A01540:319
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. G. Or rather is not this foppery? Mr. G. slideth from the subject matter and manner to circumstances only, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning indeed the subject matter, as Mr. B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words do not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I join that word with them; Are not the subject matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and without the essence and substance of those things that they have reference unto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amiss, rthat refer the Place and the Subject matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a circumstance, I know not what is. But if it be true of these, saith Mr. B. that they are at the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawful in it self, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtless doth it; what reason can either Mr. B. or any other show why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more stinted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that useth a thing lawful in it self? This is another of Mr. Bs. spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to show his skill in conjuring them down again. Yea but Mr. B. can show you some difference ⟨p. 130⟩between the one and the other. For, If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done. And must there not be Subject-matter and manner too? Or must not a man have warrant as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith Mr. B. for I hope he will not deny that. Well what warrant then? It may be done when, and where there is just occasion of that act: and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is just occasion thereof offered? So that Mr. B. denieth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some Circumstances; only he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are no Circumstances. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that warrant from the word is required for the one as well and as much as for the other. But I leave this his frivolous sbeating the air: having only observed, how Mr. B.