And it is a certain truth, that ya Reverend Divine hath, that In every action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or question is made by any) to find out some sentence clearly and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to do, seem we in Scripture never so expert, would trouble us more than we are aware.
To reflect upon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans actions ought to be grounded upon it, since that they are all lawful or unlawful so far forth as they are either consonant unto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulness whereof may be demonstrated much more readily from some other, either proofs of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from ⟨p. 138⟩any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft do the 2best and religiousest Divines resolve Cases of Conscience concerning Civill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?
Yea but, saith Mr. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his persuasion he have sufficient direction from natural Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it do not, as it doth not, I might well return it to Mr. B. and request him to return an answer to it himself. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seek further for it, save for the further strengthening of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsely persuaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsely persuaded of sufficient direction either from natural Reason, or the written word, ahe hath just cause to look further, though he be not aware of it.
But doth that Maxim, What is not of faith is […], intimate, that whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natural Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor do I, as Mr. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoever is so done […] of faith: because whatsoever is so done, as before was showed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.
Yea but natural Reason is not defective only, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so utterly defaced ⟨p. 139⟩that there is nothing left of it, that a man can have any certainty at all of?
And it is a certaine truth, that ya Reuerend Diuine hath, that In euery action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or question is made by any) to finde out some sentence clearely and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to doe, seeme we in Scripture neuer so expert, would trouble vs more than we are aware.
To reflect vpon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans actions ought to be grounded vpon it, since that they are all lawfull or vnlawfull so far forth as they are either consonant vnto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulnesse whereof may be demonstrated much more readily from some other, either proofes of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from ⟨p. 138⟩any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft doe the 2best and religiousest Diuines resolue Cases of Conscience concerning Ciuill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?
Yea but, saith Mr. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion hee haue sufficient direction from naturall Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it doe not, as it doth not, I might well returne it to Mr. B. and request him to returne an answer to it himselfe. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seeke further for it, saue for the further strengthning of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsly perswaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsly perswaded of sufficient direction either from naturall Reason, or the written word, ahee hath iust cause to looke further, though he be not aware of it.
But doth that Maxime, What is not of faith is 〈…〉, intimate, that whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor doe I, as Mr. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoeuer is so done 〈…〉 of faith: because whatsoeuer is so done, as before was shewed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.
Yea but naturall Reason is not defectiue onely, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so vtterly defaced ⟨p. 139⟩that there is nothing left of it, that a man can haue any certainty at all of?
- yMr. Hooker of Eccles. Polity, lib. 2. sect. 8.Mr. Hooker of Eccles. Politie, lib. 2. sect. 8.
- 2Read Mr. Perkins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Callings, &c.Reade Mr. Perkins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Callings, &c.
- aConscientia siquidem […] non excusat.Conscientia siquidem 〈…〉 non excusat.