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Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicallThomas Gataker, 1619

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

pp. 1–360712 passagespart 1 of 18

Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.

:29p. 1

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.

OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

:30p. 1

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Lottery in general.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Loterie in generall.

:31p. 1–2¶1

§ 1. The ^ause of Lots and Lottery, as it is very ancient, so hath bin in all ages no less frequent among men of all sorts. And considering that those things that are most in use, are by means of mans corruption most subject to abuse;^b it ought not to seem strange, if the like hath among the rest befallen Lots; if having been so much in use, they have not been free from much abuse; if having been used by so many, they have bin abused by the most. For ^cwhat Creature of God, or what Ordinance, be it civill or sacred, though good and holy in it self, is so happy, but that it receiveth, if not a deep tincture, yet at least some slight fully, from the foul hands or defiled fingers of the most that deal with it. That the lawful use therefore of this Ordinance may be wisely discerned and warily severed from ⟨p. 2⟩the abuse of it (^d so that neither the use of it be wholly banished and abandoned in regard of the abuse, as where Friend and Flatterer are both indiscreetly thrust out together at one door; nor yet way be given to the abuse of it while the right use is admitted, as where the door is unheedily set open to Flattery while men hope to entertain Friendship;) is the main matter that in this whole Treatise is aimed at. Which that it may be the better and the more orderly performed, it will not be amiss that we endeavour to consider and conceive aright, in the first place what the nature of a Lot is in general; and next to that, what the several sorts thereof are; whereby the warrantable and unwarrantable use of them may the more plainly appear.

:34p. 2–4

The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casual event, because that how soever in some kind of Lot some guess may be given, yet the event is mainly casual, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it unto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a little too far that define a ⟨p. 3⟩^eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoever by the event whereof some hidden thing may be discovered. For many things are and may be done for the discovery of hidden and unknown truths, which yet come not within the nature and compass of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his servant to be light-fingered, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withal, and thereby to try his honesty which he hath in some jealousy, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses used ordinarily by those that are in place of authority and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discovery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lottery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is ever some event merely casual; as if a man to try whether his servant be a thief or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, together with others rolled up severally into water, to see which will unfold first, and thereby to determine and judge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltless of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that ^fTo use Lottery is to put a thing from skill and counsel to temerity and casualty. that ^gA Lot is the child of chance. that ^hThe issue of Lots is not in mans power, but is such as casualty casteth on us. that ⁱIn Lottery there is no certainty. that ^kLots are not carried by reason and judgement, nor by counsel and advice: but ^lChance and casualty striketh the ⟨p. 4⟩chief stroke in them; if we respect secondary causes.

The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casuall euent, because that how soeuer in some kind of Lot some guesse may be giuen, yet the euent is mainly casuall, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it vnto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a litle too farre that define a ⟨p. 3⟩^eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoeuer by the euent whereof some hidden thing may be discouered. For many things are and may be done for the discouery of hidden and vnknowne truths, which yet come not within the nature and compasse of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his seruant to be light-fingred, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withall, and thereby to try his honestie which he hath in some iealousie, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses vsed ordinarily by those that are in place of authoritie and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discouery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lotery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is euer some euent meerely casuall; as if a man to try whether his seruant be a theefe or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, togither with others rolled vp seuerally into water, to see which will vnfold first, and thereby to determine and iudge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltlesse of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that ^fTo vse Loterie is to put a thing from skill and counsell to temeritie and casualty. that ^gA Lot is the child of chance. that ^hThe issue of Lots is not in mans power, but is such as casualty casteth on vs. that ⁱIn Lotery there is no certainty. that ^kLots are not caried by reason and iudgement, nor by counsell and aduice: but ^lChance and casualtie striketh the ⟨p. 4⟩cheife stroke in them; if wee respect secondary causes.

eSorts propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, ut eius event• confiderato occultū liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, ut occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius eventu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.Sortes propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, vt eius euent• confiderato occultū •liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, vt occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius euentu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.
fSortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, ubi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dedivin: l. 2.Sortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, vbi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dediuin: l. 2.
g[Greek or Hebrew] dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò [Greek or Hebrew] nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.
hSortis evenius nō est in nostra potestante, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.Sortis euenius nō est in nostra potestāte, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.
iQuid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? Cicidivinat. l. 2.Quid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscētur atque ducūtur? Cicidiuinat. l. 2.
k

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§ 3. The form or specific difference of a Lot is taken from the use and intent or purpose of the user, or that whereunto this casualty or casual event is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspense, or the discovery of some hidden and unknown truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casual events and accidents, and that maketh the casual event so used to be a Lot so justly accounted and called. Every Lot therefore is casual; and there can be no Lottery, where there is not casualty. But every casual event is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their lives, which yet come not the most of them within compass of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they never minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speak with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other business; the finding of some one thing while they look after an other, or while they look after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casual, but no lots; there is no lottery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth upon the will and purpose of the user, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it own nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casual thing or the casual occurrence of any such thing to the discovering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth unknown, event uncertain, or course unresolved, is to use it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giveth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lottery given by some others, who define ^mA Lot to be a casual event determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, ⁿLottery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or uncertainty by the variable event or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selves.

§ 3. The forme or specificall difference of a Lot is taken from the vse and intent or purpose of the vser, or that whereunto this casualtie or casuall euent is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspence, or the discouery of some hidden and vnknowne truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casuall euents and accidents, and that maketh the casuall euent so vsed to be a Lot so iustly accounted and called. Euery Lot therefore is casuall; and there can be no Lotery, where there is not casualty. But euery casuall euent is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their liues, which yet come not the most of them within compasse of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they neuer minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speake with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other businesse; the finding of some one thing while they looke after an other, or while they looke after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casuall, but no lots; there is no lotery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth vpon the will and purpose of the vser, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it owne nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casuall thing or the casuall occurrence of any such thing to the discouering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth vnknowne, euent vncertaine, or course vnresolued, is to vse it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giueth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lotery giuen by some others, who define ^mA Lot to be a casuall euent determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, ⁿLotery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or vncertainty by the variable euent or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selues.

mSorsest effectus fortuitus statuens de consilijs nostris. Aret. in problem: clas. 1. loc. 67.
nSortibus uti est ex vario eventu seu dispositione alicuius rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Proverb. c. 16.Sortibus vti est ex vario euentu seu dispositione alicuiꝰ rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Prouerb. c. 16.

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§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath been said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lottery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casual event. For that Lottery is not but where some question or controversy is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed upon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the means whereby questions and controversies are determined, of all these it is ^osome casualty or casual event only that is made choice of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly term Lottery. In regard whereof as they wander far from the right path in this point, ^pthat confound ^qthe suffrages or voices anciently used to be given either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquitting or casting of the party in question by casting of ^rbeans white or black, or of beads and stones, ^sor bones or shells ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed ^tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, ^uHe would not trust his own Mother with the trial of his life when he could avoid it, for fear lest she should unwittingly cast in a black bean for a white:) with ^*the Lotteries used in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of employment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seem to shoot also no less wide in this business, ^xthat draw within the compass of Lottery ^ythe proof of Aaron's right to the Priesthood by that miraculous budding and fruit-bearing of his Almond-tree rod, ^zthe trials of quarrels in question of right by duels and combats, canonical purgations, ^aby taking of the Host or the Eucharist, as also ^bby fire and water anciently used even ^cin these parts, ^ddivination by mens names as foretelling their fortunes, and whether should prevail either against other, and the like:

§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath bene said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lotery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casuall euent. For that Lotery is not but where some question or controuersie is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed vpon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the meanes wherby questions and controuersies are determined, of all these it is ^osome casualtie or casuall euent onely that is made choise of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly terme Lotery. In regard whereof as they wander farre from the right path in this point, ^pthat confound ^qthe suffrages or voices anciently vsed to be giuen either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquiting or casting of the party in question by casting of ^rbeanes white or blacke, or of beades and stones, ^sor bones or shels ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed ^tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, ^uHe would not trust his owne Mother with the tryall of his life when he could auoide it, for feare lest shee should vnwittingly cast in a blacke beane for a white:) with ^*the Loteries vsed in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of imployment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seeme to shoote also no lesse wide in this businesse,

oIn a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casual act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controversy. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.In a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casuall act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controuersie. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.
pSerar. in Josh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: [Greek or Hebrew] Pythag: [Greek or Hebrew]. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in urnam co•iectis Judices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. [Greek or Hebrew] & [Greek or Hebrew]; cum de sortitioni•us i• utrumque dicatur.Serar. in Iosh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Pythag: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in vrnam co•iectis Iudices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; cum de sortitioni•us i• vtrumque dicatur.
q[Greek or Hebrew]. Suidas. Et inde [Greek or Hebrew] dicitur per i•cū A•istophani Equip: populus Atheniensis. i. [Greek or Hebrew], à fabis quibus [Greek or Hebrew] utebantur, Hesych: Suid: & Aristoph: Schol.

