Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
Yet nevertheless most true it is, that rno particular moral action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessity be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeed the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessary, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no special matte• of goodness in them, as for a man to eat when he is hungry, to drink when he is athirst, tto provide carefully for his own Family, uto love those that love him, and the like, which yet in ⟨p. 96⟩strictness of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
Yet neuerthelesse most true it is, that rno particular morall action, or no action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word or disconformable thereunto. In common speech indeede the word Indifferent according to this acception is taken in some latitude of signification, when it is attributed to such actions as though good and warrantable, yea or necessarie, yet sare not greatly praise-worthy, because there is no speciall matte• of goodnesse in them, as for a man to eate when he is hungrie, to drinke when he is athirst, tto prouide carefully for his owne Family,
to loue those that loue him, and the like, which yet in
⟨p. 96⟩
strictnesse of truth according to this acception are not absolutely indifferent.
rVise Thom. par. 2a 2ae, q. 14. a. 9. & q. 21. a. 1.2. Quicquid facimus, aut malitiae, aut virt••tis gerimu• imperio. Senes. ep. 107.
sMediū est, quod nec in virtutibus est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praevaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.Mediū est, quod nec in virtutibꝰ est nec in vitijs. Cic. de fin. l. 3. Indifferens nihil gloriosum. Sen. ep. 83. Neglecta quaedam offensam contrabunt, quae impleta gloriam non merentur; & damnant praeuaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & dispens.
uMatth. 5.45.46. [Greek or Hebrew]; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbiter. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.Matth. 5.45.46. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; Quid magnifici est se amara, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. benef. l. 4. c. 14. Si quid amicum erga benefeci, aut consului fideliter; non videor meruisse laudem, culpa caruisse arbitrer. Plant. trinum. act. 5. scen. 2.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawful to be done, but is no necessary duty, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left undone without sin. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it bind the Creature guided by reason xto do nothing but what is good, and to do good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to do all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choice whether of them he will do, being not necessarily tied unto or enjoined any one of them: As for a student having divers books about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present employment, there being no special occasion to urge the use of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a pair of knives about him, it is indifferent to draw and use either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either choose or refuse ••ther do or leave undone.
In the latter sense that is said to be indifferent *that is good and lawfull to be done, but is no necessarie dutie, that may either be committed or omitted, done or left vndone without sinne. And thus are many particular actions indifferent. The ground whereof is this; because the Law of God though it binde the Creature guided by reason xto doe nothing but what is good, and to doe good at all times, yet yit bindeth him not to doe all good at once or at all times; so that many good things there are that may at sometime be done, whereof a man may make choise whether of them he will doe, being not necessarily tied vnto or enjoyned any one of them: As for a student hauing diuers bookes about him in his study it is indifferent to choose one this or that, refusing the rest, for present imployment, there being no speciall occasion to vrge the vse of one more then of another: Or zfor a man that carieth a paire of kniues about him, it is indifferent to draw and vse either when occasion requireth. And of this nature in this Caution is the thing required to be, that is put to a Lot, to wit, such as a man may lawfully either chuse or refuse ••ther doe or leaue vndone.
*Adiaphora collocat Gel. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, sive imperet pater, sive non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, ut mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, ut manda tum non admittant: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc usurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreate. rule spec. § 4.Adiaphora collocat Gell. l. 2. c. 7. inter ea quae sua virecta & hon•sta sunt, & quae his contraria turpia & omninò iniqua sunt: illa fieri oportere, siue imperet pater, siue non i• peret; ista nec fi imperet: in medijs solummodò parendū. Id quod I•an. Sari•h. polyer. l. 6. c. 12. Quaedam ita necessaria sun•, vt mandatum nec exp• ctent; alia sic detestabilia, vt manda tum non admittāt: media quae nec sunt necessaria bona, nec detestabilia •ala, consistunt in arbitrio praesidentis. Adiaphora quae nec praecepta sunt lege Dei, nec prohibita. M•lanch. loc. commun. •oc. 21. reg. 2. noc necessariò facienda, nec necessariò vitanda. Ibid. loc. 23. reg. 2. quae nunc vsurpare, nunc omittere, indifferenter liceat. Caluin. institut. l. 3 c. 19. §. 7. Things indifferent, neither simply commanded, nor forbidden, but left free. Fenner of recreat. rule spec. § 4.
§ 5. Now this Caution divideth it self into two distinct branches according to the divers quality ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swerve from this indifferency.
§ 5. Now this Caution diuideth it selfe into two distinct branches according to the diuers qualitie ⟨p. 97⟩of those things that oppose to, or swarne from this indifferencie.
