Forasmuch as God is in himself eternal, infinite, and incomprehensible, the first cause of all causes and effects, there can no definition be given of him; seeing every definition is an explication of the nature of the thing defined by words expressing the material and formal cause thereof, but of the first cause there can be no causes, therefore no words to express them; for these over-reaching terms of thing, being, somewhat, nature, &c. which seem to contain the Word of God as well as all other things created by him, do not express any material cause of God, neither do they contain these words God and creature, as the general doth his specials or kinds, but are spoken of them equivocally, so that the term only, and not the definition of the term doth agree to them; for in the kinds or specials of one general there is no priority of nature, as is between the cause and effect, ⟨p. 32⟩neither is this word Cause affirmed of God, but as a term of the art of Logic; and if substance be that which upholdeth accidents, as Aristotle teacheth, neither may God be called a substance, for that in him are no accidents, but if substance be taken generally for a being, it may be said that God is a substance, yet none otherwise then as he is a being, thing, nature, &c. And if there be no material cause, there can be no formal cause of God; for although we read in the Scripture the form of God, Phil. 2. 6. yet the form is not there taken for any cause of God: but either for that which God indeed is, or for that glory which of right belongeth unto him; for in speaking of God, whom no words of man are able to express, the holy Ghost oftentimes condescending to the weakness of our understanding, useth such terms, as being known to men, do signify something that is like to that, which God indeed is of himself, that we may understand so much as is expedient for us to know of him.
Forasmuch as God is in himself eternall, infinite, and incomprehensible, the first cause of all causes and effects, there can no definition be given of him; seeing every definition is an explication of the nature of the thing defined by words expressing the materiall and formall cause thereof, but of the first cause there can be no causes, therefore no words to expresse them; for these over-reaching tearms of thing, beeing, somewhat, nature, &c. which seem to contain the Word of God as well as all other things created by him, doe not expresse any materiall cause of God, neither doe they contain these words God and creature, as the generall doth his specials or kinds, but are spoken of them equivocally, so that the tearm onely, and not the definition of the tearm doth agree to them; for in the kinds or specials of one generall there is no priority of nature, as is between the cause and effect, ⟨p. 32⟩neither is this word Cause affirmed of God, but as a tearm of the art of Logick; and if substance be that which upholdeth accidents, as Aristotle teacheth, neither may God be called a substance, for that in him are no accidents, but if substance be taken generally for a beeing, it may be said that God is a substance, yet none otherwise then as he is a beeing, thing, nature, &c. And if there be no materiall cause, there can be no formall cause of God; for although we reade in the Scripture the form of God, Phil. 2. 6. yet the form is not there taken for any cause of God: but either for that which God indeed is, or for that glory which of right belongeth unto him; for in speaking of God, whom no words of man are able to expresse, the holy Ghost oftentimes condescending to the weaknesse of our understanding, useth such tearms, as being known to men, doe signifie something that is like to that, which God indeed is of himself, that we may understand so much as is expedient for us to know of him.