A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…

I. B. The former is not true, except Mr. G. understand a matter of mere indifferency controverted. For though such a matter may be the Subject matter of a Controversy, yet a matter controverted is the only subject matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as Mr. G. truly writeth even in this case, p. 167. If Mr. G. so understand, then there it some necessity of ending the Controversy put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then merely in the will of a man whether he shall do it, or not do it.

I. B. The former is not true, except Mr. G. vnderstand a matter of meere indifferencie controuerted. For though such a matter may be the Subiect matter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controuerted is the onely subiect matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as Mr. G. truly writeth euen in this case, p. 167. If Mr. G. so vnderstand, then there it some necessitie of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then meerely in the will of a man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it.

T. G. That I say there is no Lot, where no Controversy is, is untrue. I say only, Where no question or Controversy is. For a question may be where a Controversy is not. Since that a Controversy is properly ^ca Question between two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But unless some such controversy be about the matter of indifferency to be done or not done, my former fore-piece, saith Mr. B. it not true. If it be then, belike it is. What Mr. B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferency so to the ⟨p. 81⟩hazard of an uncertain event, in a matter of controversy is lawful. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controversy, it is not lawful. The reason he giveth why it is lawful in the former, is because there is some necessity then of ending the controversy put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then merely in the will of man whether he shall do it, or not do it. Where 1. Mr. B. is too busy with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that wheresoever any Controversy is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so untrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other means also be decided. 3. He misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous event, whereas my words are plain of the doing or not doing the thing it self, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be lawful, that no way hurteth me. The reason he rendereth why it is unlawful in the latter is, because such a matter unless it be controverted, cannot be the subject matter of a Lot; which we have nothing yet to do withal. And the words therefore, as they are untrue, nor do I any where so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the present Proposition. Here is Mr. Bs. Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controversy is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferency to the hazard of some casual event whether it shall be