JEANS.IEANES.
pp. 2193 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
JEANS.
IEANES.
First, Arminius tells you, that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint. Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra, sufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius causae necessariae absentiâ. And if this be true, then permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things so permitted to pass, which will actually bring them to pass if they be not hindered; and consequently a permissive decree doth, though not suppose (that's not our language) yet, infer the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes.
FIrst, Arminius tells you, that the absence of one necessary cause is sufficient to denominate a restraint. Ad productionem effecti requiritur causa integra, sufficiente ad ejus impedimentum unius causae necessariae absentiâ. And if this be true, then permission doth imply a concurrence of causes simply requisite and necessary, for the bringing of things so permitted to passe, which will actually bring them to passe if they be not hindered; and consequently a permissive decree doth, though not suppose (that's not our language) yet, inferre the futurity of such a presence of all requisite and necessary causes.
Besides Secondly, Scheibler Met. lib. 1. c. 14. t. 2. p. 2. n. 44. out of Zabarell acquaints us, how restraint is sometimes taken privatively, pro privation actionis inferendae, and absence not only of one requisite and necessary cause, but also of one necessary condition is sufficient to denominate such a restraint: Sic distantia loci (saith he) impedit ne ignis calefaciat aliquod corpus, non quasi distantia illa habeat efficientiam, vel influxum aliquem, sed solum distantia illa dicit privationem actionis in igne, & passionis in calefactibili. In regard of this acception of restraint, fire cannot be said to be permitted to burn combustible matter, unless there be an approximation of the fire unto the said combustible matter, for distance of place hinders the fire from burning: distance of place between fire and a barrel of Gunpowder, doth hinder the fire from firing or blowing up that barrel of Gunpowder, if you take hinderance or restraint in such a sense as Scheibler speaks of: Answerably unto which fire cannot be said to be permitted to fire or blow up such a barrel of Gunpowder, between which, and it, there is such a distance.