A01540:533
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and…
A just defence of certain passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and use of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have been made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiency of his answers given to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecility of his arguments produced against the same further discovered; and the point it self in controversy more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.
London: printed by John Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623London: printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, 1623
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
I. B. Well; then let us consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not enjoined? What? Is Recreation (in general) enjoined by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by just consequence? as Mr. G. in his allowance of lusorious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so useful an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controversies, enjoined by precept, either directly or by just consequence? Doth God more carefully provide for recreations, than for peace among his people? But Mr. G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135. where he saith: The use of Lots is not simply commanded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission ⟨p. 226⟩than a precept; and not so much a commandment, as an advice and counsel. I will come to an issue. If it will please Mr. G. to set down his just consequence to prove Recreation enjoined by precept, I will undertake to set down as just a consequence to prove, that a Lot to end a Controversy is likewise enjoined by precept. In mean while, I cannot be persuaded, that our God of peace, who commandeth us to seek peace1 and follow after it, and hath ordained a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate providence, to end controversies, which otherwise cannot be ended conveniently, doth leave us at liberty in that case, to use or not to use a Lot.
I. B. Well; then let vs consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned? What? Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by iust consequence? as Mr. G. in his allowance of lusorious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so vsefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controuersies, inioyned by precept, either directly or by iust consequence? Doth God more carefully prouide for recreations, than for peace among his people? But Mr. G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135. where he saith: The vse of Lots is not simply commanded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission