A01540:323
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. But let us with fear and trembling consider Mr. Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction.] Let us consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is given us, in moral matters to supply the defect of natural reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seek sufficient direction in moral matters from natural reason, before we consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times urged thus. I say, where natural reason doth not of it self afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his persuasion he have sufficient direction from natural reason? Doth the Maxim of Gods Spirit, quoted here by Mr. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sin,] intimate, that1 whatsoever is done by sufficient direction from natural reason is of faith? Became natural reason only ⟨p. 134⟩defective, and not corrupted also by our first Parents2 their fall? O God have mercy upon us! For I see that the wisdom of the flesh is enmity against thee: for it is not subject to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why do I vex my soul with this fearful doctrine, seeing Mr. Gs. heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For at last he cometh to say: Neither doth the word abridge us of the help and use of natural Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authority (to wit, Of not abridging us of the help, &c.) given to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge us, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth give us leave to use the direction of natural reason in moral matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margin.
I. B. But let vs with feare and trembling consider Mr. Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction.] Let vs consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is giuen vs, in morall matters to supplie the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction in morall matters from naturall reason, before wee consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times vrged thus. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion he haue sufficient direction from naturall reason? Doth the Maxime of Gods Spirit, quoted here by Mr. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sinne,] intimate, that