Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.
pp. 220–2212 passages
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Mr GOODWIN, pag. 29. cap. 3. Sect. 2.
That Prescience or fore-knowledge are not formally or properly in 1God, is the constant assertion, both of ancient and modern Divinity The learned Assertours of the Protestant cause are at perfect agreement with their Adversaries the Schoolmen, and Papists, in this. Nor is it any wonder at all, that there should be peace, and a concurrence of Judgement about such a point as this; even between those, who have many Irons of ⟨p. 221⟩contention otherwise in the fire, considering how obvious, and near at hand, the truth herein is. For 1. If foreknowledge were Properly and formally in God, then might Predestination, Election, Reprobation, and many other 2things be properly and formally in him also; in as much as these are, in the letter and propriety of them, as competible unto him as foreknowledge. Nor can there be any reason given for a difference. But unpossible it is that there should be any Plurality of things whatsoever, in their distinct and proper natures, and formalities, in God, the infinite simplicity of his nature and being, with open mouth gainsaying it. 2ly If foreknowledge were properly, or formally in God, there should be somewhat in him corruptible, or changeable. For that 3which is supposed to be such a fore-knowledge in him to day, by the morrow, suppose the thing, or event fore-known, should in the interim actually come to pass, must needs cease, and be changed; in as much as there can be no foreknowledge of things that are present, the adequate and appropriate object of this knowledge (in the Propriety of it) being res futura somewhat that is to come. Thirdly (and lastly) there is nothing in the Creature univocally and formally the same, with any thing which is in God. The reason is; because then, there must either be somewhat finite in God, or somewhat infinite in the Creature: both which are unpossible. But if Prescience or fore-knowledge, being properly and formally in the Creature, should be properly and formally also in God, there should be somewhat in the Creature, univocally and formally the same, with somewhat, which is in God. Therefore certainly there is no fore-knowledge, properly so called, in God.