But if God bestows faith on man upon consideration of some precedent work of his, which was ⟨p. 45⟩not the work of God, then (and not otherwise neither) it will follow, that upon the consideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or predestinate faith unto him. So that if we desire sincerely and ingeniously to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the absoluteness of predestination, we should state the question as touching Predestination unto faith, and not as touching Predestination unto salvation. For we all confess that God predestinated no man unto salvation, but such as he foresaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe sooner or later. And therefore the main question between the Remonstrants and Contraremonstrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predestination, and whether there were not another decree of Predestination besides, as namely, whether God did not decree to bestow faith on some, and deny it unto others. And secondly to inquire, Whether this decree of bestowing faith on some, did not proceed according to Gods good pleasure, without consideration of any different work in man. And the most compendious resolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himself in the bestowing of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his mere pleasure he hath not mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance, and of his mere pleasure, denies the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whosoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their suffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the first Synod that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had disturbed it, namely, Gratiam non dari secundum merita, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, Gratiam non dari secundum opera. Lastly, all of us now a days consent, as 1touching Gods concourse to the substance of every act of the creature whether good or evil. Now let this Author or any other, represent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to answer particularly, according to this Authors text.
But if God bestowes faith on man upon consideration of some precedent work of his, which was ⟨p. 45⟩not the work of God, then (and not otherwise neither) it will follow, that upon the consideration of that future work of man, God did elect him unto faith, or predestinate faith unto him. So that if we desire sincerely and ingeniously to inquire what was the opinion of the Ancients about the absolutenesse of predestination, we should state the question as touching Predestination unto faith, and not as touching Predestination unto salvation. For we all confesse that God predestinated no man unto salvation, but such as he foresaw, coming unto ripe years, would believe sooner or later. And therefore the main question between the Remonstrants and Contraremonstrants was, whether this decree were the whole decree of Predestination, and whether there were not another decree of Predestination besides, as namely, whether God did not decree to bestow faith on some, and deny it unto others. And secondly to inquire, Whether this decree of bestowing faith on some, did not proceed according to Gods good pleasure, without consideration of any different work in man. And the most compendious resolution hereof, is to inquire of the manner how God carrieth himselfe in the bestowing of faith and repentance on some, and denying it unto others; as namely, Whether on his meer pleasure he hath not mercy on some, giving them faith and repentance, and of his meer pleasure, denyes the gift of faith and repentance unto others. Now let the Fathers, (whosoever thinks good) be admitted to bring in their suffrages on this Article, and remember what was decreed in the first Synode that was gathered, to make peace in the Church after Pelagius had disturbed it, namely, Gratiam non dari secundum merita, that is, as Bellarmine acknowledgeth, Gratiam non dari secundum opera. Lastly, all of us now a daies consent, as 1touching Gods concourse to the substance of every act of the creature whether good or evill. Now let this Author or any other, represent unto us, what footing he finds in Antiquity concerning this. But I come to answer particularly, according to this Authors text.
- 1De Grat. & lib. Arbitr. l. 6. c. 5.