Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
To which kind of Lot-sports or Lot-games (which shall be the last, and so I leave them) may their aBanquet-lotteries be added, which we find two sorts of, some free, some set to sale, and both ⟨p. 123⟩containing either matter of free gift, or matter of charge and expense, or mixed matter of either. For so we read that bAugustus used con some Festivals and at other times by Lot to distribute certain gifts among his guests, some of worth and value, as gold, silver, and garments, and coins of all sorts foreign, ancient, and others; and some again mere toys and trifles, as dheir-clothes, and sponges, and pincers, or scissors and the like, with merry Posies upon them eof doubtful and double sense, seeming to glance at and nip them to whose Lot they were fallen. So likewise that monster of men fHeliogabalus, a second Nero, used to propound to whom he pleased, both in public and private, certain mixed Lots, some matter of gift, some matter of charge, of such extreme inequality, that some were neither mended nor impaired at all, but mocked only, gsome were made, as we say, and some utterly undone by them: for some according to that they drew were to pay in and lay down, either a pound of beef, or a dead dog, or ten flies, or ten fleas, or ten bears, or ten camels, or so many pounds of lead, or as many of silver, or gold, &c. And others again were to receive the like, as their Lot came: which made many rich that were poor before, and others as poor that were rich before: the monster delighting in nothing more then in the mischief and miseries of many. And these Lots were sometimes either written or painted h
on their spoons, as we have commonly on fruit-trenchers painted emblems and poe•ies, that sometime we use to make sport withal somewhat after that manner.
⟨p. 122⟩
[…]
⟨p. 123⟩
[…]
⟨p. 124⟩
Again sometime were such Lots as these in mirth set to sale: for
so used Augustus to do sometime with his Lots; as also with pictures showing the backside of them only; in merriment propounding them to those fthat were at board with him, that none might come in but upon a price to draw in the one, and he that would at adventure bid most, should have the other. Not altogether unlike to
our riflings and Lotteries, wherein a certain number or so many as will venture their money are admitted to cast dice or to draw Lots for some prize or prizes propounded;
To which kinde of Lot-sports or Lot-games (which shall be the last, and so I leaue them) may their aBanquet-loteries be added, which we finde two sorts of, some free, some set to sale, and both ⟨p. 123⟩containing either matter of free gift, or matter of charge and expence, or mixt matter of either. For so we reade that bAugustus vsed con some Festiuals and at other times by Lot to distribute certaine gifts among his guests, some of worth and value, as gold, siluer, and garments, and coines of all sorts foraine, auncient, and others; and some againe meere toies and triffles, as dheire-clothes, and spunges, and pinsers, or scissers and the like, with merry Poesies vpon them eof doubtfull and double sense, seeming to glaunce at and nip them to whose Lot they were falne. So likewise that monster of men fHeliogabalus, a second Nero, vsed to propound to whom he pleased, both in publike and priuate, certaine mixt Lots, some matter of gift, some matter of charge, of such extreame inequality, that some were neither mended nor impaired at all, but mocked onely, gsome were made, as we say, and some vtterly vndone by them: for some according to that they drew were to pay in and lay downe, either a pound of beefe, or a dead dog, or ten flies, or ten fleas, or ten beares, or ten camels, or so many pounds of leade, or as many of siluer, or gold, &c. And others againe were to receiue the like, as their Lot came: which made many rich that were poore before, and others as poore that were rich before: the monster delighting in nothing more then in the mischiefe and miseries of many. And these Lots were sometimes either written or painted hon their spoones, as we haue commonly on fruite-trenchers painted emblemes and poe•ies, that sometime wee vse to make sport withall somewhat after that manner. ⟨p. 122⟩〈…〉⟨p. 123⟩〈…〉⟨p. 124⟩Againe sometime were such Lots as these in mirth set to sale: for iso vsed Augustus to doe sometime with his Lots; as also with pictures shewing the backside of them onely; in merriment propounding them to thoe fthat were at bord with him, that none might come in but vpon a price to draw in the one, and he that would at aduenture bid most, should haue the other. Not altogether vnlike to kour riflings and Loteries, wherein a certaine number or so many as will venture their money are admitted to cast dice or to draw Lots for some prize or prizes propounded;
iSu•t. Aug. c. 75. Solebat & maequalissimarum rerum sorts & aduersas tabularum picturas in conuivio vē ditare; incert•que casu spem mercantium vel frustrari vel implere.Su•t. Aug. c. 75. Solebat & maequalissimarum rerum sortes & aduersas tabularum picturas in conuiuio vē ditare; incert•que casu spem mercantium vel frustrari vel implere.
kLoteria in Europa frequens, quam vulgo la riff, alij ludum ollae vocan•. Delri• mag. disqu. tom. 2. l. 4. c 4. q. 2.Loteria in Europa frequens, quam vulgo la riffe, alij ludum ollae vocan•. Delri• mag. disqu. tom. 2. l. 4. c 4. q. 2.
concerning which kind of Lotteries the Civill Lawyers and others are divided in judgement; lsome referring them to the head of serious divisory Lots, as containing a twofold virtual contract, the one of bargain and sale between all the adventurers jointly and the owner or owners of the prize or prizes that they are to draw for, as making sale thereof unto them for such a sum as all their adventures put together amount unto; and another of society or fellowship between the Adventurers among themselves, agreeing to draw Lots or cast dice for that which in common they have so bought:* Or, as in running, as they term them, and unlimited Lotteries, a single contract only of bargain and sale between the Owner and the Adventurers, not unlike altogether that wherein a Fisherman's draught or a Fowlers fortune, or a Merchants adventure at sea is bought or the like, wherein men buy bare hope alone rather then actually ought else: mothers bringing them within compass of unlawful games, ⟨p. 125⟩as indeed, for ought I see, the most of them are little better, nused mostly to help and relieve either base Spend-thrifts or beggarly Bankrupts. And thus have we seen in what divers manner Lots have been or may be used in or about game.
concerning which kinde of Loteries the Ciuill Lawyers and others are diuided in iudgement; lsome referring them to the head of serious diuisory Lots, as containing a twofold virtuall contract, the one of bargaine and sale betweene all the aduenturers ioyntly and the owner or owners of the prize or prizes that they are to draw for, as making sale thereof vnto them for such a summe as all their aduentures put together amount vnto; and another of society or fellowship betweene the Aduenturers among themselues, agreeing to draw Lots or cast dice for that which in common they haue so bought:* Or, as in running, as they tearme them, and vnlimited Loteries, a single contract onely of bargaine and sale betweene the Owner and the Aduenturers, not vnlike altogether that wherein a Fishermans draught or a Fowlers fortune, or a Merchants aduenture at sea is bought or the like, wherein men buy bare hope alone rather then actually ought else: mothers bringing them within compasse of vnlawfull games, ⟨p. 125⟩as indeed, for ought I see, the most of them are little better, nvsed mostly to helpe and releiue either base Spend-thrifts or beggerly Banckrupts. And thus haue we seene in what diuers manner Lots haue been or may be vsed in or about game.
lFr. Garcias de cō tract. l. 3. c. 20. Lud. Lopez de contr. l. 2. c. 23. & Joan. Briart. quodlibet. 5. quos sequitur D•lrio.Fr. Garcias de cō tract. l. 3. c. 20. Lud. Lopez de contr. l. 2. c. 23. & Ioan. Briart. quodlibet. 5. quos sequitur D•lrio.
*Venditio sine re intelligitur, cum quasi alea emitur; quod sit cùm captus p•scium vel missiliū emitur, (quae non tam rei quàm) spei emptio est. Pompo•. in Dig. l. 18. t 1. l. 8. & t. 4. l. 7.Venditio sine re intelligitur, cum quasi alea emitur; quod sit cùm captꝰ p•scium vel missiliū emitur, (quae non tam rei quàm) spei emptio est. Pompo•. in Dig. l. 18. t 1. l. 8. & t. 4. l. 7.
mCon•ad. de contract. tract. 3 q. 71. concl. 2. Perkins of witchcraft.
nPostell de magistrat. Athen. c. 8. & Perkins of witchcraft.
§ 3. Now concerning these games hof hazard, as they are termed, wherein a Lot is thus used, and there is therefore a kind of Lottery in them, there is much question and disputation among the learned: and divers reverend and religious pass a peremptory sentence upon them as altogether unlawful and unbeseeming good Christians.
§ 3. Now concerning these games hof hazard, as they are tearmed, wherein a Lot is thus vsed, and there is therefore a kinde of Lotery in them, there is much question and disputation among the learned: and diuers reuerend and religious passe a peremptory sentence vpon them as altogether vnlawfull and vnbeseeming good Christians.
hAlea ludus omnis qui p••det à casu. Martyr. in Ind. c. 14. fortunae mag•s quàm artis. Erasm. chill. 1. c•nt. 4. adag. 32. in quo multum fortunae, p•udentiae minimum Ramirez in Mart.Alea ludꝰ omnis qui p••det à casu. Mar•yr. in Ind. c. 14. fortunae mag•s quàm artis. Erasm. chil. 1. c•nt. 4. adag. 32. in quo multum fortunae, p•udentiae minimum Ramirez in Mart.
Yet among those also that oppugn and oppose them there is diversity of opinion. For isome of them allow those games that are carried partly by casualty and partly by skill, which they suppose not to come within compass of Lots, condemning those only that depend wholly upon casualty. Others of them kutterly and absolutely reject all that have any spice of Lottery or casualty at all in them. This of those that deal more distinctly in the point: For ldivers others there be that so glance at them in general, that it is somewhat uncertain whether part they concur with; or mrather ⟨p. 126⟩of some of them whether they concur at all with either, or do not rather upon other grounds divers from theirs, disallow some of these games, not all of them, or not all manner use of them, as of some other hereafter shall plainly appear.
Yet among those also that oppugne and oppose them there is diuersitie of opinion. For isome of them allow those games that are carried partly by casualtie and partly by skill, which they suppose not to come within compasse of Lots, condemning those onely that depend wholy vpon casualtie. Others of them kvtterly and absolutely reiect all that haue any spice of Lotery or casualty at all in them. This of those that deale more distinctly in the point: For ldiuers others there bee that so glance at them in generall, that it is somewhat vncertain whether part they concurre with; or mrather ⟨p. 126⟩of some of them whether they concurre at all with either, or doe not rather vpon other grounds diuers from theirs, disallow some of these games, not all of them, or not all manner vse of them, as of some other hereafter shall plainely appeare.
iConcedi p•ssun• ludi qui partim casu, par••in industriae nituntur. Martyr. ad Judic. c. 14. Hipropriè alea dicinō debent, nec sun• omnino pro•ibendi. Dan. de alea c 6. quemsequi profitetur Taffia. de res• pisc. l 2 c. 19. Dice I utterly disallow, Ca•ds and Tables I condemn not. Babington on Command. 8. For mixed plays at Cards and Tables, consisting partly of hazard, & partly of wit, the common opinion of learned Divines is, that as they are not to be commended, so they are not simply to be condemned. Perkins Cases of Consc l. 3. c. 4. §. 4. q. 2.Concedi p•ssun• ludi qui partim casu, par••in industriae nituntur. Martyr. ad Iudic. c. 14. Hipropriè alea dicinō debent, nec sun• omnino pro•ibendi. Dan. de alea c 6. quemsequi profitetur Taffia. de res• pisc. l 2 c. 19. Dice I vtterly disallow, Ca•ds and Tabl•s I condemne not. Babington on Command. 8. For mixt playes at Cards and Tables, consisting partly of hazard, & partly of wit, the cōmon opinion of learned Diuines is, that as they are not to be commended, so they are not simply to be condemned. Perkins Cases of Consc l. 3. c. 4. §. 4. q. 2.
kFennor of lawful recreations cap. 4. Balmford dialogue of pames consisting of chance.Fennor of lawfull recreations cap. 4. Balmford dialogue of pames consisting of chaunce.
lLudus taxillatorius vitio vanitatis non caret. Them de sort. c. 5. Talorū Tabularumqu• qu•s chartas vocant, lud•s, [Greek or Hebrew] relegamus. Zuingl. de adolesc. form § 3. Alusus est sor•is, cùm ad ludu• jocumque adhibetur. Cartwr. in
But to return to the two former sorts, it is well observed by none of the latter rank of them, that some of the reasons produced by the former for the disallowing of the one kind, if the grounds be admitted, cannot choose but condemn both kinds. For if the one be evil and not allowable because they depend upon Lot and Chance, then the other must likewise be evil and unwarrantable so far forth as in part also they depend thereupon. And on the other side if those former Authors will avow and justify the one, they cannot but secretly withal give sentence also for the other, since they stand both on the same ground, and are built both on one bottom.
