JEANS.IEANES.

JEANS.

IEANES.

First, here you make to will and to command terms equivalent or Synonymous (as you do afterwards to will and to enjoin) which is very unreasonable, for 'tis the very thing in question, and D. Twice affirmeth, that to command is to will only improperly, and therefore equivocally. For you then to use to Will and Command, as words of the same import and signification, before you have proved them to be so, serves for nothing but to breed confusion, distract the Reader, and disturb the course of Disputation.

FIrst, here you make to will and to command termes equivalent or Synonimous (as you doe afterwards to will and to injoyne) which is very unreasonable, for 'tis the very thing in question, and D. Twisse affirmeth, that to command is to will only improperly, and therefore equivocally. For you then to use to Will and Command, as words of the same import and signification, before you have proved them to be so, serves for nothing but to breed confusion, distract the Reader, and disturbe the course of Disputation.

Secondly, I confess that the will wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, is as properly his will, as that, whereby he willeth or decreeth things to be done; for they are one and the same will really, distinguished only ratione ratiocinat•, by their objects, in regard of our manner of conceiving. And if any one in imitation of your subtlety in the following part of this Section, should object, that acts are differenced, and distinguished by their objects, therefore if the object of that will, wherewith, or out of which God commandeth us to do that which is our duty to do, be really distinguished from the object of that will, whereby he decreeth things to be done, unpossible it is, but that these two wills of his, should be also really distinguished, I shall for answer refer them unto Ferrariensis upon Aquinas contra gentes lib. 1. c. 77. Adverte quod ex ista probatione (viz.) (that actus secundum objecta distinguntur) vult habere, S. Tho. quod distinguibile proportionatum objecto est actus; & ideo si plura objecta faciant aliquam pluralitatem, illa erit actuum pluralitas: Non autem intendit, quod per quaecunque plura objecta plurificentur actus. Unde sensus illius propositionis est, quod actus est id quod proprie & primo plurificatur, quando pluralitas objectorum aliquam pluralitatem inducit. The sense of this proposition, Acts are differenced and distinguished by their objects, is, that if many, or different objects do infer any plurality or distinction, 'tis only of acts; not that every plurality, or distinction of objects doth always argue a plurality or distinction of acts.