The former is that Lots may not be used in ought evidently unlawful or in it self evil, either in the omission of some necessary good duty, or in the yielding to ought simply wicked, ungodly, or unjust, and so consequently where at the present it is evidently apparent upon other grounds what a man ought to choose or to refuse. For a Lot, as we have seen, is casual: and to put a necessary act to a casual event, cannot be without sin, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessary. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall do it or no, for which he seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should do it or not do it. What a man seeth evident grounds against, that he may not do: and look what he may not lawfully do, that he may not put to hazard whether he shall do or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessary ground for, that he is necessarily bound to do: what he is necessarily bound unto, he may not refuse or forbear to do: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
The former is that Lots may not bee vsed in ought euidently vnlawfull or in it selfe euill, either in the omission of some necessarie good dutie, or in the yeelding to ought simply wicked, vngodly, or vniust, and so consequently where at the present it is euidently apparent vpon other grounds what a man ought to chuse or to refuse. For a Lot, as we haue seene, is casuall: and to put a necessarie act to a casuall euent, cannot be without sinne, since it maketh that casual and contingent which Gods law maketh necessarie. *In such cases therefore a man is to follow the grounds and to be led by the rules of religion and reason; and not to put that to hazard whether he shall doe it or no, for which hee seeth and knoweth already good grounds why he should doe it or not doe it. What a man seeth euident grounds against, that he may not doe: and looke what hee may not lawfully doe, that hee may not put to hazard whether he shall doe or no. And on the other side what a man seeth necessarie ground for, that he is necessarily bound to doe: what he is necessarily bound vnto, he may not refuse or forbeare to doe: and wha•••e may not refuse, he may not put to the hazard of refusing.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweal, whereof some are fit, some are altogether unfit for it, or some fitter, some less fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst them all, which of them shall have it, were utterly unlawful: For it were to hazard the binding of themselves to do that which they ought not to do, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholly unfit, as it fell out when the High-priesthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a silly rude Clown, that for simpleness scarce knew what the High-priesthood meant, and became therefore a scorn to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choice may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to pass: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitness or unfitness, *of the worth or unworthiness of those that be put together upon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemn such promiscuous Lotteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of employment: yet gwhere divers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequality, so that hhowsoever the Lot fall, it cannot light amiss, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not miss but hit a good man, there were it not unlawful to dispose a place or office, were it civill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for divers by sundry persons on either side engaged, who may all by that means be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched upon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
To illustrate this by some instances. Where many stand for an office either in Church or Commonweale, whereof some are fit, some are altogether vnfit for it, or some fitter, some lesse fit with very manifest difference, in this case for those persons in whose power it is to call and admit thereunto, ⟨p. 98⟩ato put it to Lot amongst thē al, which of them shal haue it, were vtterly vnlawfull: For it were to hazard the binding of themselues to doe that which they ought not to doe, as it may fall out, to accept of one either wholy vnfit, as it fell out when the High-preisthood was once so put to Lot, bthe Lot lighting on a sily rude Clowne, that for simplenesse scarce knew what the High-preisthood meant, and became therefore a scorne to all sorts; or not so fit as were fit where better choise may be had; as cin some offices at Rome it came sometime to passe: Since dthe Lot maketh no difference of good or bad; nor taketh any notice of the fitnesse or vnfitnesse, *of the worth or vnworthinesse of those that bee put together vpon it. In which regard though emany worthily condemne such promiscuous Loteries, and prefer for the most part, and that justly, other courses of election before that by Lot: ⟨p. 99⟩and fit is generally accounted a greater credit for a man to be elected then to be allotted to any place of imploiment: yet gwhere diuers Competitors are judged alike fit, or are all fit in some good competency though with some small inequalitie, so that hhowsoeuer the Lot fall, it cannot light amisse, that as he said sometime, ithough a man should cast blindfold at them, he could not misse but hit a good man, there were it not vnlawfull to dispose a place or office, were it ciuill or sacred, by Lot among such; especially when there shall be much labouring and contending for diuers by sundrie persons on either side engaged, who may all by that meanes be quieted, and some one picked out and pitched vpon without disgrace to any of his Competitors, or discontentment to their friends.
aPeccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Navarre. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, ubi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno favere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.Peccat, qui sortesiacit ad electionem beneficij Eccles. nullo prius habito id•neorum delectu. Martin. Nauar. manual. c. 11. §. 38. Iniqua est sortitio, vbi de officijs public•s digni cum indignis sortes mitterent: poss•t enim sors indigno fauere, cum damno publico, & digniorum iniuria. Delrio. disquis. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1.
b[Greek or Hebrew]. Joseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ioseph. captiu. l. 4 c. 12.
cSors ad parum idon•es deerrabat. Tacit annal. l. 13.
d[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo. de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Isocr. in Areop. [Greek or Hebrew]. Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort• non est electio: ubi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in Psalm. 30. Sort & urna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte eventus est, non judicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sort melioribus ultimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de constit. princip.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist•t. Rhetoric. lib. 2. cap. 20. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo. de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. . Isocr. in Areop. . Chrysost. ad Ephes. homil. 2. In sort non est electio: vbi merita considerantur, electio est, non sors. August. in
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lottery, that the Lottery might go only among such as were of some sufficiency, so again after the Lottery there was a public *trial of them, and an inquiry made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faulty they might be rejected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some special kind of skill, military, musical or the like, either were mexempted wholly from Lottery, or the Lot went namong such only, as upon due trial were found to be expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence used without just cause in this kind: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Physician when they are sick, or a Pilot when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they have not had some good trial before, or assurance otherwise: much less were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helm of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-over-head that the Lot might light upon. Again for private men in some danger and distress weary of their lives to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were unlawful: because a plain breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared upon some special occasion, as qwith the Jews where some offender was given them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discuss the lawfulness of that course, but taking it to be granted that some one is upon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here rif the parties be unlike, the one a debauched Rogue that hath been before oft in the like villainies, the other but a Novice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first known offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not unlikely to prove an honest man afterward; for the public Magistrate it were unfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
And to this purpose in most estates, where offices were disposed by Lot, as there went kan election before the Lotery, that the Lotery might go onely among such as were of some sufficiencie, so againe after the Lotery there was a publike *triall of them, and an inquirie made into the courses and abilities of such as the Lot had ⟨p. 100⟩lighted on, that if they were found insufficient or faultie they might be reiected, and lothers taken in in their steed. Besides that those places that required some speciall kinde of skill, military, musicall or the like, either were mexempted wholy from Lotery, or the Lot went namong such onely, as vpon due triall were found to bee expert in that particular. Neither was there great diligence vsed without iust cause in this kinde: for oif men would be loath by Lot to take a Phisitian when they are sicke, or a Pilote when they are to go to sea, of whose skill they haue not had some good triall before, or assurance otherwise: much lesse were it fit by Lot, without further enquiry, to commit the helme of the estate and the life of many hundreds into the hand of any one hand-ouer-head that the Lot might light vpon. Againe for priuate men in some danger and distresse weary of their liues to cast Lots, as pthey sometime did, who shall slay either other, were vnlawfull: because a plaine breach of Gods precept: or where two Malefactors are condemned to death, but the one is to be spared vpon some speciall occasion, as qwith the Iewes where some offendor was giuen them to grace their feast, (I stand now to discusse the lawfulnesse of that course, but taking it to bee granted that some one is vpon good ground to be ⟨p. 101⟩spared) here r
k[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist pit. l. 4. c. 16. [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. 6. Jude [Greek or Hebrew] dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in comment. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et, [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist p•it. l. 4. c. 16. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. 6. Iude 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dicti qui a•sp•m sortis admitt••tur •ud. in com•ent. Hi•• D•mosth. in Eu•ulid 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
*[Greek or Hebrew]. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et [Greek or Hebrew]. Ibid. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes [Greek or Hebrew]. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. [Greek or Hebrew]. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, juramento adigebatur, [Greek or Hebrew], id indicare. Lysias in Philon.
whereas in war, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maim to the whole, and again passing by all would be a matter of evil example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deserving death, and being in the power of the General to put all to death, it is lawful for him to tithe them, as we said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saved, who slain.
whereas in warre, as before, when a whole band hath offended, swhere the cutting off of all would be too great a maime to the whole, and againe passing by all would be a matter of euill example, here time being not afforded to consider of particulars, who may best be spared, or who are worthiest to be punished, all alike deseruing death, and being in the power of the Generall to put all to death, it is lawfull for him to tithe them, as wee said they did sometime, and by Lot to decide who shall be saued, who slaine.
sNe in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, ut poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.Ne in bello propter hostium metum miles deficeret, amplier ei mortis & supplicij metus est à maioribus constitu•us: ne autem nimium multi poenam capitis subivent, idcircò illa sortitio comparata est. Cic. ibid. Sic enim fieri posse, vt poena ad paucus, exemplum ad multos per•eniret. Donat. in Scipion.
In matter of alms and liberality, for a man to make Beggars usually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his alms and his prodigality (for that term would best fit it,) as tthe mad Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩[…] ⟨p. 101⟩[…] ⟨p. 102⟩by advice: Or again where two Persons in want crave that relief of a man which but one of them can have, it being apparent that the one hath far more need then the other, and is nearer to the party in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because he may evidently see here xwhether is rather to be relieved, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to avoid the clamour of many much alike poor suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall have it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a tool of some trade which two poor men of that trade are Suitors to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twain shall have the tool, were neither unlawful nor unfit.
In matter of almes and liberalitie, for a man to make Beggers vsually as he meeteth them, draw cuts for his money, were to play and make sport with his almes and his prodigality (for that tearme would best fit it,) as tthe madde Antiochus sometime did, and as uBernard saith the Pope doth with his; and so were but to abuse a Lot for the inconsiderate casting away of that, *that ought to be disposed of ⟨p. 100⟩〈…〉⟨p. 101⟩〈…〉⟨p. 102⟩by aduice: Or againe where two Persons in want craue that reliefe of a man which but one of them can haue, it being apparent that the one hath farre more neede then the other, and is neerer to the partie in whose power it is to dispose of, for him to make them draw cuts for it in this case were not warrantable, because hee may euidently see here xwhether is rather to bee relieued, and may not therefore hazard the defeating of him. But for those that be in office to auoide the clamour of many much alike poore suing for some pension, to cast Lots among them which shall haue it for the present, and which expect it hereafter; or yfor a man that hath a toole of some trade which two poore men of that trade are Suters to him for, there being no ground for him to pleasure the one rather then the other, here likewise by Lot to determine whether of the twaine shall haue the toole, were neither vnlawfull nor vnfit.
tSolitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, [Greek or Hebrew]. Ex Pt•lom. Everget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.Solitum A•tiochum Epiphan•m, vel Epimanem potius, effusis per viam publicam nunamis dicere, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ex Pt•lom. Euerget. comment. l. 5. Athenae. l. 10.
uPauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur undique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.Pauperum vita in plateis di•ilum seminatur. Argentum micat in luto: accurritur vndique: tollit illud non pauperior, sed fortior, a•t quifor•ècilius praecucurrit. Scilice• sic factirabat Petius, sic Paulus ludeba•. Bern de consider. l. 4.
*Nec avarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• judicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• jucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be used either in necessary duties or things in themselves evil, such as may evidently at the present appear to be such.
§ 6. And thus was the former branch of this Caution that Lots are not to be vsed either in necessarie duties or things in themselues euill, such as may euidently at the present appeare to be such.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be used in such things, though not otherwise in themselves evil, where by consequence the use of them may in likelihood prove Inconvenient or Inexpedient.
The latter branch is that Lots may not be vsed in such things, though not otherwise in themselues euill, where by consequence the vse of them may in likelihood proue Inconuenient or Inexpedient.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawful in themselves, become unlawful unto us when they grow Inconvenient or Inexpedient in the use of them.
The reason is apparent; because zthings indifferent and such as are good and lawfull in themselues, become vnlawfull vnto vs when they grow Inconuenient or Inexpedient in the vse of them.
z1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod […] oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.1. Cor. 6.12. & 10.23. Est aliquid quod 〈…〉 oporteat, etia•s• licet. Cic. pro Balb•. Quid decoat vos, non quantum liceat vobis, spectare debetis. Idem pro Rabir.
In matters therefore of indifferency that of themselves ⟨p. 103⟩are not evil, yet are such as by some circumstance they may easily become evil, great regard ought to be had of the conveniency and expediency of them. Where under the head of inconveniency I comprehend all such things, as may tend to any outward evil: unto the head of Inexpediency I refer all such things as may bring a man within danger of some spiritual evil.
In matters therefore of indifferencie that of themselues ⟨p. 103⟩are not euill, yet are such as by some circumstance they may easily become euill, great regard ought to be had of the conueniencie and expediencie of them. Where vnder the head of inconueniencie I comprehend all such things, as may tend to any outward euill: vnto the head of Inexpediency I referre all such things as may bring a man within danger of some spirituall euill.
For the former point of Conveniency and Inconveniency the rule is, that because things in themselves otherwise lawful and warrantable may seem Convenient in some respects, and Inconvenient in others, that therefore where the Conveniences and the Inconveniences shall be laid in an even balance of equal and indifferent judgement, either against' other the action is to be deemed either Convenient or Inconvenient, as the one side shall appear to weigh down the other: that is to say, The Conveniences being more or weightier make the thing questioned Convenient, the Inconveniences being more and weightier make it justly deemed Inconvenient.