But to returne to the two former sorts, it is well obserued by none of the latter ranke of them, that some of the reasons produced by the former for the disallowing of the one kinde, if the grounds be admitted, cannot chuse but condemne both kindes. For if the one be euill and not allowable because they depend vpon Lot and Chance, then the other must likewise be euill and vnwarrantable so far forth as in part also they depend thereupon. And on the other side if those former Authors will avow and iustifie the one, they cannot but secretly withall giue sentence also for the other, since they stand both on the same ground, and are built both on one botome.
For as for that which osome say distinguishing the nature of these games, that the one is Lottery but not the other, or that there is a Lot in the one, but not in the other. It is true indeed, that if we define a Lot so, as divers of them do, to be pa kind of consulting with God, and a seeking to be informed and directed by him; qthere is no Lot at all either in the one or in the other. But if we understand a Lot as it was formerly defined according to the proper, and ordinary signification of it, so there is a Lot as much and as well in the one as in the other, the only difference is that there is a mere Lot in the one, a mixed Lot in the other, but a true rLot in either.
For as for that which osome say distinguishing the nature of these games, that the one is Lotery but not the other, or that there is a Lot in the one, but not in the other. It is true indeede, that if wee define a Lot so, as diuers of them doe, to be pa kinde of consulting with God, and a seeking to be informed and directed by him; qthere is no Lot at all either in the one or in the other. But if we vnderstand a Lot as it was formerly defined according to the proper, and ordinary signification of it, so there is a Lot as much and as well in the one as in the other, the onely difference is that there is a meere Lot in the one, a mixt Lot in the other, but a true rLot in either.
oNon est alea propriè dicta. Dan. lud. all c 6. Alea dicitur ludus qui f•rtunae so•ùm innititur. Angel sum. Mixed games are no Lots. Perkins Cas▪ of Consc. l. 3. c. 4 §. 3. q. 2.Non est alea propriè dicta. Dan. lud. al c 6. Alea dicitur ludus qui f•rtunae so•ùm innititur. Angel summ. Mixed games are no Lots. Perkins Cas▪ of Consc. l. 3. c. 4 §. 3. q. 2.
pSors est modus Deū consulendi, &c. Aret. probl. par. 1. Actio humana in hun• finem instituta, ut ex eius evensu rem nobis incognitam divini•us agnoscere possimus. Zanch. desert.Sors est modus Deū cōsulendi, &c. Aret. probl. par. 1. Actio humana in hun• finem instituta, vt ex eius euensu rem nobis incognitam diuini•ꝰ agnoscere possimus. Zanch. des•rt.
qJacobus •e• in [Greek or Hebrew] l. 3. & B. King in lon. c. 1. lect 9.Iacobus •e• in 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 l. 3. & B. King in lon. c. 1. lect 9.
rArs aleatoria & ipsa tota sortil•ga est. Agrip. de van. scient. c. 14. Ad sorte• revocatur alea, i. ludi qui ab ancipiti casu pendent. ex Greg. Toloss. s•ntag. l. 39. c. 3. Aerodio l. 3. c. 9. Molina de jure & just. disp. 509. Ser. ad l•sh. c. 7. q. 20. Q•id est sors? Idem propem•dum quod micare, quod talos, quod tesser as jac•re. Cic. divin. l. 2Ars aleatoria & ipsa tota sortil•ga est. Agrip. de van. scient. c. 14. Ad sorte• reuocatur alea, i. ludi qui ab ancipiti casu pendent. ex Greg. Toloss. s•ntag. l. 39. c. 3. Aerodio l. 3. c. 9. Molina de iure & iust. disp. 509. Ser. ad l•sh. c. 7. q. 20. Q•id est sors? Idem propem•dum quod micare, quod talos, quod tesser as iac•re. Cic. diuin. l. 2
For the argument that sa reverend Writer of ours bringeth to prove the contrary, because in a Lot there are two things required; first a casual act, and secondly an applying of that casual act to the determination of some particular and uncertain event; whereas the dealing of the Cards is a casual act indeed, but the determination of the uncertain victory is not in mixed games merely from it, but much or most from the wit and skill or the will of the player: and therefore the dealing of the cards is no more a Lot then the dealing of alms is, when the Princes Almoner putteth his hand into his pocket, and giveth one man six pence, another 12. pence, another two pence, what cometh forth without further advice. This argument, I say, is not sound, because it reasoneth from a particular to a general; The dealing of the Cards is not applied to the determining of this uncertain event, to wit, the main issue of the game or the victory: therefore it is not applied to the determining of any uncertain event at all. Which consequence is unsound; as also the consequent is untrue. For it is manifest that the dealing of the cards is applied to the determining of this uncertain event, what cards or casts each one shall have to exercise his skill with: and is therefore even by his own description a Lot: as is also the dealing of alms in that sort, if it be done for that end, to try what will casually fall to each ones share by such a course, as well as if it were done by drawing of rushes or cuts, which go commonly for Lots.
