because God is indivisible: Wherefore it is not well said, that the person is a part of the essence, or the essence consisteth of three persons; for every person is the whole divine essence, one and the same. Neither is it as the general to the special; because essence is not the general to the three persons, nor person a special to essence. But God is a more common name, because the essence of the Deity is common to the three persons, and therefore may be affirmed of each of them. But these names, Father, Son, and holy Ghost are more strict, because the persons are indeed distinct, and cannot be affirmed the one of the other. Therefore it is well said, God, or the divine Essence is the Father, is the Son, is the holy Ghost: Likewise, The three persons are one God, or in one God. Again, They are one and the same essence, nature, divinity, wisdom, &c. They are of one and the same essence, nature, divinity, &c. Yet it cannot be well said, They are of one God: because there is no one of these persons but is whole and perfect God. Wherefore the divine essence is, in respect of the persons, as a thing after a rare and singular manner communicated, in respect of those things unto which it is common: For neither is there the like example of community in any created things. For a general is a certain thing common to many specials, and a general and special to many individuals; but yet so, that they are affirmed of those many plurally, not singularly: as that the father and the son (or, this father and son) are two living creatures, two men. But we may not speak after this sort of God and the divine persons, as to say, The Father and the Son are two Gods, two Spirits, two Omnipotents, &c. Because there is but one God, one Spirit, one Omnipotent, &c. Wherefore that affirmation, The Father is God, the Son is God, the holy Ghost is God, is a true affirmation, affirming that which is more common of a thing which is more restrict: that is, affirming the essence of the individual; which hath in some sort an analogy and proportion only with the special affirmed of his individual, but it is not at all the same, nor of the same kind.
because God is indivisible: Wherefore it is not well said, that the person is a part of the essence, or the essence consisteth of three persons; for every person is the whole divine essence, one and the same. Neither is it as the generall to the speciall; because essence is not the generall to the three persons, nor person a speciall to essence. But God is a more common name, because the essence of the Deity is common to the three persons, and therefore may be affirmed of each of them. But these names, Father, Son, and holy Ghost are more strict, because the persons are indeed distinct, and cannot be affirmed the one of the other. Therefore it is well said, God, or the divine Essence is the Father, is the Son, is the holy Ghost: Likewise, The three persons are one God, or in one God. Again, They are one and the same essence, nature, divinity, wisdome, &c. They are of one and the same essence, nature, divinity, &c. Yet it cannot be well said, They are of one God: because there is no one of these persons but is whole and perfect God. Wherefore the divine essence is, in respect of the persons, as a thing after a rare and singular manner communicated, in respect of those things unto which it is common: For neither is there the like example of community in any created things. For a generall is a certain thing common to many specials, and a generall and speciall to many individuals; but yet so, that they are affirmed of those many plurally, not singularly: as that the father and the son (or, this father and son) are two living creatures, two men. But we may not speak after this sort of God and the divine persons, as to say, The Father and the Son are two Gods, two Spirits, two Omnipotents, &c. Because there is but one God, one Spirit, one Omnipotent, &c. Wherefore that affirmation, The Father is God, the Son is God, the holy Ghost is God, is a true affirmation, affirming that which is more common of a thing which is more restrict: that is, affirming the essence of the individuall; which hath in some sort an analogy and proportion only with the speciall affirmed of his individuall, but it is not at all the same, nor of the same kind.