Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The eighth and last Caution is that aNo covin or crafty conveyance be used in them: like that which bTemo the Priest used in deciding a controversy between Cresphontes and Aristodemus his issue.
The eighth and last Caution is that aNo couine or crafty conu•iance bee vsed in them: like that which bTemo the Preist vsed in deciding a controuersie betweene Cresphontes and Aristodemus his issue.
aUt fraus & dolus malus absit. Martyr. in Sam. c. 10. Aret. problem. part. 1. loc. 67. §. 6. ca•t. 5.Vt fraus & dolus malus absit. Martyr. in Sam. c. 10. Aret. problem. part. 1. loc. 67. §. 6. ca•t. 5.
For the story here touched, it is diversly reported by Authors, and in some particulars mistaken by ⟨p. 93⟩him that allegeth it. We shall have occasion chereafter more particularly to relate it. Meanwhile this may suffice, that, howsoever that which is here touched and the like guileful courses are unjust and consequently unlawful, especially where both parties have an interest in that that is to be shared: For I dare not condemn Caesars slight who in punishing of his mutinous troupes, where it was in his own power to slay or save whom he would,
carried the matter so cunningly, that the Lot lighted on those that had been faultiest and forwardest in that business. Howsoever, I say, such injurious and cozening conveyances are unwarrantable: Yet this Caution seemeth needless, because the very nature of a Lot excludeth all such courses: and therefore to give such a Caution concerning a Lot, is as if a man should say that A Lot must be a Lot, or else it cannot be a lawful Lot. For where the event is determined by such counsels or courses, there is there no casualty, and so consequently no Lottery. Whereas the Question is here how a man may lawfully use a Lot, not whether he may not use some other course in stead of a Lot, when he pretendeth to use it.
For the story here touched, it is diuersly reported by Authors, and in some particulars mistaken by ⟨p. 93⟩him that alledgeth it. We shal haue occasion chereafter more particularly to relate it. Meanewhile this may suffice, that, howsoeuer that which is here touched and the like guilefull courses are vniust and consequently vnlawfull, especially where both parties haue an interest in that that is to be shared: For I dare not condemne Caesars slight who in punishing of his mutinous troupes, where it was in his owne power to slay or saue whom he would, kcarried the matter so cunningly, that the Lot lighted on those that had beene faultiest and forwardest in that busines. Howsoeuer, I say, such injurious and coosening conueiances are vnwarrantable: Yet this Caution seemeth needlesse, because the very nature of a Lot excludeth all such courses: and therefore to giue such a Caution concerning a Lot, is as if a man should say that A Lot must be a Lot, or else it cannot be a lawfull Lot. For where the euent is determined by such counsels or courses, there is there no casualtie, and so consequently no Lotery. Whereas the Question is here how a man may lawfully vse a Lot, not whether he may not vse some other course in steede of a Lot, when he pretendeth to vse it.
§ 4. These are most of the Cautions most commonly given; in stead whereof, because the most of them are not so material, it shall not be amiss to propound some other that may more precisely limit the use of this kind of Lots, and meet with the abuses most usual in such.
§ 4. These are most of the Cautions most commonly giuen; in steede whereof, because the most of them are not so materiall, it shall not be amisse to propound some other that may more precisely limite the vse of this kinde of Lots, and meete with the abuses most vsuall in such.
Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be used the rule of Caution in general is this that Lots are to be used in things indifferent only. Which Caution that it may be the better conceived, a word or two will do well for the explication of the word Indifferent used in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be used in things indifferent only, they may not be used at all. True it is that in the Schools there are two received Axioms that may seem the one to cross the other, to wit, that lEvery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salve with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that every naked or bare action simply conceived is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come nearer home to that we have now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two ways, either as it opposed to Good and Evil, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserve more special either praise or reproof; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needs be done, and so consequently also to Evils simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawful nor unlawful. In this sense albeit ⟨p. 95⟩many pnatural actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore coming not within compass of the Moral law, as for a man to talk or walk in his sleep and the like, are in that regard merely indifferent, no Law being given of them that may be observed or transgressed in them: As also howsoever qmany actions in general are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become evil, nor yet so absolutely evil but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not only become good, but prove even necessary duties:
Concerning the matter or businesses wherein Lots may lawfully be vsed the rule of Caution in generall is this that Lots are to be vsed in things indifferent onely. Which Caution that it may be the better conceiued, a word or two will doe well for the explication of the word Indifferent vsed in it. The rather for that some there be that suppose that there is no Act at all Indifferent; and so according to their judgement, if Lots may be vsed in things indifferent onely, they may not be vsed at all. True it is that in the Schooles there are two receiued Axiomes that may seeme the one to crosse the other, to wit, that lEuery action is indifferent; and that mNo action is indifferent: which seeming contradiction they yet salue with a distinction of nnaked and clothed, that euery naked or bare action simply conceiued is indifferent, but no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent. For example, say they, to strike is indifferent, but to strike an Innocent, or to strike without authority, or to strike in this or that case, this or that Person, is not so. But to come neerer home to that wee haue now in hand: The word indifferent may be taken two waies, either as it opposed to Good and Euill, and more specially to such actions of virtue and vice as deserue more speciall either praise or reproofe; or as it is opposed to necessary good duties, such things as must needes be done, and so consequently also to Euills simply forbidden, which in that regard may in no wise be done. In the former sense is that said to be oindifferent, that is neither good nor bad, neither lawfull nor vnlawfull. In this sense albeit ⟨p. 95⟩many pnaturall actions not proceeding from reason, and therefore comming not within compasse of the Morall law, as for a man to talke or walke in his sleepe and the like, are in that regard meerely indifferent, no Law being giuen of them that may be obserued or transgressed in them: As also howsoeuer qmany actions in generall are said to be indifferent, because they are not either so simply good, but that by some particular circumstances they may be so tainted and corrupted as they may become euill, nor yet so absolutely euill but that in some cases and with some circumstances qualified they may not onely become good, but proue euen necessarie duties:
lOmnis actio est adiaphora.
mNulla actio est adiaphora. Vise Gerson. in regul. mor.
nOmnis nuda; nulla vestita.
oOmnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur ut medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci [Greek or Hebrew] vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. [Greek or Hebrew] indifferens sive medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.Omnia aut bona sunt, a•t mala, aut indifferentia: quod nec bonum nec malum est, sequitur vt medium sit. Senec. epist. 118. Indifferentia dico. quae Graeci 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vocant, quae nec bona, nec mala sunt. Idem ep. 83. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 indifferens siue medium, quod nec bonum nec malū est: quod nec in bonis ponitur, nec in contrarijs. Cic. de fin. lib. 3.
pIndifferentia sunt morbus, paupertas, &c. Senec. ep 83. Indifferens est actus omnis à ratione non procedens. Thom. sum. par. 2• 2ae, q. 18. a. 9. Id medium atque indifferens v•camus, quod tam malo contingere quàm bono potest. Senec. ep. 118.
q[Greek or Hebrew], quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde ut aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendenda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉, quaeper sese ipsa neque honesta (malè vulgo, inhonesta) sunt neque turpia, sed perinde vt aguntur, ita aut probanda fiunt, aut reprehendēda. Gellius noct. Attic. l. 2. c. 7.
Yet nevertheless most true it is, that rno particular moral action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeed the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessary, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no special matte• of goodness in them, as for a man to eat when he is hungry, to drink when he is athirst, tto provide carefully for his own Family, uto love those that love him, and the like, which yet in ⟨p. 96⟩strictness of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
Yet neuerthelesse most true it is, that rno particular morall action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeede the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessarie, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no speciall matte• of goodnesse in them, as for a man to eate when he is hungrie, to drinke when he is athirst, tto prouide carefully for his owne Family, uto loue those that loue him, and the like, which yet in ⟨p. 96⟩strictnesse of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
rVise Thom. par. 2a 2ae, q. 14. a. 9. & q. 21. a. 1.2. Quicquid facimus, aut malitiae, aut virt••tis gerimu• imperio. Senes. ep. 107.
sMediū est, quod nec in virtutibus est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praevaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.Mediū est, quod nec in virtutibꝰ est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praeuaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.
uMatth. 5.45.46. [Greek or Hebrew]; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbiter. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.Matth. 5.45.46. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbitrer. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawful to be done, but is no necessary duty, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left undone without sin. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it bind the Creature guided by reason xto do nothing but what is good, and to do good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to do all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choice whether of them he will do, being not necessarily tied unto or enjoined any one of them: As for a student having divers books about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present employment, there being no special occasion to urge the use of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a pair of knives about him, it is indifferent to draw and use either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either choose or refuse ••ther do or leave undone.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawfull to be done, but is no necessarie dutie, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left vndone without sinne. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it binde the Creature guided by reason xto doe nothing but what is good, and to doe good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to doe all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choise whether of them he will doe, being not necessarily tied vnto or enjoyned any one of them: As for a student hauing diuers bookes about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present imployment, there being no speciall occasion to vrge the vse of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a paire of kniues about him, it is indifferent to draw and vse either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either chuse or refuse ••ther doe or leaue vndone.
*Adiaphora collocat Gel. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, sive imperet pater, sive non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, ut mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, ut manda tum non admittant: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc usurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreate. rule spec. § 4.Adiaphora collocat Gell. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, siue imperet pater, siue non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, vt mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, vt manda tum non admittāt: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc vsurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Caluin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreat. rule spec. § 4.
§ 5. Now this Caution divideth it self into two distinct branches according to the divers quality ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swerve from this indifferency.
§ 5. Now this Caution diuideth it selfe into two distinct branches according to the diuers qualitie ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swarne from this indifferencie.
The former is that Lots may not be used in ought evidently unlawful or in it self evil, either in the omission of some necessary good duty, or in the yielding to ought simply wicked, ungodly, or unjust, and so consequently where at the present it is evidently apparent upon other grounds what a man ought to choose or to refuse. For a Lot, as we have seen, is casual: and to put a necessary act to a casual event, cannot be without sin, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessary. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall do it or no, for which he seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should do it or not do it. What a man seeth evident grounds against, that he may not do: and look what he may not lawfully do, that he may not put to hazard whether he shall do or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessary ground for, that he is necessarily bound to do: what he is necessarily bound unto, he may not refuse or forbear to do: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
The former is that Lots may not bee vsed in ought euidently vnlawfull or in it selfe euill, either in the omission of some necessarie good dutie, or in the yeelding to ought simply wicked, vngodly, or vniust, and so consequently where at the present it is euidently apparent vpon other grounds what a man ought to chuse or to refuse. For a Lot, as we haue seene, is casuall: and to put a necessarie act to a casuall euent, cannot be without sinne, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessarie. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall doe it or no, for which hee seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should doe it or not doe it. What a man seeth euident grounds against, that he may not doe: and looke what hee may not lawfully doe, that hee may not put to hazard whether he shall doe or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessarie ground for, that he is necessarily bound to doe: what he is necessarily bound vnto, he may not refuse or forbeare to doe: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweal, whereof some are fit, some are altogether unfit for it, or some fitter, some less fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst them all, which of them shall have it, were utterly unlawful: For it were to hazard the binding of themselves to do that which they ought not to do, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholly unfit, as it fell out when the High-priesthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a silly rude Clown, that for simpleness scarce knew what the High-priesthood meant, and became therefore a scorn to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choice may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to pass: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitness or unfitness, *of the worth or unworthiness of those that be put together upon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemn such promiscuous Lotteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of employment: yet gwhere divers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequality, so that hhowsoever the Lot fall, it cannot light amiss, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not miss but hit a good man, there were it not unlawful to dispose a place or office, were it civill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for divers by sundry persons on either side engaged, who may all by that means be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched upon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweale, whereof some are fit, some are altogether vnfit for it, or some fitter, some lesse fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst thē al, which of them shal haue it, were vtterly vnlawfull: For it were to hazard the binding of themselues to doe that which they ought not to doe, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholy vnfit, as it fell out when the High-preisthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a sily rude Clowne, that for simplenesse scarce knew what the High-preisthood meant, and became therefore a scorne to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choise may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to passe: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitnesse or vnfitnesse, *of the worth or vnworthinesse of those that bee put together vpon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemne such promiscuous Loteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of imploiment: yet gwhere diuers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequalitie, so that hhowsoeuer the Lot fall, it cannot light amisse, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not misse but hit a good man, there were it not vnlawfull to dispose a place or office, were it ciuill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for diuers by sundrie persons on either side engaged, who may all by that meanes be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched vpon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
aPeccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Navarre. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, ubi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno favere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.Peccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Nauar. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, vbi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno fauere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.
b[Greek or Hebrew]. Joseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ioseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.
cSors ad parum idon•es deerrabat. Tacit annal. l. 13.
d[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo. de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Isocr. in Areop. [Greek or Hebrew]. Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort• non est electio: ubi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in Psalm. 30. Sort & urna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte eventus est, non judicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sort melioribus ultimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de constit. princip.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo. de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. . Isocr. in Areop. . Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort non est electio: vbi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lottery, that the Lottery might go only among such as were of some sufficiency, so again after the Lottery there was a public *trial of them, and an inquiry made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faulty they might be rejected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some special kind of skill, military, musical or the like, either were mexempted wholly from Lottery, or the Lot went namong such only, as upon due trial were found to be expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence used without just cause in this kind: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Physician when they are sick, or a Pilot when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they have not had some good trial before, or assurance otherwise: much less were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helm of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-over-head that the Lot might light upon. Again for private men in some danger and distress weary of their lives to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were unlawful: because a plain breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared upon some special occasion, as qwith the Jews where some offender was given them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discuss the lawfulness of that course, but taking it to be granted that some one is upon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here rif the parties be unlike, the one a debauched Rogue that hath been before oft in the like villainies, the other but a Novice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first known offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not unlikely to prove an honest man afterward; for the public Magistrate it were unfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lotery, that the Lotery might go onely among such as were of some sufficiencie, so againe after the Lotery there was a publike *triall of them, and an inquirie made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faultie they might be reiected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some speciall kinde of skill, military, musicall or the like, either were mexempted wholy from Lotery, or the Lot went namong such onely, as vpon due triall were found to bee expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence vsed without iust cause in this kinde: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Phisitian when they are sicke, or a Pilote when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they haue not had some good triall before, or assurance otherwise: much lesse were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helme of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-ouer-head that the Lot might light vpon. Againe for priuate men in some danger and distresse weary of their liues to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were vnlawfull: because a plaine breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared vpon some speciall occasion, as qwith the Iewes where some offendor was giuen them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discusse the lawfulnesse of that course, but taking it to bee granted that some one is vpon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here r
k[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist pit. l. 4. c. 16. [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. 6. Jude [Greek or Hebrew] dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in comment. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist p•it. l. 4. c. 16. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. 6. Iude 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in com•ent. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
*[Greek or Hebrew]. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes [Greek or Hebrew]. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. [Greek or Hebrew]. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, juramento adigebatur, [Greek or Hebrew], id indicare. Lysias in Philon.
whereas in war, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maim to the whole, and again passing by all would be a matter of evil example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deserving death, and being in the power of the General to put all to death, it is lawful for him to tithe them, as we said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saved, who slain.
whereas in warre, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maime to the whole, and againe passing by all would be a matter of euill example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deseruing death, and being in the power of the Generall to put all to death, it is lawfull for him to tithe them, as wee said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saued, who slaine.
sNe in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, ut poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.Ne in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, vt poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.
In matter of alms and liberality, for a man to make Beggars usually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his alms and his prodigality (for that term would best fit it,) as tthe mad Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩[…] ⟨p. 101⟩[…] ⟨p. 102⟩by advice: Or again where two Persons in want crave that relief of a man which but one of them can have, it being apparent that the one hath far more need then the other, and is nearer to the party in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because he may evidently see here xwhether is rather to be relieved, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to avoid the clamour of many much alike poor suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall have it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a tool of some trade which two poor men of that trade are Suitors to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twain shall have the tool, were neither unlawful nor unfit.
In matter of almes and liberalitie, for a man to make Beggers vsually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his almes and his prodigality (for that tearme would best fit it,) as tthe madde Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩〈…〉⟨p. 101⟩〈…〉⟨p. 102⟩by aduice: Or againe where two Persons in want craue that reliefe of a man which but one of them can haue, it being apparent that the one hath farre more neede then the other, and is neerer to the partie in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because hee may euidently see here xwhether is rather to bee relieued, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to auoide the clamour of many much alike poore suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall haue it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a toole of some trade which two poore men of that trade are Suters to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twaine shall haue the toole, were neither vnlawfull nor vnfit.
tSolitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, [Greek or Hebrew]. Ex Pt•lom. Everget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.Solitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ex Pt•lom. Euerget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.
uPauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur undique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.Pauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur vndique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.
*Nec avarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• judicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• jucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be used either in necessary duties or things in themselves evil, such as may evidently at the present appear to be such.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be vsed either in necessarie duties or things in themselues euill, such as may euidently at the present appeare to be such.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be used in such things, though not otherwise in themselves evil, where by consequence the use of them may in likelihood prove Inconvenient or Inexpedient.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be vsed in such things, though not otherwise in themselues euill, where by consequence the vse of them may in likelihood proue Inconuenient or Inexpedient.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawful in themselves, become unlawful unto us when they grow Inconvenient or Inexpedient in the use of them.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawfull in themselues, become vnlawfull vnto vs when they grow Inconuenient or Inexpedient in the vse of them.
z1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod […] oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod 〈…〉 oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.
•
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Praecepta negatiua ligant semper, & ad semper.
yPraecepta affirmativa ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.Praecepta affirmatiua ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.
. Sorte & vrna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte euentus est, non iudicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sorte melioribus vltimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de constit. princip.
*Sicut aleae, sic & curiae casus delectu carens, digni• & indigni• aequè respondet. Gyraeld. Itinera•. Cambr. praesat. 1. Fortuna dignum atque indignum nequit internoscere. Pacu•. apud Cornif. ad Heren. lib. 2. §. 41.
eEt Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.Et Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.
f[Greek or Hebrew]. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Ulpia. [Greek or Hebrew]. Et Ulyss•s apud Ovid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus unum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire jubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sort, quem judicio missus videaris.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Vlpia. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et Vlyss•s apud Ouid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus vnum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire iubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sorte, quem iudicio missus videaris.
g[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lavat. in Prou. c. 16.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lauat. in Prou. c. 16.
hUbi impossibile esset ut sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque sirs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.Vbi impossibile esset vt sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque s•rs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.
i[Greek or Hebrew]. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.
if the parties be vnlike, the one a debauched Roge that hath beene before oft in the like vilanies, the other but a Nouice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first knowne offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not vnlikely to proue an honest man afterward; for the publike Magistrate it were vnfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, iuramento adigebatur, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, id indicare. Lysia• in Philon.
l[Greek or Hebrew] inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.
m[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic [Greek or Hebrew], & militares reliqui [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Athenians. [Greek or Hebrew], &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, & militares reliqui 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Atheniens. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.
n[Greek or Hebrew]. Plot. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plat. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
o[Greek or Hebrew]. Socrates apud Xenoph. [Greek or Hebrew]. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]; &c.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Socrates apud Xenoph. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; &c.
pJoseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.Ioseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.
rOportet ut par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae judicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.Oportet vt par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae iudicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.
Nec auarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• iucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.
ySi cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobus dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm ut sort eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari utrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.Si cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobꝰ dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm vt sorte eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari vtrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.
