A01540:324
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. G. The strange and fearful Position, as Mr. B. conceiveth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliver it my self; For the doing of every act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the difference between these two be demanded; I answer: First, Mr. Bs. Proposition may seem to imply, that in any Act whatsoever sufficient direction may ⟨p. 135⟩by natural Reason be afforded, (which I say not:) in mine only, that in some kind and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) Mr. B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater prejudice to that that I hold. Again, (wherein the most material difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to have warrant from Gods word, (which I deny not but that every action ought to have) and another thing to have that warrant taken immediately out of it; as shall afterward appear. So that neither doth Mr. B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor do I affirm what he here relateth. Yet for the point, as Mr. B. here propoundeth it, saving what he would seem to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the envy of; the Proposition it self containeth such an undeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with common sense, but will acknowledge it. For if Natural Reason of it self afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was even so with Adam in his original estate. If any truth undeniable then be fearful and strange then this position peradventure may be such; but not else. But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deal not) that for the doing of every act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if natural reason will not of it self afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the question be demanded, why I speak in this manner, I answer, ⟨p. 136⟩because many things in this kind are so clear and evident even to natural reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may unanswerably and necessarily be thereby concluded;
T. G. The strange and fearefull Position, as Mr. B. conceiueth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliuer it my selfe; For the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the difference betweene these two be demanded; I answer: First, Mr. Bs. Proposition may seeme to imply, that in any Act whatsoeuer sufficient direction may