A01540:320
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
that was so diligent to hook in out of the Margin whatsoever he thought he might with any the least show of colour, (though without any just occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it self that I press, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossibility, which by instances I show, of making particular actions good, or justifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue upon the denial hereof. Which I desire by the unpartial and judicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I do, and taketh occasion thereby to deal with, and rather than he will let it pass, he will step aside into the ⟨p. 131⟩Margin to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not go far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.
that was so diligent to hooke in out of the Margine whatsoeuer he thought he might with any the least shew of colour, (though without any iust occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it selfe that I presse, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossibilitie, which by instances I shew, of making particular actions good, or iustifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue vpon the deniall hereof. Which I desire by the vnpartiall and iudicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I doe, and taketh occasion thereby to deale with, and rather than he will let it passe, he will step aside into the ⟨p. 131⟩Margine to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not goe far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.
I. B. Let us now proceed to that, which Mr. G. writeth touching both the doing of every Act, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the word, if natural reason of it self afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearful shifting from the word is here? But why doth he join the doing it self of an Act with the manner thereof? Isle tell you: even to make a way to his Assumption. For if he stick close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it self is lawful in it self, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expressly or by just consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his Assumption, that every Lot is not lawful in it self. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of natural reason, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he showeth no direction therein of natural reason either sufficient or insufficient.