Thesis 42.
pp. 34–353 passages
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Thesis 42.
The Judicial laws some of them being hedges and fences to safeguard both moral and ceremonial precepts, their binding power was therefore mixed and various, for those which did safeguard any moral law (which is perpetual) whether by just punishments or otherwise, do still morally bind all Nations:1 For as Piscator argues, a moral law is as good and as precious now in these times as then, and there is as much need of the preservation of these fences to preserve these laws, in these times, and at all times, as well as then, there being as much danger of the treading down of those laws by the wild beasts of the world, and brutish men (sometimes even in Churches) now as then; and hence God would have all Nations preserve these fences for ever, as he would have that law preserved for ever which these safeguard: but on the other side these judicials which did safeguard ceremonial laws, which we know were not perpetual, but proper to that Nation, hence those judicials which compass these about are not perpetual nor universal; the ceremonials being plucked up by their roots, to what purpose then should their fences and hedges stand? As on the contrary the morals abiding, why should not their judicials and fences remain? The learned generally doubt not to affirm, that Moses judicials bind all nations, so far forth as they contain any moral equity in them, which moral equity doth appear, not only in respect of the end of the law, when it is ordered for common and universal good, but chiefly in respect of the law which they safeguard and fence,2 which if it be moral, it's most just and equal, that either the same or like judicial fence (according to some fit proportion) should preserve it still, because 'tis but just and equal, that a moral and universal law should be universally preserved: from whence ⟨p. 35⟩by the way, the weakness of their reasonings may be observed, who that they may take away the power of the civill Magistrate in matters of the first Table (which once he had in the Jewish common-wealth) affirm that such civill power, then, did arise from the judicial, and not from any moral law: when as it's manifest that this his power in preserving Gods worship pure from Idolatrous and profane mixtures, according to the judicial laws, was no more but a fence and safeguard set about moral Commandments;
The Iudiciall lawes some of them being hedges and fences to safeguard both morall and ceremoniall precepts, their binding power was therefore mixt and various, for those which did safeguard any morall law (which is perpetuall) whether by just punishments or otherwise, doe still morally binde all Nations:1 For as Piscator argues, a morall law is as good and as precious now in these times as then, and there is as much need of the preservation of these fences to preserve these lawes, in these times, and at all times, as well as then, there being as much danger of the treading downe of those lawes by the wilde beasts of the world, and brutish men (sometimes even in Churches) now as then; and hence God would have all Nations preserve these fences for ever, as hee would have that law preserved for ever which these safeguard: but on the other side these judicialls which did safeguard ceremoniall laws, which wee know were not perpetuall, but proper to that Nation, hence those judicials which compasse these about are not perpetuall nor universall; the ceremonialls being pluckt up by their roots, to what purpose then should their fences and hedges stand? As on the contrary the morals abiding, why should not their judicials and fences remaine? The learned generally doubt not to affirme, that Moses judicials binde all nations, so farre forth as they containe any morall equity in them, which morall equity doth appeare, not onely in respect of the end of the law, when it is ordered for common and universall good, but chiefely in respect of the law which they safeguard and fence,2 which if it bee morall, it's most just and equall, that either the same or like judiciall fence (according to some fit proportion) should preserve it still, because 'tis but just and equall, that a morall and universall law should bee universally preserved: from whence ⟨p. 35⟩by the way, the weaknesse of their reasonings may bee observed, who that they may take away the power of the civill Magistrate in matters of the first Table (which once he had in the Jewish common-wealth) affirm that such civill power, then, did arise from the judiciall, and not from any morall law: when as it's manifest that this his power in preserving Gods worship pure from Idolatrous and prophane mixtures, according to the judiciall lawes, was no more but a fence and safeguard set about morall Commandments;
- 1Pisc. pr•fat. on Exod.
- 2Vid. Pisc. prof. in Exod. Vid Jun. de Pol. Mos.Vid. Pisc. pr•f. in Exod. Vid Iun. de Pol. Mos.
which fences and preservatives are therefore (for substance) to continue in as much power and authority now, as they did in those days, as long as such laws continue in their morality, which these preserve: the duties of the first Table being also as much moral as those of the second, to the preserving of which later from hurt and spoil in respect of their morality, no wise man questions the extent of his power.
which fences and preservatives are therfore (for substance) to continue in as much power and authority now, as they did in those dayes, as long as such lawes continue in their morality, which these preserve: the duties of the first Table being also as much morall as those of the second, to the preserving of which later from hurt and spoil in respect of their morality, no wise man questions the extent of his power.