1. If Gods decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is ascribed unto God, not as a power distinct from the act, but as an act not elicit but subsisting: And here I shall give you the words and reasons of Suarez, then whom there are few Modern Schoolmen more rational. He having proved that the will is not in God per modum potentiae secundum rem, sed per modum actus ultimi & puri, he propounds the doubt secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum, wherein hear his resolution. In hoc eodem modo loquendum est, quo de intellectu & scientià locuti sumus, quod scilicet ex parte rei conceptae, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non potest concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi potest quod sit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptae involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere secundum rationem, non est agere, sed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, scilicet virtutem amandi se, ut sic, quam praescindimus ab actuali amore, sicut de actu primo & secundo in scientia diximus.
1. If Gods decrees were properly acts of his will, then his will were properly a power, But his will is not properly a power, for will is ascribed unto God, not as a power distinct from the act, but as an act not elicite but subsisting: And here I shall give you the words and reasons of Suarez, then whom there are few Moderne Schoolemen more rationall. He having proved that the will is not in God per modum potentiae secundum rem, sed per modum actus ultimi & puri, he propounds the doubt secundum rationem, & modum concipiendi nostrum, wherein heare his resolution. In hoc eodem modo loquendum est, quo de intellectu & scientià locuti sumus, quod scilicet ex parte rei conceptae, non potest concipi potentia volendi in Deo, quia non potest concipi potentia agendi vel recipiendi ad intra. Nec fingi potest quod sit potentia ad agendum & recipiendum, non secundum rem, sed secundum rationem; quia loquendo ex parte rei conceptae involvitur repugnantia in his terminis; nam agere secundum rationem, non est agere, sed fingere actionem. Ex parte autem modi concipiendi nostri, concipimus in Deo aliquid ad eum modum, quo in creaturis concipimus potentiam volendi, scilicet virtutem amandi se, ut sic, quam praescindimus ab actuali amore, sicut de actu primo & secundo in scientia diximus.