For the argument that sa reuerend Writer of ours bringeth to proue the contrary, because in a Lot there are two •hings required; first a casuall act, and secondly an applying of that casuall act to the determination of some particular and vncertaine euent; whereas the dealing of the Cards is a casuall act indeed, but the determination of the vncertaine victory is not in mixt games meerely from it, but much or most from the wit and skill or the will of the player: and therefore the dealing of the cards is no more a Lot then the dealing of almes is, when the Princes Almoner putteth his hand into his pocket, and giueth one man six pence, another 12. pence, another two pence, what commeth foorth without further aduice. This argument, I say, is not sound, because it reasoneth from a particular to a generall; The dealing of the Cards is not applied to the determining of this vncertaine euent, to wit, the maine issue of the game or the victory: therefore it is not applied to the determining of any vncertaine euent at all. Which consequence is vnsound; as also the consequent is vntrue. For it is manifest that the dealing of the cards is applied to the determining of this vncertaine euent, what cards or casts each one shall haue to exercise his skill with: and is therefore euen by his owne description a Lot: as is also the dealing of almes in that sort, if it be done for that end, to trie what will casually fall to each ones share by such a course, as well as if it were done by drawing of rushes or cuts, which go commonly for Lots.
For the thing it self I hold that these Lusorious Lots, and Games consisting of such are not simply ⟨p. 128⟩or in that regard evil or unwarrantable: or in a word, that a Lot used in game is not unlawful. In which assertion if I shall dissent from some others of religion and learning, whom otherwise I worthily respect and embrace, I desire but to have my grounds duly viewed and examined, that if they prove firm and sound, the frame built on them may stand, if weak and unsound, it may fall before the truth, as tDagon did before Gods Ark, my self promising to lend an hand with the first to the overturning and razing of what I now rear, if it shall be showed me to be other then is warrantable by Gods word.
For the thing it selfe I hold that these Lusorious Lots, and Games consisting of such are not simply ⟨p. 128⟩or in that regard euill or vnwarrantable: or in a word, that a Lot vsed in game is not vnlawfull. In which assertion if I shall dissent from some others of religion and learning, whom otherwise I worthily respect and imbrace, I desire but to haue my grounds duly viewed and examined, that if they proue firme and sound, the frame built on them may stand, if weake and vnsound, it may fall before the truth, as tDagon did before Gods Arke, my selfe promising to lend an hand with the first to the ouerturning and razing of what I now reare, if it shall be shewed me to be other then is warrantable by Gods word.
§ 4. The former grounds therefore laid concerning the nature of Lots in general, the reasons that induce me to allow Lots of this kind as not evil in themselves among others are these.
§ 4. The former grounds therefore laid concerning the nature of Lots in generall, the reasons that induce me to allow Lots of this kinde as not euill in themselues among others are these.
First, that which may be ordinarily used in other civill affairs, be they more weighty or of less weight, that may also be used for matter of recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily used in other civill affairs, as, by the express uauthority of Gods spirit speaking by Solomon, for the ending of contentions, and matters in suite or strife, be they weightier or of less weight: For the words in the text are indefinite, neither is there ought to restrain the ordinary use of them in that kind either there or else-where. The word used there, though in its original propriety it signify *Law-suites, yet in the ordinary xuse of it it extendeth it self to contentions of all kinds. And the practise of Gods people recorded in Scripture showeth that even mean ⟨p. 129⟩matters have been decided and determined usually by Lot: as in matter of Tithe, though it were not much material, which Lamb the Levite had, so that he had one of ten, two of twenty, &c. yet was it decided yby Lot. It was a matter of no great weight what gate of the Temple such or such Levites should wait at; I say not, that it was a mean matter to be a Porter in Gods house, (though zit seem to be mentioned as one of the meanest places of employment there;) but whether company should wait at this gate, and whether at that other gate, (as who should stand at the North door of the Church, and who at the South, to receive peoples benevolence, upon occasion of some collection) was no matter of great moment, and yet was that also decided *by Lot. Neither was it greatly material which of the Priests offered incense, or which dressed the Lamps, &c. so it were done by some one of them, yet that also went aby Lot. Since that Lots therefore may lawfully be used in other ordinary affairs, Gods word indefinitely warranting it, the same else-where not restraining it, and the practise of the godly carrying it even to mean matters (for bthe offices themselves were not put by them to Lot, but the distribution of particular duties or stations among those of the same office) I see not what should banish them out of our disports, more then out of other our (though serious, yet) civill affairs.
