A01540:160
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. For if God had opened his eyes, he might have seen plainly, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Civill affairs; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be used in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set purpose to employ God but as it may stand with his pleasure.
I. B. For if God had opened his eyes, he might haue seene plainely, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Ciuill affaires; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be vsed in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set purpose to imploy God but as it may stand with his pleasure.
T. G. 1. I marvel then why many others sharper sighted than Mr. G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as Mr. B's, do not see it. 2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argument? unless the denying of the Conclusion be a legal kind of Answer.
T. G. 1. I maruell then why many others sharper sighted than Mr. G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as Mr. Bs, doe not see it. 2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argument? vnlesse the denying of the Conclusion be a legall kinde of Answer.
I. B. Hereof more hereafter. In mean while, in further answer to this Argument, I deny the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily used in other Civill matters, yet not for matter of recreation. Whereof also more hereafter.
I. B. Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in further answer to this Argument, I denie the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for matter of recreation. Whereof also more hereafter.