For the former point of Conueniencie and Inconueniencie the rule is, that because things in themselues otherwise lawfull and warrantable may seeme Conuenient in some respects, and Inconuenient in others, that therefore where the Conueniences and the Inconueniences shall be laid in an euen ballance of equall and indifferent iudgement, either against' other the action is to be deemed either Conuenient or Inconuenient, as the one side shall appeare to weigh downe the other: that is to say, The Conueniences being more or weightier make the thing questioned Conuenient, the Inconueniences being more and weightier make it iustly deemed Inconuenient.
To apply this to the present; In the Use of a Lot about a matter of it self otherwise not evil, if the Conveniences shall be so many and so weighty on the one side, that they may well weigh down whatsoever Inconveniences may be produced on the other side, there the action is Convenient, and a Lot therefore lawful: but contrariwise where the Inconveniences that shall necessarily or in good probability appear to accompany the thing questioned or ensue upon the doing of it shall be such and ⟨p. 104⟩so great, as the Conveniences that stand on the other side shall not be able to countervail, there the action is worthily disallowed as Inconvenient, and a Lot consequently unlawful.
To apply this to the present; In the Vse of a Lot about a matter of it selfe otherwise not euill, if the Conueniences shall be so many and so weighty on the one side, that they may wel weigh downe whatsoeuer Inconueniences may be produced on the other side, there the action is Conuenient, and a Lot therefore lawfull: but contrariwise where the Inconueniences that shall necessarily or in good probability appeare to accompanie the thing questioned or ensue vpon the doing of it shall be such and ⟨p. 104⟩so great, as the Conueniences that stand on the other side shall not be able to counteruaile, there the action is worthily disallowed as Inconuenient, and a Lot consequently vnlawfull.
Thus in public affairs for the giving of some few private men contentment to admit a Lot where the admission of it may in likelihood prove prejudicial to the public, were an unwise course and an unwarrantable, because the public weighing down the private maketh the action inconvenient. Where it is worth the observing that albeit among the Romans the ordinary employments of their Officers, and many other affairs were ordered oft-times by Lot, yet awhen any extraordinary accident fell out, or any business to be dispatched of more special weight, they either left wholly then their Lottery, or blimited the course of it (which yet cafter when things were quieted and settled they returned again unto) and though those in office themselves ddesired, ⟨p. 105⟩yea eurged it and instantly called for it, that they might not seem contemned, as being balked and rejected, and others in the State-service preferred before them; yet fthe regard of the common good prevailed so far with them that they would not hearken unto them to put that to the hazard of a Lot, where the event might prove much inconvenient, which otherwise ordinarily they did.
Thus in publike affaires for the giuing of some few priuate men contentment to admit a Lot where the admission of it may in likelihood proue preiudiciall to the publike, were an vnwise course and an vnwarrantable, because the publike weighing down the priuate maketh the action inconuenient. Where it is worth the obseruing that albeit among the Romanes the ordinary imployments of their Officers, and many other affaires were ordered oft-times by Lot, yet awhen any extraordinarie accident fell out, or any busines to be dispatched of more speciall weight, they either left wholy then their Lotery, or blimited the course of it (which yet cafter when things were quieted and setled they returned againe vnto) and though those in office themselues ddesired, ⟨p. 105⟩yea evrged it and instantly called for it, that they might not seeme contemned, as being balked and reiected, and others in the State-seruice preferred before them; yet fthe regard of the common good preuailed so farre with them that they would not hearken vnto them to put that to the hazard of a Lot, where the euent might proue much inconuenient, which otherwise ordinarily they did.
aSic cum Annibal ad portas, Bellum cum Annibale Coss. mandatum: Liu. l. 24. an. 541. Consulibus belium cum Annibale & binae legions decretae: Praetors provincias sortili sunt: Liu. l. 25. an. 542. Italia ambobus provincia decreta. Jaē l. 27. an. 545. & 547. & 548. Sic Ausonum bello, Omni ope annixi sunt, ut ma•imum ea tempestate Imperatorē haberent, & ne forte casu erraretur, petitum ab Coss. ut extra sortem Coruini ea pr• uincia esset. Linius l. 8. an. 420. Sic bellum Volseum Camillo extra ordinem decretum. Idem. l. 6. an. 374. & idem Manlijs sine sort. Ibid. an. 276 Sic Martio novi hosts devernuntur. Idem l. 9. an. 448. Sic Coss. ambobus quaestio de clandestinis coniurationibus decreta est. Idem l. 39. an. 568. Sic Augustus provincias validicres, & quas annuis magistratuum imperijs regi nec facilenec tutum erat, ipse suscepit, caeteras Procensulibus s•rtitò permisit. Suet. Aug. c. 47. In bello Macedonico Coss. provincias sortiri parantes, cùm bellum produci animadu•rterent, quod rebus vix dumb inc•oatis Imperatores au•carentur, cohibuerunt patribus adnitentibus Tribuni, & Quintio imperium prorogarunt: ut Liu. l. 32. ann. 557. Provinciae quae in bello decretae. Idem l. 41. an. 577.Sic cum Annibal ad portas, Bellum cum Annibale Coss. mandatum: Liu. l. 24. ann. 541. Consulibus belium cum Annibale & binae legiones decretae: Prae•ores prouincias sortili sunt: Liu. l. 25. ann. 542. Italia ambobus prouincia decreta. Iaē l. 27. ann. 545. & 547. & 548. Sic Ausonum bello, Omni ope annixi sunt, vt ma•imum ea tempestate Imperatorē haberent, & ne forte casu erraretur, petitum ab Coss. vt extra sortem Coruini ea pr• uincia esset. Linius l. 8. ann. 420. Sic bellum Volseum Camillo extra ordinem decretum. Idem. l. 6. ann. 374. & idem Manlijs sine sorte. Ibid. ann. 276 Sic Martio noui hostes deuernuntur. Idem l. 9. ann. 448. Sic Coss. ambobus quaestio de clandestinis coniurationibus decreta est. Idem l. 39. ann. 568. Sic Augustus prouincias validicres, & quas annuis magistratuum imperijs regi nec facilenec tutum erat, ipse suscepit, caeteras Procensulibus s•rtitò permisit. Suet. Aug. c. 47. In bello Macedonico Coss. prouincias sortiri parantes, cùm bellum produci animadu•rterent, quod rebus vix dum inc•oatis Imperatores aucarentur, cohibuerunt patribus adnitentibus Tribuni, & Quintio imperium prorogarunt: vt Liu. l. 32. ann. 557. Prouinciae quae in bello decretae. Idem l. 41. ann. 577.
That is not true therefore that one of our Writers saith, that gRome directed the main course of her government by the Fortune of this mock-destiny. For neither were the Officers themselves ordinarily chosen by Lot, neither did they retain the use of it in matters of special weight or difficulty: the only constant use of it was in dividing the Provinces and Jurisdictions, as if the Judges with us should cast Lots for their Circuits; and the two in each Circuit whether should sit upon private suites, and whether upon public pleas. Which course also as they brake, where the employments were of more special importance; so, if in using the Lot, it fell not out so, as seemed behovefull for the State, hthey made bold, as they might well do, to control the Lottery, and to dispose of things otherwise.
That is not true therefore that one of our Writers saith, that gRome directed the maine course of her gouernment by the Fortune of this mocke-destinie. For neither were the Officers themselues ordinarily chosen by Lot, neither did they retaine the vse of it in matters of speciall weight or difficultie: the only constant vse of it was in diuiding the Prouinces and Iurisdictions, as if the Iudges with vs should cast Lots for their Circuits; and the two in each Circuit whether should sit vpon priuate suites, and whether vpon publike pleas. Which course also as they brake, where the imploiments were of more speciall importance; so, if in vsing the Lot, it fell not out so, as seemed behouefull for the State, hthey made bold, as they might well doe, to controle the Lotery, and to dispose of things otherwise.
gClem. Edmund on Caesars comment. l. 1. c. 20.