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§ 5. Where let me add yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lottery, that the thing be casual that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casual, (I speak in regard of the creature both using and used) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩own nature, or in the conceit or counsel of those that make such use of it, any special relation otherwise to the business thereby to be decided. An instance or two will help to clear my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his friend, to say, I will ride, if it hold up by noon, if it do not, I will not stir abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the event of his journey, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that success in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualty, but that not considered as a casualty, but as having otherwise a peculiar relation to the business intended, and the conveniency or inconveniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lottery: In which point also some of the former Authors seem to fail, when they bring in ^edivination by the flight of Fowls, and by their eating or refusing their food under this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompany his friend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall go with you or you stay with me, and put off your journey to some other time: or being upon the way together, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to refer the question and controversy between them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowl, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is merely casual, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lottery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lottery is in general, to wit, A Lot some casualty or event merely casual purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lottery the deciding or determining of some question or controversy by such casual events considered as they are such.

§ 5. Where let me adde yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lotery, that the thing be casuall that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casuall, (I speake in regard of the creature both vsing and vsed) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩owne nature, or in the conceit or counsell of those that make such vse of it, any speciall relation otherwise to the businesse thereby to be decided. An instance or two will helpe to cleare my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his frend, to say, I will ride, if it hold vp by noone, if it doe not, I will not stirre abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the euent of his iourney, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that successe in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualtie, but that not considered as a casualtie, but as hauing otherwise a peculiar relation to the businesse intended, and the conueniency or inconueniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lotery: In which point also some of the former Authors seeme to faile, when they bring in ^ediuination by the flight of Fowles, and by their eating or refusing their food vnder this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompanie his frend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall goe with you or you stay with me, and put off your iourney to some other time: or being vpon the way togither, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to referre the question and controuersie betweene them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowle, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is meerely casuall, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lotery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lotery is in generall, to wit, A Lot some casualty or euent meerely casuall purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lotery the deciding or determining of some question or controuersie by such casuall euents considered as they are such.

e[Greek or Hebrew] Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.

:45p. 9–11

First for the name or term of Chance or Casualty, albeit it be by some utterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a term according to the just analogy & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, used by the Holy Ghost himself in Gods book both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of ^bSolomon, the wisest (of a mere man) that ever was since Adam, where he saith, that ^cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft ^delse-where in that book. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely ^egreater and wiser than Solomon, ^fthe very power and wisdom of God, our Saviour Christ himself, in the parable of the Jew that journeying to Jericho fell among thieves, who as he lay wounded half alive and half dead, a Priest is said to have ^gcome by Chance that way: where the Evangelist Luke to express in Greek what our Saviour spake in Syriac, useth a word precisely answering ^han other used by Solomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same root. I might add divers other places, where this term is ⁱelsewhere used in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though ^khe repent himself in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blind Goddess, and ascribed unto her what they should have given unto God; yet withal he explaineth himself that ^lhe meant nothing thereby but the casual event of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well used, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩^mReligion condemneth not, nor inhibiteth such kind of speeches, as to say, Peradventure such a thing shall be, or, Perchance it may be, or, Such a thing came to pass by chance or casualty.

First for the name or terme of Chance or Casualtie, albeit it be by some vtterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a terme according to the iust analogie & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, vsed by the Holy Ghost himselfe in Gods booke both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of ^bSalomon, the wisest (of a meere man) that euer was since Adam, where he saith, that ^cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft ^dels-where in that booke. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely ^egreater and wiser than Salomon, ^fthe very power and wisdome of God, our Sauiour Christ himselfe, in the parable of the Iew that journeying to Iericho fell among theeues, who as he lay wounded halfe aliue and halfe dead, a Priest is said to haue ^gcome by Chance that way: where the Euangelist Luke to expresse in Greeke what our Sauiour spake in Syriack, vseth a word precisely answering ^han other vsed by Salomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same roote. I might adde diuers other places, where this terme is ⁱelsewhere vsed in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though ^khe repent himselfe in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blinde Goddesse, and ascribed vnto her what they should haue giuen vnto God; yet withall he explaineth himselfe that ^lhe ment nothing thereby but the casuall euent of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well vsed, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩

b1 Reg. 3.12. 2 Chron. 1.12.
cEccles 9.11. [Greek or Hebrew] quod Plato de leg: l. 4 [Greek or Hebrew].Eccles 9.11. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 quod Plato de leg: l. 4 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
dEccles. 9.2, 3. [Greek or Hebrew] & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 [Greek or Hebrew] casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.Eccles. 9.2, 3. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.
eMatth. 12.42.
f1 Cor. 1.24
gLuk. 10.31. [Greek or Hebrew].Luk. 10.31. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
h[Greek or Hebrew] evenire, contingere: unde Gracī • [Greek or Hebrew]: sed & Lati•um curro, & occurro. Avenar. & Guichard. & inde nomen [Greek or Hebrew].

:46p. 11–12¶2

§ 2. Secondly for the nature of the thing so named, albeit some say that ⁿit is nothing, as ^othe same is said of sin, and therefore deserveth no name, save that Nothing it self must needs have some name, to express not so much what it is, as what it is not. Yet ^*Chance and Casualty is indeed something, & may be defined a Contingency or uncertainty severed from fore-cast & fore-sight. Contingency or uncertainty I term it, to seclude it from necessity & certainty. For where necessity is or certainty, there can be no Casualty; "Casualty & Certainty ever expelling either other. I add, severed from fore-cast and fore-sight, to distinguish casualty from such contingency, as is accompanied with either of these twain, either directed by fore-cast, or determined by foresight, which either of them both jointly & severally exclude casualty. Chance or casualty thus conceived is an affection or adjunct both of efficients and of effects. In regard of the former, it is by the ^pancient Philosophers marshalled commonly among the causes in the rank of Efficients, though some ^qlater ones ⟨p. 12⟩going more exactly to work, acknowledge it to be rather an Affection of an Efficient, or an Adjunct manner of Efficiency than an efficient cause of or in it self. In regard of the latter, Chance or Casualty is by a Trope ordinarily used to signify the Effect it self so affected: And so take I it here, and consider it in the matter of a Lot, as the use of Authors well warranteth it, and as ^rChristian Writers in these Questions most usually understand it, for a Casual Event, that is, an Event contingent, not directed or determined by any fore-cast or fore-sight. A Contingent, I say, that is, an uncertain or variable Event, as all grant it to be: And that again so uncertain as the uncertainty of it is not directed or determined by the skill, counsel, or fore-cast of him to whom it is casual; not that it is not effected and produced by known natural causes, but that neither his skill or counsel hath any hand in the directing of those causes in the producing of that effect, nor his fore-cast can determine what the effect will be in particular but by mere conjecture only.

§ 2. Secondly for the nature of the thing so named, albeit some say that ⁿit is nothing, as ^othe same is said of sin, and therefore deserueth no name, saue that Nothing it selfe must needs haue some name, to expresse not so much what it is, as what it is not. Yet ^*Chance and Casualty is indeed something, & may be defined a Contingencie or vncertainty seuered from fore-cast & fore-sight. Contingencie or vncertainty I terme it, to seclude it from necessitie & certainty. For where necessitie is or certainty, there can be no Casualty; "Casualty & Certainty euer expelling either other. I adde, senered from fore-cast and fore-sight, to distinguish casualty from such contingency, as is accompanied with either of these twaine, either directed by fore-cast, or determined by foresight, which either of them both ioyntly & seuerally exclude casualty. Chance or casualty thus conceiued is an affection or adiunct both of efficients and of effects. In regard of the former, it is by the ^pancient Philosophers marshalled cōmonly among the causes in the ranke of Efficients, though some ^qlater ones ⟨p. 12⟩going more exactly to worke, acknowledge it to be rather an Affection of an Efficient, or an Adjunct manner of Efficiency than an efficient cause of or in it selfe. In regard of the latter, Chance or Casualtie is by a Trope ordinarily vsed to signifie the Effect it selfe so affected: And so take I it here, and consider it in the matter of a Lot, as the vse of Authors well warranteth it, and as ^rChristian Writers in these Questions most vsually vnderstand it, for a Casuall Euent, that is, an Euent contingent, not directed or determined by any fore-cast or fore-sight. A Contingent, I say, that is, an vncertaine or variable Euent, as all grant it to be: And that againe so vncertaine as the vncertainty of it is not directed or determined by the skill, counsell, or fore-cast of him to whom it is casuall; not that it is not effected and produced by knowne naturall causes, but that neither his skill or counsell hath any hand in the directing of those causes in the producing of that effect, nor his fore-cast can determine what the effect will be in particular but by meere conjecture onely.

nFortuna quid est• nihil est. Fors nihil est; ne nomen quidem, tanquam rem quampiam, cam decuit habere. Scalig: de subtil: exere: 307. § 25.
oM•litiae nihil est. Ambr. fuga sec: Malum nihil est. Aug: s•lil•q. l. 1. cap. 1. & Isid: de sum: bono l. 1. c. 11. Mal•m nihil est aliud nisi boni privatio. Aug: Enchir: 11. Peccatum nihil est; & nihili f•unt cum peccan• homines; sicut idolum nihil est. Idem in Joan: tract• 1. [Greek or Hebrew]. Basil ho•. 8. Nemo quarat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Aug: de Civit: Dei l. 12. c. 7.M•litiae nihil est. Ambr. fuga sec: Malum nihil est. Aug: s•lil•q. l. 1. cap. 1. & Isid: de sum: bono l. 1. c. 11. Mal•m nihil est aliud nisi boni priuatio. Aug: Enchir: 11. Peccatum nihil est; & nihili f•unt cum peccan• homines; sicut idolum nihil est. Idem in Ioan: tract• 1. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Basil ho•. 8. Nemo quarat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Aug: de Ciuit: Dei l. 12. c. 7.
*Est aliquid: nec enim serm• communis inane. Gerson super Magnif. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de cons•i•: Prine:Est aliquid: nec enim serm• communis inan•. Gerson super Magnif. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de consi: Prine:

:48p. 12–14

^tNecessary are such as fall out naturally always ⟨p. 13⟩alike in a certain and constant course, and cannot do otherwise, unless some supernatural power countermand and over-rule them, and the causes producing them: Such kind of events are the motion of the Heavens, the course of the Sun, for the fire to burn combustible matter cast into it, and the like. ^uContingent and not casual are such as are so done one way, as they may or might have been done some other way, but that uncertainty is determined by the knowledge, art, fore-cast, and skill, or by the advice, counsel, deliberation, or free election of those whom they concern or befall: as for a man on his way to go on or stand still, to go forward or backward, it being in his power & determinable by his own will and advice to do the one or the other. Contingent and casual are such ^xas might fall out in like sort diversly, and are ^ynot determined by any art or fore-cast, counsel or skill in regard of the person to whom they are casual, or whom they casually befall. Thus for a man travailing on the way, without fore-cast of ought in that kind, to espy the Eclipse of the Sun falling out at that instant in the river where he rideth in to water his horse: the Eclipse of the Sun here is natural and necessary, his seeing or not seeing of it is contingent or voluntary, his espying it in that place going in for no such end is merely casual and accidentary. Thus he that slew Ahab by casualty, is said to have drawn his bow ^ain simplicity, intending, it seemeth, nothing less than that his arrow should there light where it did, being shot out at all adventure by him, the uncertain motion not directed ⟨p. 14⟩or determined by the will or skill of the shooter to the mark that it hit. So the slaughter of the person that is casually slain, is said to be done ^bsuddenly, inconsiderately, not out of enmity, not of set purpose or by a train, the party that did it ^cnot eying or seeing him, nor seeking his hurt whom he slew: all which terms and phrases used by the Spirit of God in that case, tend not only to express the uncertainty of the event, but to remove also all knowledge and counsel, all fore-sight and fore-cast, whereby that uncertainty might be determined by the party that was agent in that act.

^tNecessary are such as fall out naturally alwaies ⟨p. 13⟩alike in a certaine and constant course, and cannot doe otherwise, vnlesse some supernaturall power countermand and ouer-rule them, and the causes producing them: Such kind of euents are the motion of the Heauens, the course of the Sunne, for the fire to burne combustible matter cast into it, and the like. ^uContingent and not casuall are such as are so done one way, as they may or might haue bene done some other way, but that vncertainty is determined by the knowledge, art, fore-cast, and skill, or by the aduice, counsell, deliberation, or free election of those whom they concerne or befall: as for a man on his way to go on or stand still, to go forward or backward, it being in his power & determinable by his owne will and aduice to do the one or the other. Contingent and casuall are such ^xas might fall out in like sort diuersly, and are ^ynot determined by any art or fore-cast, counsell or skill in regard of the person to whom they are casuall, or whom they casually befall. Thus for a man trauailing on the way, without fore-cast of ought in that kind, to espie the Eclipse of the Sunne falling out at that instant in the riuer where he rideth in to water his horse: the Eclipse of the Sunne here is naturall and necessary, his seeing or not seeing of it is contingent or voluntary, his espying it in that place going in for no such end is meerely casuall and accidentary. Thus he that slew Achab by casualtie, is said to haue drawne his bow ^ain simplicitie, intending, it seemeth, nothing lesse than that his arrow should there light where it did, being shot out at all aduenture by him, the vncertaine motion not directed ⟨p. 14⟩or determined by the will or skill of the shooter to the marke that it hit. So the slaughter of the person that is casually slaine, is said to be done ^bsodainly, inconsiderately, not out of enmitie, not of set purpose or by a traine, the party that did it ^cnot eying or seeing him, nor seeking his hurt whom he slew: all which termes and phrases vsed by the Spirit of God in that case, tend not onely to expresse the vncertainty of the euent, but to remoue also all knowledge and counsell, all fore-sight and fore-cast, whereby that vncertainty might be determined by the party that was agent in that act.

tNecessarium est quod aliter se habere non po••st. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3. Hinc Thales, [Greek or Hebrew]. Laert: vit: philos: & Flut: plac: l. 1. c. 25. [Greek or Hebrew]. •'ut. conviu: 7. Sap: & Grammatici [Greek or Hebrew]. Etymol. & Eustath.Necessarium est quod aliter se habere non po••st. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3. Hinc Thales, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Laert: vit: philos: & Flut: plac: l. 1. c. 25. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. •'ut. conviu: 7. Sap: & Grammatici 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Etymol. & Eustath.
u[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot: analyt: pr: l. 1. c. 12. Contingens quod vel esse, vel non esse potest. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot: analyt: pr: l. 1. c. 12. Contingens quod vel esse, vel non esse potest. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3.
xQuid est aliud sors, quid fortuna, quid c•sus, quid eventus, nisi cam sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel nō • cadere atque evenire, vel aliter cadere aetque evenire potuerit? Cic: de divin: l. 2.Quid est aliud sors, quid fortuna, quid c•sus, quid euentus, nisi cam sic aliquid cecidit, sic euenit, vt vel nō • cadere atque euenire, vel aliter cadere aetque euenire potuerit? Cic: de diuin: l. 2.
y[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. analy•: pr: l. 1. c. 12. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot: physic: l 2. c. 5, 6. & 3.5 [Greek or Hebrew]. Menand. apud Stob: l. 1. c. 10.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. analy•: pr: l. 1. c. 12. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot: physic: l 2. c. 5, 6. & 3.5 . Menād. apud Stob: l. 1. c. 10.

:49p. 14–15¶3

§ 3. Now in these casual events there are two things concurring, as generally in all acts & events whatsoever. The one an act of the creature either reasonable or unreasonable; of the reasonable either led merely by guess and conjecture, as in drawing of cuts; or roving at all adventure, as in taking out of tickets shuffled and so blended together, that there is no place at all left for guess; of the unreasonable either moving it self naturally but uncertainly in regard of particular circumstances, as in divination by the flight of Fowls, and by their feeding or refusing their food, or moved by some other at all adventure, (for so far forth as any art or skill is used, so far forth it is not casual) and that so as it may take divers courses, or light diversly, if it be but one, as when a blind man or one blindfolded shooteth a shaft at random; or when boys play at cross and pile; or they must of necessity fall diversly though uncertain how, if they be many or more than one,as where divers dice or pawns are cast ⟨p. 15⟩out of the same box or hand, sundry balls or bowls out of the same lap or arm. The other is an act of the Creator, a providence or assistance either in general or special; and that for the most part general and mediate in ordinary casualties, sometime special and immediate in extraordinary events. A general providence, I say, ordinarily, as in all other things: For the prescience and providence, or, if you will, rather the will, pleasure, and omniscience of God extendeth it self in general unto all things, even to ^dthe lighting of a sparrow, ^eto the shedding of an hair. ^fGod (saith one well) is the author of all things, be they casual or other: ^gauthor, I say, as an other well distinguisheth, of the action, though disposer only not author of the evil, where any is, in it. If a providence of God therefore in all things, then in casual events also: and as in all things, so in casual events ordinarily, and no otherwise. If a ^hSparrow fall not without Gods permission, much less is any man slain without Gods providence, who is therefore said to ⁱoffer the man that is casually slain, unto the hand of him by whom he is slain. In this regard well saith Augustine, that ^kThat which is commonly called Chance, is yet by a certain course secretly guided:

§ 3. Now in these casuall euents there are two things concurring, as generally in all acts & euents whatsoeuer. The one an act of the creature either reasonable or vnreasonable; of the reasonable either led meerely by guesse and conjecture, as in drawing of cuts; or roauing at all aduenture, as in taking out of tickets shuffled and so blended togither, that there is no place at all left for guess; of the vnreasonable either mouing it selfe naturally but vncertainly in regard of particular circumstances, as in diuination by the flight of Fowles, and by their feeding or refusing their food, or moued by some other at all aduenture, (for so far forth as any art or skill is vsed, so far forth it is not casuall) and that so as it may take diuers courses, or light diuersly, if it be but one, as when a blind man or one blindfolded shooteth a shaft at random; or when boyes play at crosse and pile; or they must of necessitie fall diuersly though vncertaine how, if they be many or more than one,as where diuers dice or pawnes are cast ⟨p. 15⟩out of the same box or hand, sundry balls or bowles out of the same lap or arme. The other is an act of the Creator, a prouidence or assistance either in generall or speciall; and that for the most part generall and mediate in ordinary casualties, sometime speciall and immediate in extraordinary euents. A generall prouidence, I say, ordinarily, as in all other things: For the prescience and prouidence, or, if you will, rather the will, pleasure, and omniscience of God extendeth it selfe in generall vnto all things, euen to ^dthe lighting of a sparrow, ^eto the shedding of an haire. ^fGod (saith one well) is the author of all things, be they casuall or other: ^gauthor, I say, as an other well distingnisheth, of the action, though disposer onely not author of the euill, where any is, in it. If a prouidence of God therefore in all things, then in casuall euents also: and as in all things, so in casuall euents ordinarily, and no otherwise. If a ^hSparrow fall not without Gods permission, much lesse is any man slaine without Gods prouidence, who is therefore said to ⁱoffer the man that is casually slaine, vnto the hand of him by whom he is slaine. In this regard well saith Augustine, that

dMatth. 10.29. Luk: 12.6.
eMatth: 10.30. Act: 27.34. Luk. 12.7 . & 21.18. Possum dicer• porcorum qu•que se: as apud Deum numeratas, nedum capillos sanctorum. Tertull: de fuga.
fDeus omnium & fortuitorum & non fortuitorum. autor est. Mar•in: in Ram: dial: l. 1. c. 5. Aeterna lege cuncta decuerunt. Sen: provid: c. 5.Deus omnium & fortuitorum & non fortuitorum. autor est. Mar•in: in Ram: dial: l. 1. c. 5. Aeterna lege cuncta decuerunt. Sen: prouid: c. 5.
gAug: confess: l. 1. c. 10. Domine D •, ordinator & creator rerum omni•m naturalium, p•c•atorū autem tantum ordinator, non creator. Sic enim legendum, quod in vulgatu perperā, Peccatorū autem tantúm non ordinator: Prout idem alibi: de Civit: Det l. 5. c 9. Creator creatorum spirituum volunta•es bonas adiuvat, malas judicat, omnes ordinat. Et ibid: l. 14. c. 26. Omnipotenti D•o summo a• summè bono, creatori emnium naturarū, voluntatū autem bonarū adiutori ac remuneratori, malarū relictori & damnatori; utrarum• ordinatori &c. Nisi fortè cum Gomaro de provid: c. 12. leg•re lubeat, Tantamm•do ordinator.Aug: confess: l. 1. c. 10. Domine D •, ordinator & creator rerum omni•m naturalium, p•c•atorū autem tantum ordinator, nō creator. Sic enim legendum, quod in vulgatu perperā, Peccatorū autem tantúm non ordinator: Prout idem alibi: de Ciuit: Det l. 5. c 9. Creator creatorum spirituum voluntaes bonas adiuvat, malas iudicat, omnes ordinat. Et ibid: l. 14. c. 26. Omnipotenti Do summo a summè bono, creatori emnium naturarū, voluntatū autem bonarū adiutori ac remuneratori, malarū relictori & damnatori; vtrarum ordinatori &c. Nisi fortè cum Gomaro de prouid: c. 12. legre lubeat, Tantammdo ordinator.

:50p. 15–17¶3

and that ^lEven in those things that we say come by chance or by adventure, respect ought to be had to a divine disposition. Yea in regard of this providence ⟨p. 16⟩by casualties oft checking mens counsels, is it said by Solomon, that ^mThe race goeth not always with the swiftest, nor the battle with the strongest, nor bread to the wisest, nor wealth to the skilfullest, nor grace to the cunningest; but Time and Chance befalleth them all. That which the Heathen man it may be saw when he said, that ⁿMen ought not to rely overmuch on their counsel or forecast; for that ^ofortune, as saith he, or ^pGods providence by fortune, as much better another jumping almost in precise terms with Solomon saith, striketh a great stroke, and oft carieth things across to that we expect. Which as it is so in other casual events, so in Lots among others; of which Solomon saith therefore that ^qThe Lot is cast into the lap, but each disposition of it is of God. In which speech the spirit of God by Solomon, as divers ^rDivines of great, yea of good note expound him, implieth but thus much, that though nothing seem to be, or indeed is more casual than a Lot, where it is carried as it ought, yet there is a divine providence in the disposition of it; as there is the like also in all other events, of what nature and quality soever they be. And therefore look what is said by Solomon of a Lot in that place, the self-same is said ^selsewhere of all mens thoughts, and ways, and words, and works, and counsels, and courses, that they are disposed ⟨p. 17⟩by God, and are ^tnot absolutely in our power to give issue to them as we will. Thus is it true that Augustine saith, that ^uThose things that fall to us by Lot, are given us from God: according to that of the Psalmist, ^*The lines are fallen to me in a pleasant place, and I have a fair heritage: I praise the Lord for it. (Though that be spoken metaphorically not properly, as the former words show, ^xThe Lord is the portion of my part and of my cup; and the maintainer of my Lot.) But withal in like manner ^yall wealth whatsoever, be it ^zleft by decease of friends, or got by ^atravail and industry, or attained otherwise, and ^brest or sleep, and ^ca good wife, and ^dchildren are said to be Gods gifts, and to come all from him, who ^egiveth all things to all, and ^fworketh all things for all, and ^gin all.

and that ^lEuen in those things that we say come by chance or by aduenture, respect ought to be had to a diuine disposition. Yea in regard of this prouidence ⟨p. 16⟩by casualties oft checking mens counsels, is it said by Salomon, that ^mThe race goeth not alwaies with the swiftest, nor the battell with the strongest, nor bread to the wisest, nor wealth to the skilfullest, nor grace to the cunningest; but Time and Chance befalleth them all. That which the Heathen man it may be saw when he said, that ⁿMen ought not to rely ouermuch on their counsell or forecast; for that ^ofortune, as saith he, or ^pGods prouidence by fortune, as much better another jumping almost in precise termes with Salomon saith, striketh a great stroke, and oft carieth things acrosse to that we expect. Which as it is so in other casuall euents, so in Lots among others; of which Salomon saith therefore that ^qThe Lot is cast into the lap, but each disposition of it is of God. In which speech the spirit of God by Salomon, as diuers ^rDiuines of great, yea of good note expound him, implieth but thus much, that though nothing seeme to be, or indeed is more casuall than a Lot, where it is caried as it ought, yet there is a diuine prouidence in the disposition of it; as there is the like also in all other euents, of what nature and quality soeuer they be. And therefore looke what is said by Salomon of a Lot in that place, the selfe-same is said ^selsewhere of all mens thoughts, and wayes, and words, and works, and counsels, and courses, that they are disposed ⟨p. 17⟩by God, and are ^tnot absolutely in our power to giue issue to them as we will. Thus is it true that A•gustine saith, that

lHoc totum, quód Forte, fortuitò &c. d•cimus, ad diu••ā providentiam revocate debemus. Idem ibid:Hoc totum, quód Forte, fortuitò &c. d•cimus, ad diu••ā prouidentiam revocate debemus. Idem ibid:
mEccles: 9.11.
nNommuliū oportet consilio credere; quia suam habet for•una rationem quod non expectas ex trans•erso fit; & suam super no• fortuna negotium curat. Patron. satyr▪Nōmuliū oportet consilio credere; quia suam habet for•una rationem quod non expectas ex trans•erso fit; & suam super no• fortuna negotium curat. P•trō. satyr▪
o[Greek or Hebrew]. Me•and: Hypobol: [Greek or Hebrew]. Ch•rem: Achil: Thersiticid: apud S•ob: lib. 1. cap. 10. & Plut: de Fortun: Vitā regit fortuna non sapi•ntia. A Callisthene dictum laudat Theophrastus Cicer: Tuscul: l 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Me•and: Hypobol: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ch•rem: Achil: Thersiticid: apud S•ob: lib. 1. cap. 10. & Plut: de Fortun: Vitā regit fortuna non sapi•ntia. A Callisthene dictum laudat Theophrastꝰ Cicer: Tuscul: l 3.
p[Greek or Hebrew]. Plat de leg: l. 4. [Greek or Hebrew]. Tyrius Mx: serm: 3.

:51p. 17–18

Yet sometime there is a more special and immediate providence in extraordinary cases and upon extraordinary occasions in these casual events, as in the ^hcasting of the man suddenly for fear of the enemy into the sepulchre of Elisha, who by Gods admirable work to grace the blessed memory of his faithful servant deceased, revived thereupon: as in the ⁱLot whereby Jonah was sometime discovered; done, as Hierome well saith, ^knot by virtue of the Lot it self, much less of a Lot used by Heathen and Infidels, but by his will and providence that ruled, or rather over-ruled the uncertainty of it. And in this case is that true, which Bernard saith, that ^lThat which seems Chance to us, is as a word of God acquainting us with his will. That which is true indeed in general, if we consider Gods decreeing will of ⟨p. 18⟩whatsoever cometh to pass: for we know that it was Gods will it should be so, when we see it once fallen out so, and his will is manifested by his work, either for the doing of the thing it self, or for the permitting of it to be done. Otherwise if it be further understood of the manifestation of Gods approving will concerning somewhat to be done or left undone of us, it is not true in the general. For what word of God is there showing his will in this kind and this sense, when an Hare starteth out before a man in the way, or a Fowl flieth beside him, or he treadeth in some unclean thing unawares, and the like, more than in any other act whatsoever? unless we will give way to their ^lsuperstitious and frivolous conceits, that make such accidents ominous. Howbeit of extraordinary Lots cast by special instinct or express appointment of God, it is most true, and of such may well be understood those speeches of other of the Ancients, who call Lottery ^ma divine trial, and ⁿa divine sentence: and say that ^oa Lot discovereth to men Gods hidden will; and ^pmaketh it known openly what God judgeth secretly: as also that ^qA Lot is a matter in mans doubting manifesting Gods will. Which sayings all, if they be understood of Gods approving will what he would have done or not done of us, must of necessity be restrained to such Lots alone as God himself shall by some special means appoint to be used to that purpose.

Yet sometime there is a more speciall and immediate prouidence in extraordinary cases and vpon extraordinary occasions in these casuall euents, as in the ^hcasting of the man sodainly for feare of the enemie into the sepulchre of Elisha, who by Gods admirable worke to grace the blessed memory of his faithfull seruant deceased, reviued therevpon: as in the ⁱLot whereby Ionas was sometime discouered; done, as Hierome well saith, ^knot by vertue of the Lot it selfe, much lesse of a Lot vsed by Heathen and Infidels, but by his will and prouidence that ruled, or rather ouer-ruled the vncertainty of it. And in this case is that true, which Bernard saith, that ^lThat which seemes Chance to vs, is as a word of God acquainting vs with his will. That which is true indeed in generall, if we consider Gods decreeing will of ⟨p. 18⟩whatsoeuer commeth to passe: for we know that it was Gods will it should be so, when we see it once fallen out so, and his will is manifested by his work, either for the doing of the thing it selfe, or for the permitting of it to be done. Otherwise if it be further vnderstood of the manifestation of Gods approuing will concerning somewhat to be done or left vndone of vs, it is not true in the generall. For what word of God is there shewing his will in this kind and this sense, when an Hare starteth out before a man in the way, or a Fowle flieth beside him, or he treadeth in some vncleane thing vnawares, and the like, more than in any other act whatsoeuer? vnlesse we will giue way to their ^lsuperstitious and friuolous conceits, that make such accidents ominous. Howbeit of extraordinary Lots cast by speciall instinct or expresse appointment of God, it is most true, and of such may well be vnderstood those speeches of other of the Auncients, who call Lotery ^ma diuine tryall, and ⁿa diuine sentence: and say that ^oa Lot discouereth to men Gods hidden will; and ^p

h2 King: 13.21.
iJon. 1.7.Ion. 1.7.
kDeprehendebatur Jonas non viribus sortium, & maximé sortibus Ethnicorū, sed voluntate eius qui sortes regebat inceri••. Hieron. in Jon: c. 1.Deprehendebatur Ionas non viribus sortium, & maximé sortibus Ethnicorū, sed voluntate eius qui sortes regebat inceri••. Hieron. in Ion: c. 1.
lQui nobi• casus videtur, serm• qu• dam Dei est, suam nobi• indicans voluntat•m. •ern. de divers: •erm. 26.Qui nobi• casus videtur, serm• qu• dam Dei est, suam nobi• indicans voluntat•m. •ern. de diuers: •erm. 26.
lDe quibu• latissi•ié I•an: Sarisber: in policrat: sive de nugis Curial: l. 1. c. 12.De quibu• latissi•ié I•an: Sarisber: in policrat: siue de nugis Curial: l. 1. c. 12.
mSors veluti divino pendet examine. Ambr: de Tob: c. 20.

:53p. 18–20

The first conclusion: It is idle in matter of Casualty, ⟨p. 19⟩and so of Lottery, to confound the act of the Creator with the work of the creature; they being two several things distinct in themselves, which ought not therefore to be confounded in casual events more than in any other whatsoever. Yet thus many seem to do, and those men of some note, when they say, that ^rFortune or Chance is the same with Gods providence, and that they differ only in respect: as also, that ^sProvidence, Fate or Destiny, and Fortune or Casualty are in truth the same; yet so to be distinguished, that the first includes the two latter: For that Providence is the cause of all things that are done; which Providence in respect of things done necessarily is called Fate or Destiny, in respect of things done casually is called Fortune or Casualty. And therefore ^tThat (say they) which to the wise and godly is Gods singular Providence, to the foolish and profane is Fortune or Chance. The very like hereunto saith Lactaentius of nature, (as before him ^uSeneca,) which he confoundeth also with God. ^*Folly and error and blindness, saith he, and, as Cicero confesseth, the ignorance of causes brought in the names of Nature and Fortune. And again, ^xThis overthrow of piety brought in Natures ⟨p. 20⟩name: For when men knew not by whom the world was made, or would persuade men that nothing was made by the Deity; they said that ^yNature was the mother of all things, as if they should say that all things had sprung up naturally of themselves; which word while they use, they confess their own folly: Since ^zNature, severed from the divine power and providence, is just nothing. And the like error commit they when they define ^“Fortune a certain Goddess which by sundry casualties sporteth her self with defeating of mens purposes, because they understand not from whom those good or evil things come that befall them. It is true indeed, (as a ^aworthy man saith answering that objection of Atheists and Epicures, what will become of Fortune if there be a divine Providence in all things?) that if we speak of Fortune, as the ^bPoets paint her, blind, standing on a globe, turned about like a weathercock with every puff of wind &c. it is but either a poetical figment^c, that ^dmay as easily be done out by us as it is drawn by them:

The first conclusion: It is idle in matter of Casualty, ⟨p. 19⟩and so of Lotery, to confound the act of the Creator with the worke of the creature; they being two seuerall things distinct in themselues, which ought not therefore to be confounded in casuall euents more than in any other whatsoeuer. Yet thus many seeme to do, and those men of some note, when they say, that ^rFortune or Chance is the same with Gods prouidence, and that they differ onely in respect: as also, that ^sProuidence, Fate or Destinie, and Fortune or Casualtie are in truth the same; yet so to be distinguished, that the first includes the two latter: For that Prouidence is the cause of all things that are done; which Prouidence in respect of things done necessarily is called Fate or Destinie, in respect of things done casually is called Fortune or Casualtie. And therefore ^tThat (say they) which to the wise and godly is Gods singular Prouidence, to the foolish and prophane is Fortune or Chance. The very like herevnto saith Lactaentius of nature, (as before him ^uSeneca,) which he confoundeth also with God. ^*Folly and error and blindnes, saith he, and, as Cicero confesseth, the ignorance of causes brought in the names of Nature and Fortune. And againe, ^xThis ouerthrow of piety brought in Natures ⟨p. 20⟩name: For when men knew not by whom the world was made, or would perswade men that nothing was made by the Deity; they said that ^yNature was the mother of all things, as if they should say that all things had sprung vp naturally of themselues; which word while they vse, they confesse their owne folly: Since ^zNature, seuered from the diuine power and prouidence, is iust nothing. And the like error commit they when they define ^“

rFors five fortuna idem est quod [Greek or Hebrew]; sed differun• ratione significandi. Scalig: de subtil: exerc. 307. § 25.Fors fiue fortuna idem est quod 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; sed differun• ratione significandi. Scalig: de subtil: exerc. 307. § 25.
sTriae ha•, Providentia, Fatum, Fortuna idem sunt reipsa: ratione tamen ita disting•untur, ut providentiae quasi t•tum videatur, reliqua verò• dua parts, nam providentia omniū causa est qua fiunt; cadē autem respectu corum quae necessarió fiun•, •Fatum, respectu veró corū quae fortuitó fieri videntur, Fortuna appellatur. D•unam: in R•m: dial: l. 1. c. 5.Triae ha•, Prouidentia, Fatum, Fortuna idem sunt reipsa: ratione tamen ita disting•untur, vt prouidentiae quasi t•tum videatur, reliqua verò• dua partes, nam prouidentia omniū causa est qua fiunt; cadē autem respectu corum quae necessarió fiun•, •Fatum, respectu veró corū quae fortuitó fieri videntur, Fortuna appellatur. D•unam: in R•m: dial: l. 1. c. 5.
tQuod sapientibus & pijs singulari• Dei provid•ntia est, id ins•pientibus & prophanis Fortuna dicitur. Ibid.Quod sapientibꝰ & pijs singulari• Dei prouid•ntia est, id ins•pientibus & prophanis Fortuna dicitur. Ibid.

:54p. 20–22

or else at the best a symbolical emblem deciphering out the great uncertainty of casual events, of which we shall say more anon. And again it is no less true that the same ^eAuthor saith, that if by Fortune with Proclus, we understand a divine power coupling causes together which would of tiarre otherwise, that they may work to one and the same end; then are we to acknowledge such a power and providence not ⟨p. 21⟩in ^fcasual things and such as are uncertain alone, but in all other whatsoever, even those that be most certain. For ^gFortune is no other than but God nicknamed. But if we consider the term of Nature, and so of Fortune or Chance, as the Holy Ghost useth them; as Nature is a power or faculty in the creature distinct from Gods providence guiding and ruling, yea and oft over-ruling the same to such ends as he seeth good: so is Fortune or Chance also an affection or action of the creature distinct from the same providence whereby God likewise guideth and disposeth the same at his pleasure. As in natural effects therefore there is the work of the creature, which might be albeit there were no providence disposing it, but the creature for matter of direction were left wholly to it self: so is there the like also in casual events; which as they do now fall out, and yet are ordered, as all other things, by Gods providence either general or special; so would no doubt fall out the same oft-times that now they do, were there no providence at all, but the creature left to it own work and will. In regard whereof the Schoolman not unfitly saith, that ^hthere might be some use of some kind of Lot, although there were no providence at all to guide it, for that ⁱin the same, the decision of the matter in question is referred wholly, as we shall see after, to the casual motion of the creature, without any special providence of the Creator required thereunto. In a word, if in casual events we consider ought beside the ••ature and the uncertain motion thereof, (uncertain (I say) to us, because not determinable by us, though determined ordinarily ⟨p. 20⟩[…] ⟨p. 21⟩[…] ⟨p. 22⟩by some natural cause or other:) there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence: which two things, the act of the creature, and Gods providence accompanying it, though never sundered or severed, yet are to be distinguished and distinctly considered, and not to be confounded the one with the other.

or else at the best a symbolicall embleme deciphering out the great vncertainty of casuall euents, of which we shall say more anon. And againe it is no lesse true that the same ^eAuthor saith, that if by Fortune with Proclus, we vnderstand a diuine power coupling causes togither which would of tiarre otherwise, that they may worke to one and the same end; then are we to acknowledge such a power and prouidence not ⟨p. 21⟩in ^fcasuall things and such as are vncertaine alone, but in all other whatsoeuer, euen those that be most certaine. For ^gFortune is no other than but God nicnamed. But if we consider the terme of Nature, and so of Fortune or Chance, as the Holy Ghost vseth them; as Nature is a power or facultie in the creature distinct from Gods prouidence guiding and ruling, yea and oft ouer-ruling the same to such ends as he seeth good: so is Fortune or Chance also an affection or action of the creature distinct from the same prouidence whereby God likewise guideth and disposeth the same at his pleasure. As in naturall effects therefore there is the worke of the creature, which might be albeit there were no prouidence disposing it, but the creature for matter of direction were left wholy to it selfe: so is there the like also in casuall euents; which as they do now fall out, and yet are ordered, as all other things, by Gods prouidence either generall or speciall; so would no doubt fall out the same oft-times that now they do, were there no prouidence at all, but the creature left to it owne worke and will. In regard whereof the Scholeman not vnfitly saith, that ^hthere might be some vse of some kind of Lot, although there were no prouidence at all to guide it, for that ⁱin the same, the decision of the matter in question is referred wholy, as we shall see after, to the casuall motion of the creature, without any speciall prouidence of the Creator required therevnto. In a word, if in casuall euents we consider ought beside the ••ature and the vncertaine motion thereof, (vncertaine (I say) to vs, because not determinable by vs, though determined ordinarily ⟨p. 20⟩〈…〉

eMorn: ibid: vói sup:
fNon in vagi• tantum incertisqua quibusdam, sed in ce•tissimis, & in omnibus.
gDeus ipse est ali• nomine designatus. Ibid.
hDivisoria Sor• locū habere posset, etiamsi res humana fortuitò agerentur. Thom: de sortib: c. 5.Diuisoria Sor• locū habere posset, etiamsi res humana fortuitò agerentur. Thom: de sortib: c. 5.
iConting•t aliquē divisoria Sorte uti, non quas• requirat judicium divinum, sed quasi committens fortunae; quod maximè videtur in lud• taxillatori•. Thom: ibid.Conting•t aliquē diuisoria Sorte vti, non quas• requirat iudicium diuinum, sed quasi committens fortunae; quod maximè videtur in lud• taxillatori•. Thom: ibid.

:55p. 22–23¶5

§ 5. A second conclusion: The casualty of an event doth not simply of it self make it a work of Gods special or immediate providence. It is apparent: for there is oft-times a more special providence in many things that are not casual but contingent only, then in the most things that are casual. How many casual events daily befall us, even as many almost as we meet with men, or tread steps on our way, when every cast of our eye ministereth new variety of casualty, and every unexpected object bringeth a casual event with it; which yet no man will be so senseless as to account so many several works of special or immediate providence? And yet some one contingent event only among many other merely casual may be so, when they are not. For example; for a man on his way to be crossed oft by an Hare, to meet with many unknown, find a piece of old iron, spy a covey of Partridges, have his hat blown of his head, and the like, may well befall a man and be all merely casual. But for a mans friend out of suspicion of danger and fore-cast of distress that his friend may incur, to enforce his company upon him, whereas otherwise he should travail alone and is desirous so to do, and being in company with him to be a ⟨p. 23⟩means of saving his life by recovery upon a fall, or by rescue upon assault, were an event contingent rather than casual. And yet who would not acknowledge a more special providence of God in the latter that is less casual, or rather not casual at all but contingent only, deliberatory and voluntary, undertaken upon mature counsel and forecast, than in the former, that are or may be merely casual, and fall out beyond all expectation, without any forecast at all?

§ 5. A second conclusion: The casualtie of an euent doth not simply of it selfe make it a worke of Gods speciall or immediate prouidence. It is apparant: for there is oft-times a more speciall prouidence in many things that are not casuall but contingent only, then in the most things that are casuall. How many casuall euents daily befall vs, euen as many almost as we meete with men, or tread steps on our way, when euery cast of our eye ministreth new variety of casualtie, and euery vnexpected obiect bringeth a casuall euent with it; which yet no man will be so senselesse as to account so many seuerall works of speciall or immediate prouidence? And yet some one contingent euent onely among many other meerely casuall may be so, when they are not. For example; for a man on his way to be crossed oft by an Hare, to meete with many vnknowne, finde a peece of old yron, spie a couey of Partridges, haue his hat blowne of his head, and the like, may well befall a man and be all meerely casuall. But for a mans frend out of suspition of danger and fore-cast of distresse that his frend may incurre, to inforce his com•any vpon him, whereas otherwise he should trauaile alone and is desirous so to doe, and being in company with him to be a ⟨p. 23⟩meanes of sauing his life by recouery vpon a fall, or by rescue vpon assault, were an euent contingent rather than casuall. And yet who would not acknowledge a more speciall prouidence of God in the latter that is lesse casuall, or rather not casuall at all but contingent onely, deliberatory and voluntary, vndertaken vpon mature counsell and forecast, than in the former, that are or may be meerely casuall, and fall out beyond all expectation, without any forcecast at all?

:56p. 23–24

It is true indeed that Gods providence is more manifested in things casually befalling us for good or evil, than in things that befall us contingently by means of men and their forecast and affection to us, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessary. Howbeit the providence of God ordinarily extendeth it self to all of them alike, and is more special sometime in some things not casual than in others that are such. Yea in the same event either casual or other may a more special providence of God be justly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man travelling over Salisbury plain to find a pitcher of water left occasionally there, having no need of it or use for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a special providence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as ^hSampson sometime, and ready to die for want of water to drink, to light on the like booty casually, as ⁱHagar was directed by Gods Angel to a Well, he would have just cause to esteem it to ⟨p. 24⟩have a special providence of God in it, and might well term the place where he should so find it, as she did an other place where Gods Angel found her, ^kBeer lachai roi, or the Well of the living God that looked after me when I was near lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossly impious but would judge so of the other: yet both equally casual: the casualty of events therefore doth not of it self simply adjudge them to either.

It is true indeed that Gods prouidence is more manifested in things casually befalling vs for good or euill, than in things that befall vs contingently by meanes of men and their forecast and affection to vs, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessarie. Howbeit the prouidence of God ordinarily extendeth it selfe to all of them alike, and is more speciall sometime in some things not casuall than in others that are such. Yea in the same euent either casuall or other may a more speciall prouidence of God be iustly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man trauelling ouer Salisbury plaine to finde a pitcher of water left occasionally there, hauing no neede of it or vse for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a speciall prouidence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as ^hSampson sometime, and ready to die for want of water to drinke, to light on the like booty casually, as ⁱHagar was directed by Gods Angell to a Well, he would haue iust cause to esteeme it to ⟨p. 24⟩haue a special prouidence of God in it, and might well terme the place where he should so finde it, as shee did an other place where Gods Angell found her, ^kBeer lachai roi, or the Well of the liuing God that looked after me when I was neere lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossely impious but would iudge so of the other: yet both equally casuall: the casualtie of euents therefore doth not of it selfe simply adjudge them to either.

hJudg: 15.1•.Iudg: 15.1•.
iGenes. 21.19.
k[Greek or Hebrew] puteus viventis (Dei) videntis me. Genes. 16.14.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 puteus viuentis (Dei) videntis me. Genes. 16.14.

:57p. 24–25¶6

§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casual to one that is not casual to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsel foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seem such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiving hereof we are to consider that in casual events two things do concur, ^lignorance or want of fore-knowledge foreseeing them, and inconsiderateness, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the event of them uncertain to us: & uncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that ^mIgnorance of causes forged the term of Chance or Fortune: and that ⁿChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or means whereby it is effected, is hid from us. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casual; but some of them are necessary, as that the Load-stone should attract iron and steel, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no known cause or certain reason can be rendered of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and natural, not casual events: some only contingent, as the return of Ague fits in an ordinary course is not casual, to speak properly, but contingent only at the most, even to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Again many things there are and come to pass daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casual to us, because they were not foreseen by us: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man travailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his own journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casual to him that an Hare then and there should cross him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casual unto him. Thus then may the same thing be casual to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseen and fore-known by the one and not by the other:

§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casuall to one that is not casuall to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsell foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seeme such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiuing hereof we are to consider that in casuall euents two things do concurre, ^lignorance or want of fore-knowledg foreseeing them, and inconsideratenes, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the euent of them vncertain to vs: & vncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that ^mIgnorance of causes forged the terme of Chance or Fortune: and that ⁿChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or meanes whereby it is effected, is hid from vs. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casuall; but some of them are necessarie, as that the Load-stone should attract yron and steele, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no knowne cause or certaine reason can be rendred of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and naturall, not casuall euents: some onely contingent, as the returne of Ague fits in an ordinarie course is not casuall, to speake properly, but contingent on•ly at the most, euen to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Againe many things there are and come to passe daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casuall to vs, because they were not foreseene by vs: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man tra•ailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his owne journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casuall to him that an Hare then and there should crosse him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casuall vnto him. Thus then may the same thing be casuall to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseene and fore-knowne by the one and not by the other:

l[Greek or Hebrew] Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. divinat: l. 2.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. diuinat: l. 2.
mIgnoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.Ignoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.
nNihil aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cuius ratio & causa secreta est. Aug: contra Academ: l. 1. •. 1.

:59p. 25–26

Again, all counsel and fore-cast is excluded from casual events. Nothing that is done by advice, counsel or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. ^pWhat is done casually is done unadvisedly, saith Augustine. And ^qTemerity swayeth in casualty, not reason or advice, as we have formerly ⟨p. 26⟩showed. In regard whereof we use to say of those that speak inconsiderately and deal unadvisedly and unconstantly, that ^rthey deal as if they dealt by casualty, ^sor went by Lottery; that they speak• as ^tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus again may that be casual to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was ^uAhab's meeting Elijah casual to Ahab, but not casual to Elijah, who went of purpose to meet Ahab: thus ^*Jephthah's meeting his daughter and she him, was casual to him who expected her not, not casual to her whose purpose was to meet him.

Againe, all counsell and fore-cast is excluded from casuall euents. Nothing that is done by aduice, counsell or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. ^pWhat is done casually is done vnaduisedly, saith Augustine. And ^qTemeritie swaieth in casualty, not reason or aduice, as we haue formerly ⟨p. 26⟩shewed. In regard whereof we vse to say of those that speake inconsiderately and deale vnaduisedly and vnconstantly, that ^rthey deale as if they dealt by casualtie, ^sor went by Lotery; that they speak• as ^tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus againe may that be casuall to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was ^uAhabs meeting Elias casuall to Ahab, but not casuall to Elias, who went of purpose to meete Ahab: thus ^*Iephtaes meeting his daughter and shee him, was casuall to him who expected her not, not casuall to her whose purpose was to meete him.

pQuiequid cas• fit, te••rè fit. Aug: 83 q••st. 24.
qIn cas• temeritas, non ratio […] consiliu• vali•, C••: divin: l. 2.In cas• temeritas, non ratio 〈…〉 consiliu• vali•, C••: diuin: l. 2.
rReliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, ut noncommittamus ut •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, ut quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: [Greek or Hebrew].Reliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, vt noncommittamus vt •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, vt quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Xenoph. paed l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Xenoph. paed l. 1.
t

:60p. 26–27

Yea thus many things seem casual when indeed they are not; ^xbeing thought to come by adventure, when they are done by art and advice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ^ystate to couple persons together by a slight and semblance of lottery, that they might seem to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had been with lately before in that place, seemed casual to his competitors, who before ^zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himself, or at least ^ato his groom who had laid the train before for it. ^bThus a man sendeth his servant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meet his mistress coming from market laden with meat; they meet accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meet casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. ^cThus the servant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honesty withal, whether he will restore it or retain it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conveyance used in Lots to make that seem casual that indeed is not, but is carried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be grown to a by-word, In Lottery is Bovery, that is, knavery or cozenage. Now howsoever in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seem casual that indeed are not so; yet to speak properly, it is rather the ignorance of events, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casual unto any; by means whereof it cometh oft to pass, that the same events are casual to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casual to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that ^dCasualty dependeth upon our ignorance; which therefore ^ethe more we know, the less we are subject unto.

Yea thus many things seeme casuall when indeed they are not; ^xbeing thought to come by aduenture, when they are done by art and aduice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ^ystate to couple persons togither by a slight and semblance of lotery, that they might seeme to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had bene with lately before in that place, seemed casuall to his competitors, who before ^zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himselfe, or at least ^ato his groome who had laid the traine before for it. ^bThus a man sendeth his seruant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meete his mistres comming from market laden with meat; they meete accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meete casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. ^cThus the seruant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honestie withall, whether he will restore it or retaine it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conueyance vsed in Lots to make that seeme casuall that indeed is not, but is caried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be growne to a by-word, In Lotery is Bouery, that is, knauery or cosenage. Now howsoeuer in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seeme casuall that indeed are not so; yet to speake properly, it is rather the ignorance of euents, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casuall vnto any; by meanes whereof it commeth oft to passe, that the same euents are casuall to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casuall to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that ^d

x[Greek or Hebrew]. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. ut tectè legit Casa•b:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. vt tectè legit Casa•b:
y[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se judicium Religioni & Fortune committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse• Justin: •ist: l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se iudicium Religioni & For•un• committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse Iustin: ist: l. 1.

:61p. 27–29¶7

§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is ^fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casual unto him; yea nothing cometh contingently, but ^gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his prescience and providence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to pass necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is uncertainty: but ^hall things are certain with him, who hath done already what he will do or will have done; and with whom whatsoever ever shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For ⁱThere is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God. ^kHe disannulleth the devices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsel shall ever stand, and his purposes shall always take place. Nothing casually; because he ^lseeth all, and ^mknoweth all; yea ⁿhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that ever shall be. For ^ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternity, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and prescience being coeternal with himself and his own essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well known to him as his own are. For ⟨p. 29⟩^pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholly knowest it, saith David: and thou understandest my thoughts long before. And ^qThou alone knowest all mens hearts, saith Solomon. And again, ^rAll things are naked and broken up to him with whom we have to do. Yea as he foreseeth and foreknoweth all things ere they are; so ^she seeth and knoweth all things past, present and future at once. ^tWe are as men on the way, that see who go before them or with them, but see not who come behind them: God is as one standing aloft on a sentinel, that seeth all both before and behind under one view at one instant. That which the Psalmist seemeth to allude unto when he saith, that ^uGod looketh down from heaven and seeth all Adams sons; from his place of abode he views all the inhabitants of the world: and as he framed and fashioned the hearts of each of them, so he taketh notice of all their works.

§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is ^fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casuall vnto him; yea nothing commeth contingently, but ^gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to passe necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his praescience and prouidence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to passe necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is vncertainty: but ^hall things are certaine with him, who hath done already what he will do or will haue done; and with whom whatsoeuer euer shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For ⁱThere is no wisdome, nor vnderstanding, nor counsell against God. ^kHe disanulleth the deuices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsell shall euer stand, and his purposes shall alwaies take place. Nothing casually; because he ^lseeth all, and ^mknoweth all; yea ⁿhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that euer shall be. For ^ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternitie, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and praescience being coeternall with himselfe and his owne essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well knowne to him as his owne are. For ⟨p. 29⟩^pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholy knowest it, saith Dauid: and thou vnderstandest my thoughts long before. And

fDeo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) ut•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• provid: c. 5.Deo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) vt•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• prouid: c. 5.
gDeus necessariò & immutabiliter novit & praenovit universa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.Deus necessariò & immutabiliter nouit & praenouit vniuersa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.
hApud Deum quippe jam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futur•m est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in Psal. 104. In D•i dispositione jam facta sunt, quaecunque, futura sunt, qui nō aliter novit facienda quā facta. Id•m de civit: Dei l. 10. •. 12. Omnia enim quaecunque voluit, non solum praeterita, vel praesentiae, sed etiam futura jam fecit. Ibid. l. 22. c. 2. Et ideò tanquā praeterita dicuntur quae futura sunt, quia Deo & futura tam certa sunt, tamquā praeterita sint. Id •• in Psal. 43.Apud Deum quippe iam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futurm est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in

:63p. 29–31

Again, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his providence and eternal counsel all things are guided and governed, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himself. So ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 30⟩that even ^xthose things that seem most disorderly in themselves, yet are ordered with him. For not only ^ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but even ^zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternal counsel and unsearchable wisdom, that ¹even by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore coming to pass but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknown, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that ²Nothing was casual with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; ³whatsoever is done by casualty, is done unadvisedly: whatsoever is done unadvisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to pass casually, the whole world is not administered by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered ⁴might exclude as well all contingency in regard of uncertainty, as all casualty in events, but must of necessity be understood of the events of things only as they regard God; with whom, because he fore-seeth all things before they fall out, and fore-determineth all things how they shall fall out, none of those events are casual, that are most ⟨p. 31⟩casual unto us, none contingent of those many that are contingent unto us.

Againe, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his prouidence and eternall counsell all things are guided and gouerned, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himselfe. So ⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉 ⟨p. 30⟩that euen ^xthose things that seeme most disorderly in themselues, yet are ordred with him. For not only ^ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but euen ^zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternall counsell and vnsearchable wisdome, that ¹euen by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore comming to passe but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknowne, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that ²Nothing was casuall with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; ³whatsoeuer is done by casualtie, is done vnaduisedly: whatsoeuer is done vnaduisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to passe casually, the whole world is not administred by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered ⁴

xApud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata video tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.Apud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata vide• tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.
yEph: 1.11. Heb: 13.2•.
zAct: 2.23. & 3.18. & 4 27, 28.
1Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, implevit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, impleuit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.
2[Greek or Hebrew] Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Calvin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque divini necessariò fiunt universa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eveniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Caluin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque diuini necessariò fiunt vniuersa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eueniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.
3Qaicquid casu fit, temerè fit. quicquid temerè fit, non fit providentia. si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non provideniia universus mundus administratur. Aug: 83. quaest. 24.

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.

OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Lottery in general.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Loterie in generall.

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.

OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Lottery in general.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Loterie in generall.

CHAP. II. Of Chance or Casualty, and of casual Events.

CHAP. II. Of Chance or Casualtie, and of casuall Euents.

CHAP. III. Of the several Sorts of Lots.

CHAP. III. Of the seuerall Sorts of Lots.

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.

OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Lottery in general.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Loterie in generall.

Reformers309

Puritans1,782

Westminster Assembly24

Evangelicals36

OF THE NATURE and use of Lots.

OF THE NATVRE and vse of Lots.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Lottery in general.

CHAP. I. What a Lot is; and Of Loterie in generall.

CHAP. II. Of Chance or Casualty, and of casual Events.

CHAP. II. Of Chance or Casualtie, and of casuall Euents.

CHAP. III. Of the several Sorts of Lots.

CHAP. III. Of the seuerall Sorts of Lots.