerneth what is morall; for right reason doth not make a thing suitable, but onely seeth whether it be so or no, a thing may bee suitable before right reason see it, yet when 'tis presented to reason it sees it suitable, as the wall is white before the eye see it, yet when the eye doth see it, it appeares white also: It may bee a meet and comely thing to give God a seventh part of our time, though no mans reason can of it selfe find out such a meet proportion, yet when reason sees it, it's forced to acknowledge a comlinesse of equity, and suitablenesse therein, as shall hereafter appeare.
- 1Suarez metaph. Disp. 10. Sect. 2. Surifing•. de Deo. Tract. 3. Disp. 1. Sect. 32.