Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be used the rule of Caution in general is this that Lots are to be used in things indifferent only. Which Caution that it may be the better conceived, a word or two will do well for the explication of the word Indifferent used in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be used in things indifferent only, they may not be used at all. True it is that in the Schools there are two received Axioms that may seem the one to cross the other, to wit, that lEvery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salve with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that every naked or bare action simply conceived is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come nearer home to that we have now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two ways, either as it opposed to Good and Evil, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserve more special either praise or reproof; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needs be done, and so consequently also to Evils simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawful nor unlawful. In this sense albeit ⟨p. 95⟩many pnatural actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore coming not within compass of the Moral law, as for a man to talk or walk in his sleep and the like, are in that regard merely indifferent, no Law being given of them that may be observed or transgressed in them: As also howsoever qmany actions in general are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become evil, nor yet so absolutely evil but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not only become good, but prove even necessary duties:
Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be vsed the rule of Caution in generall is this that Lots are to be vsed in things indifferent onely. Which Caution that it may be the better conceiued, a word or two will doe well for the explication of the word Indifferent vsed in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be vsed in things indifferent onely, they may not be vsed at all. True it is that in the Schooles there are two receiued Axiomes that may seeme the one to crosse the other, to wit, that lEuery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salue with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that euery naked or bare action simply conceiued is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come neerer home to that wee haue now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two waies, either as it opposed to Good and Euill, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserue more speciall either praise or reproofe; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needes be done, and so consequently also to Euills simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawfull nor vnlawfull. In this sense albeit ⟨p. 95⟩many pnaturall actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore comming not within compasse of the Morall law, as for a man to talke or walke in his sleepe and the like, are in that regard meerely indifferent, no Law being giuen of them that may be obserued or transgressed in them: As also howsoeuer qmany actions in generall are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become euill, nor yet so absolutely euill but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not onely become good, but proue euen necessarie duties:
- lOmnis actio est adiaphora.
- mNulla actio est adiaphora. Vise Gerson. in regul. mor.
- nOmnis nuda; nulla vestita.
- oOmnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur ut medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci [Greek or Hebrew] vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. [Greek or Hebrew] indifferens sive medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.Omnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur vt medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 indifferens siue medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.
- pIndifferentia sunt morbus, paupertas, &c. Senec. ep 83. Indifferens est actus omnis à ratione non procedens. Thom. sum. par. 2• 2ae, q. 18. a. 9. Id medium atque indifferens v•camus, quod tam malo contingere quàm bono potest. Senec. ep. 118.
- q[Greek or Hebrew], quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde ut aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendenda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉, quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde vt aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendēda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.
