A01540:327
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
bNo Sect of Philosophers was ever held more absurd, than those that held that men had no certain knowledge of any thing. For moral grounds it seemeth Mr. B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be upheld. For if natural reason be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence concluded concerning the lawfulness or unlawfulness of ought, then it is certain that there is no certain knowledge of ought in that kind; and nothing is certain therein, but that all things are utterly and universally uncertain. That creverend Divine before mentioned, hath not amiss observed, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in mens minds, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of mens lives, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordinary and civill affairs, if this light be suppressed, and men should ever be constrained, though it burnt never so clearly, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solemn access still unto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I add further; since that the most of mens particular actions, which they must have ground for being infinite, are not expressly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore have their warrant by consequences deducted from it, in which ⟨p. 140⟩deduction, sometime da natural principle is joined with a testimony of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though etwo places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllogistical form joined together, may truly and infallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is fnatural Reason that must judge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of judicature from natural Reason in such cases, and we shall have no certainty left of the lawfulness of ought, that is not in express terms comprised in Scripture. I might well add, that by this Mr. Bs. manner of reasoning, an utter uncertainty might be concluded even of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that do not exactly understand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Natural Reason is in part defective and corrupted: and therefore it cannot certainly inform us of ought: