T. G. Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightness of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the use of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirm the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be used in any weighty affair; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margin may there show; nor do I nakedly affirm it, but add something to strengthen it: And Mr. B. though he have oft again and again carped at it, yet neither offereth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirm now further, what Mr. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightiness of the business, in regard of the event, maketh Lottery the less lawful, nor to be condescended unto without very great necessity, and to be used with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needful in it. And I say therefore the less lawful in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so using it, or in those that urge the use of it, when in such case ⟨p. 85⟩it is condescended unto. The reason is evident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the event of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may prove well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconvenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconvenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the event. If it must needs then produce such inconvenience if it do fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter upon hazard of such inconvenience. But to put the matter upon the hazard of a Lot, is to put it upon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make use of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it upon hazard of much inconvenience. Which to do (as some say of an Oath in some cases) fit either is evil, or it is of evil;
T. G. Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightnesse of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the vse of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirme the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margine may there shew; nor doe I nakedly affirme it, but adde something to strengthen it: And Mr. B. though he haue oft againe and againe carp•d at it, yet neither offreth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirme now further, what Mr. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightinesse of the businesse, in regard of the euent, maketh Lotterie the lesse lawfull, nor to be condescended vnto without very great necessitie, and to be vsed with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needfull in it. And I say therefore the lesse lawfull in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so vsing it, or in those that vrge the vse of it, when in such case ⟨p. 85⟩it is condescended vnto. The reason is euident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the euent of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may proue well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconuenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconuenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the euent. If it must needs then produce such inconuenience if it doe fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter vpon hazard of such inconuenience. But to put the matter vpon the hazard of a Lot, is to put it vpon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make vse of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it vpon hazard of much inconuenience. Which to doe (as some say of an Oath in some cases) fit either is euill, or it is of euill;
- fAut malum est, aut à malo. Matth. 5. 37. Non ait, qui amplus facit, malus est; vel siquid sit amplius malum est: sed quod amplius est à malo est. sed quaere cujus; & si non à malo jurantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine justa causa offertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exigitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Janse•. concord. Evang. c. 40. Ex bominum vitijs oritur, quia simplicitatem non colunt. Calvin. harmon. Evang.Aut malum est, aut à malo. Matth. 5. 37. Non ait, qui amplus facit, malus est; vel siquid sit amplius malum est: sed quod amplius est à malo est. sed quaere cujus; & si non à malo jurantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine justa causa offertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exigitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Ianse•. concord. Euang. c. 40. Ex bominum vitijs oritur, quia simplicitatem non colunt. Calvin. harmon. Euang.