hMummio Praetori Sardinia e•enerat: sed ca propter belli magnitudinem consularia f•cta est. Liu. l. 41. an. 577. Baebio & At•ilio primum Senatus consulto, deinde plebis etiam scito permutala provinci• sunt. Idem l. 35. an. 562. Hostilio jurisdictio urbana e•enerat: addita & peregrina, ut tres in provincias exirent. Idem lib. 27. an. •47. Cùm de Consularibus m•asors prima exisset, una vice Senatus frequens retinendum i• urbe cemsuit; hoc idem post me P•mpris acidic […] ut nes duo quasi pignora reipublicae r•tineri videamur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. Fabiam Pictor•m Flamine•• Quirinalem cui Sardinia provincia •n•neras, M•tellus Pont. Max. ads••ra retinuit: religio vicit, & dicto audiens esse Flamen Pontifici jussus. Liu. l. 37. an. 565.Mummio Praetori Sardinia e•enerat: sed ca propter belli magnitudinem consularia f•cta est. Liu. l. 41. ann. 577. Baebio & At•ilio primum Senatus consulto, deinde plebis etiam scito permutala prouinci• sunt. Idem l. 35. ann. 562. Hostilio iurisdictio vrbana e•enerat: addita & peregrina, vt tres in prouincias exirent. Idem lib. 27. ann. •47. Cùm de Consularibus m•asors prima exisset, vna v•ce Senatus frequens retinendum i• vrbe cemsuit; hoc idem post me P•mpris accidi•〈…〉 vt nes duo quasi pignora reipublicae r•tineri videamur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. Fabiam Pictor•m Flamine•• Quirinalem cui Sardinia prouincia •n•neras, M•tellus Pont. Max. ads••ra retinuit: religio vicit, & dicto audiens esse Flamen Pontifici iussus. Liu. l. 37. ann. 565.
•
an illegible letter
〈…〉
illegible words
〈non-Latin alphabet〉
Greek or Hebrew the transcribers did not key
▪
illegible punctuation
⟨p. 12⟩
a page break in the printed book
Praecepta negatiua ligant semper, & ad semper.
yPraecepta affirmativa ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.Praecepta affirmatiua ligant semper, sed non ad semper. Thom. par. 1a 2ae q. 71. a. 5. & q. 100. a. 10. & q. 88. a. 1 & par. 2a 2ae q. 3. a. 2. & Gerson. in regul. moral.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plut. de Stoic. contradict.
. Sorte & vrna mores non discerni. Heluidius apud Ta•it. hist. lib. 4. In sorte euentus est, non iudicium, & saepe irrationabili casu sorte melioribus vltimus quisque prafertur. Ambros. hexam. lib. 5. cap. 21. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de constit. princip.
*Sicut aleae, sic & curiae casus delectu carens, digni• & indigni• aequè respondet. Gyraeld. Itinera•. Cambr. praesat. 1. Fortuna dignum atque indignum nequit internoscere. Pacu•. apud Cornif. ad Heren. lib. 2. §. 41.
eEt Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat [Greek or Hebrew]. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.Et Isocrat. in Areopag. laudat 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de apibus Ambros. he•am. lib. 5. cap. 21. Rex non sorte ducitur.
f[Greek or Hebrew]. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Ulpia. [Greek or Hebrew]. Et Ulyss•s apud Ovid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus unum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire jubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sort, quem judicio missus videaris.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Demost in Midia. ad quem lo•um Vlpia. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et Vlyss•s apud Ouid. met. 13. Est a•iquid de tot Graiarum millibus vnum A Diomede legi. ••c me sors ire iubebat. Et Plin. Ep. 24. lib 8. Ne sorte, quem iudicio missus videaris.
g[Greek or Hebrew]. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lavat. in Prou. c. 16.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Arist polit. l. 6. c. 3. Sortes licitae sunt quibus functiones certae viris idoneis tribu••tur. Lauat. in Prou. c. 16.
hUbi impossibile esset ut sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque sirs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.Vbi impossibile esset vt sors aberraret. Bulling. in Act. 1. quia nu• um tunc est periculum, quacunque s•rs exe•t. Bellarm. de cler. l. 1. c. 5.
i[Greek or Hebrew]. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Cyrus apud Xenoph. Paed. l. 8.
if the parties be vnlike, the one a debauched Roge that hath beene before oft in the like vilanies, the other but a Nouice newly fallen to the trade, and the present his first knowne offence; or the one an obstinate and desperate wretch, the other penitent and not vnlikely to proue an honest man afterward; for the publike Magistrate it were vnfit here to put it to hazard whether to spare or to punish:
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Pla•o de leg l. 6. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ibid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aeschin. in Cresiph. Hinc orationes 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et D•m•sth. in Mid•am, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et de Thesmothetis Libanius in Androt. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Sed & Senatū quisqu• ingressus, iuramento adigebatur, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, id indicare. Lysia• in Philon.
l[Greek or Hebrew] inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 inde dicti: de quo priu• cap. 4. §. 6.
m[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic [Greek or Hebrew], & militares reliqui [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Athenians. [Greek or Hebrew], &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. polit. l. 6. c. 2. Sic 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, & militares reliqui 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. l. 6. Sic & Atheniens. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, &c. Pollux l 8. c. 8. § 7.
n[Greek or Hebrew]. Plot. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plat. leg. l. 6. Hinc Lysias in Alcibiadem 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
o[Greek or Hebrew]. Socrates apud Xenoph. [Greek or Hebrew]. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. [Greek or Hebrew]; &c.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Socrates apud Xenoph. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. 1. Cui geminum illud Philonis de constit. princip. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; &c.
pJoseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.Ioseph. captiu. l. 3. c. 26. & l. 7. c. 35.
rOportet ut par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae judicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.Oportet vt par sit sortientium reatus. Delri•. disq. mag. l. 4. c. 4. q. 1. Alioqui, Sortiri ad poenam, atque hominum delictum fortunae iudicio committere, minimè censorium est. Cic. pro Cluent.
Nec auarum te Deus, nec profusum vult: collocare te vult quae babes, non pr•ijcere. Aug. de 10. chord c. 12. Beneficia nec in vulgus effundenda sunt; & nullius r••, mi •imè benefici•rum, bonesta largitio est: quibus si detra•cr• iudicium, desinunt esse beneficia, in aliut quodlibe• iucidunt nomen. S••ec. benef l. 1. c. 2.
ySi cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobus dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm ut sort eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari utrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.Si cum tibi abundaret aliquid, quod oport•ret dari ei qui non haberet, nee duobꝰ dari posset; occurrerent duo, quorum neuter vel indigentia, vel crga te aliqua necessitudine superaret, nibiliustius fac•res, quàm vt sorte eligeres, cui da•dū asset, quod dari vtrique non posset. Aug. de doctrin• Christ. l. 1. c. 28.
•
bQuas provincias Praetoribus esse placeret, Consul ad Senatum retulit: decreverunt duas Romae, duas in Italia, duas extra Italiam; & extemplo sortiri jussi, Liu. l. 38. ann. 567. Nominatae jam antea Coss. provinciae erant: tum sortiri jussi. Idem l. 21. an. 536. Coss. Aetoliam & Asiam sortiri placuit. Idem l. 37. an. 565. Ligures & Galliam. Ibid. 38. an 566. Senatus decrevit ut Coss. duas Gallias sortireutur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. His ita in Senatu, ad id, qua cuius provincia foret, decretis, tum demum sortiri Coss. placuit. Liu. l. 36.Quas prouincias Praetoribus esse placeret, Consul ad Senatum retulit: decreuerunt duas Romae, duas in Italia, duas extra Italiam; & extemplo sortiri iussi, Liu. l. 38. ann. 567. Nominatae iam antea Coss. prouinciae erant: tum sortiri iussi. Idem l. 21. ann. 536. Coss. Aetoliam & Asiam sortiri placuit. Idem l. 37. ann. 565. Ligures & Galliam. Ibid. 38. ann 566. Senatus decreuit vt Coss. duas Gallias sortireutur. Cic. ad Attic. Epist. 14. His ita in Senatu, ad id, qua cuius prouincia foret, decretis, tum demum sortiri Coss. placuit. Liu. l. 36.
cCoss. cùm jam minus terroris à paeni• esset, sortiri jus•. Liu. l. 26. an. 543.Coss. cùm iam minus terroris à paeni• esset, sortiri ius•. Liu. l. 26. ann. 543.
dItaliam & Africam in sortem con•ci, ambo Africam cupientes volebant: populus rogatus quom vellet in Africam bellum gerere, Scipionem jussit. Liu. l. 30. Coss. ut Macedoniam cum Italia sortirentur petelant: ambobus Italia decreta. Ibid. 32.Italiam & Africam in sortem con•ci, ambo Africam cupientes volebant: populus rogatus quom vellet in Africam bellum gerere, Scipionem iussit. Liu. l. 30. Coss. vt Macedoniam cum Italia sortirentur petelant: ambobus Italia decreta. Ibid. 32.
eDecius iniuriam querebatur, irrita sieri fortunae arbitria: omnes ante se Cuss. previncias sortitos, nune extra so•tem Fabio Senatum dare provinciam: cui d•bium esse, ubibellum sit asperum & difficile, cum id alte• extra sortem mandetur, quin alter Consul pro superua•aneo a•que inutili habeatur? Liu. l. 10.Decius iniuriam querebatur, irrita sieri fortunae arbitria: omnes ante se C•ss. preuincias sortitos, nune extra so•tem Fabio Senatum dare prouinciam: cui d•bium esse, vbibellum sit asperum & difficile, cum id alte• extra sortem mandetur, quin alter Consul pro superua•aneo a•que inutili habeatur? Liu. l. 10.
fPopuli consensu Hetruria extra sortem Fabio decreta est. Ibid.
