A01540:199
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casual event, as there is no Controversy of. For it is frivolous for one to say, it is not lawful for a man to do that, which by his own grounds and grants is impossible.
therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casuall euent, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is friuolous for one to say, it is not lawfull for a man to doe that, which by his owne grounds and grants is impossible.
I. B. In the other piece I observe, that Mr. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be uncertain. Which is begging the question, for the reason given to his former shaped Argument.
I. B. In the other peece I obserue, that Mr. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason giuen to his former shaped Argument.
T. G. I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casual, or as dMr. B. himself speaketh, a various event, used for the deciding of some doubt. The using, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left undone, is the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition following necessarily from it.
T. G. I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casuall, or as