3. Such laws which mans reason may see, either by innate light, or by any other external help and light to be just and good and fit for man to observe, such laws are congruous and suitable to humane nature. I say by any external help, as well as by innate light, for neither internal nor external light do make a thing just and suitable to man, no more than the light of the Sun or the light of a Lantern do make the Kings high-way to the City, but they only declare and manifest the way, or that which was so in it self before: Hence it comes to pass that although mans reason cannot see the equity of some laws, antecedenter by innate light, before it be illuminated by some external light, yet if by this external light the mind sees the equity, justice, and holiness of such a law, this may sufficiently argue the morality of such a law, which was just and good, before any light discovered it, and is now discovered only, not made to be so, whether by internal or external light: And hence Aquinas well observes,1 that moral laws (which he makes to be such as are congruous to right reason) sometimes are such, as not only command such things which reason doth, readily see to be comely and meet, but also such laws about which mans reason may readily and easily err and go astray from that which is comely and meet. And hence it is, that although no reason or wit of man could ever have found out the most just and equal proportion of time, or what proportion is most comely and suitable, or that a seventh part of time should have been universally observed as holy to God; yet if any external light and teaching from above, shall reveal this time, and the equity and suitableness of it, so that reason shall acknowledge it equal and good, that if we have six days for our selves, God should have one for himself, this is a strong argument that such a command is moral, because reason thus illuminated cannot but acknowledge it most meet and equal: For though reason may not by any natural or innate light readily see that such a division of time is most suitable, and ⟨p. 20⟩yet may readily err and misconceive the most suitable and convenient proportion and division of time, it's then a sufficient proof of the morality of such a command, if the congruity and equity of it be discerned consequenter only (as we lay) and by external light.
3. Such lawes which mans reason may see, either by innate light, or by any other externall helpe and light to bee just and good and fit for man to observe, such lawes are congruous and suitable to humane nature. I say by any external helpe, as well as by innate light, for neither internall nor externall light doe make a thing just and suitable to man, no more than the light of the Sun or the light of a Lanthorne doe make the Kings high-way to the City, but they onely declare and manifest the way, or that which was so in it selfe before: Hence it comes to passe that although mans reason cannot see the equity of some lawes, antecedenter by innate light, before it bee illuminated by some externall light, yet if by this externall light the minde sees the equity, justice, and holinesse of such a law, this may sufficiently argue the morality of such a law, which was just and good, before any light discovered it, and is now discovered onely, not made to be so, whether by internall or externall light: And hence Aquinas well observes,1 that morall lawes (which hee makes to be such as are congruous to right reason) sometimes are such, as not onely command such things which reason doth, readily see to bee comely and meet, but also such lawes about which mans reason may readily and easily erre and go astray from that which is comely and meet. And hence it is, that although no reason or wit of man could ever have found out the most just and equall proportion of time, or what proportion is most comely and suitable, or that a seventh part of time should have been universally observed as holy to God; yet if any externall light and teaching from above, shall reveale this time, and the equity and suitableness of it, so that reason shall acknowledge it equall and good, that if we have sixe dayes for our selves, God should have one for himselfe, this is a strong argument that such a command is morall, because reason thus illuminated cannot but acknowledge it most meet and equall: For though reason may not by any naturall or innate light readily see that such a division of time is most suitable, and ⟨p. 20⟩yet may readily erre and misconceive the most suitable and convenient proportion and division of time, it's then a sufficient proof of the morality of such a command, if the congruity and equity of it be discerned consequenter only (as we lay) and by externall light.
- 1Aquin. 1.2. q. 99. art. 2. & 100 ar•. •.