A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…

T. G. Mr. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratively not for the casual event applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein used. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense. For his denial he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembered well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption. The Proposition is this, as himself also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto▪ Will any man that hath common sense, beside Mr. B. deny this Proposition, or require a proof of it? If any do, I will for my part ⟨p. 70⟩deal no more further with such an one, than ^awith one that denieth principles. The Assumption is this, The lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot. This Mr. B. denieth too, and by denying it therefore, it seemeth his denial is grounded upon his former distinction; which yet he seemeth to apply not to the Proposition it self denied, but to the antecedent of the proof, to wit, that a Lot is a matter of great uncertainty. To which he answereth, that a Lot in relation to the Creature used in it is casual; in relation to Gods whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which place will come to be examined hereafter in his due place) is certain. If his meaning be this, that it is uncertain in regard of the Creature either using it or used in it, but certain in regard of God in his providence disposing it, who either doubteth of the one, or denieth the other? or what is said more of a Lot herein than is true ^bof any contingent Act, whether casual or other? But if his meaning be that God doth certainly ever dispose every Lot according to the nature of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the better part in a division unequally made, shall go with him that hath the better right the office in an election, with him that is fittest for it:

T. G. Mr. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratiuely not for the casuall euent applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein vsed. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense. For his deniall he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembred well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption. The Proposition is this, as himselfe also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto Will any man that hath common sense, beside Mr. B. denie this Proposition, or require a proofe of it? If any doe, I will for my part