A01540:422
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
T. G. ⟨p. 186⟩Though I needed not to give any: hhe that saith it, should prove it: yet I give indeed not two only; but more than two, if Mr. B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I give these.
T. G. ⟨p. 186⟩Though I needed not to giue any: hhe that saith it, should proue it: yet I giue indeed not two onely; but more than two, if Mr. B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I giue these.
- hAffirmanti incumbit probatio. Negans probare non tenetur. Reiswich. reg. Jur.Affirmanti incumbit probatio. Negans probare nō tenetur. Reiswich. reg. Iur.
I. B. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate providence in a Lot, as it is casual, then there is an immediate providence in all things that are casual. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to us, is a certain word of God (saith Bernard,1 but Mr. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting us with his will, p. 17. and, In casual events there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence, p. 22.
I. B. The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate prouidence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate prouidence in all things that are casuall. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God (saith Bernard,