First, that which may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, bee they more weighty or of lesse weight, that may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, as, by the expresse uauthoritie of Gods spirit speaking by Salomon, for the ending of contentions, and matters in suite or strife, bee they weightier or of lesse weight: For the words in the text are indefinite, neither is there ought to restraine the ordinary vse of them in that kinde either there or else-where. The word vsed there, though in its originall propriety it signifie *Law-suites, yet in the ordinary xvse of it it extendeth it selfe to contentions of all kindes. And the practise of Gods people recorded in Scripture sheweth that euen meane ⟨p. 129⟩matters haue beene decided and determined vsually by Lot: as in matter of Tithe, though it were not much materiall, which Lambe the Leuite had, so that he had one of ten, two of twenty, &c. yet was it decided yby Lot. It was a matter of no great weight what gate of the Temple such or such Leuites should waite at; I say not, that it was a meane matter to be a Porter in Gods house, (though zit seeme to be mentioned as one of the meanest places of imployment there;) but whether company should waite at this gate, and whether at that other gate, (as who should stand at the North doore of the Church, and who at the South, to receiue peoples beneuolence, vpon occasion of some collection) was no matter of great moment, and yet was that also decided *by Lot. Neither was it greatly materiall which of the Preists offered incense, or which dressed the Lampes, &c. so it were done by some one of them, yet that also went aby Lot. Since that Lots therefore may lawfully be vsed in other ordinary affaires, Gods word indefinitely warranting it, the same else-where not restraining it, and the practise of the godly carrying it euen to meane matters (for b
*[Greek or Hebrew] si•e [Greek or Hebrew] à [Greek or Hebrew] vel [Greek or Hebrew] judicare.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 si•e 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 à 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vel 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 iudicare.
zPsalm 84 10. [Greek or Hebrew] ad limen residere. Le• Jud. Limen frequē tare. Jun. abiectus Vulg. ad locum cō munem & ignobilem reijci. Calvin. be a door-keeper. Angl. constant. Seruus esse perpetuus, posti affix••, ut Exod. 21 6. •. v•lissim: conditione ibi agere, [Greek or Hebrew] quàm alibi liberè ag•ntem c•mmorari. Inde enim [Greek or Hebrew] •i er•aes. Leyfeild.
§ 5. Secondly, if we consider aright the nature of a Lot, and the great uncertainty of it, we shall find it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, ⟨p. 130⟩and cnot fit to be used in any weighty affair. In regard whereof, as those that make use of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be material which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left unto it: s• where it may be material and of some consequence whether it go the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquity of others may enforce a man unto; a less inconvenience is allowable for the avoiding of a greater;) there dwill no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the uncertain hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be used unto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be used. Or more particularly for the present business: A matter of mere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully either do or not do, and it is not material whether he do or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of an other, or to the hazard of the uncertain motion of any creature whether he shall do it or not do it. But the using of a Lot in game (or the using of it in any business, be it serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of mere indifferency to the hazard of an uncertain event, to wit, who shall join or stand out, who shall lead or follow, who shall overcome or yield to the other side &c. which are matters merely indifferent, such as may without sin be either done or forborne, either ⟨p. 131⟩done the one way or the other. The Use therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not evil simply in it self.
§ 5. Secondly, if we consider aright the nature of a Lot, and the great vncertainty of it, wee shall find it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, ⟨p. 130⟩and cnot fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make vse of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be materiall which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left vnto it: s• where it may be materiall and of some consequence whether it go the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquitie of others may enforce a man vnto; a lesse inconuenience is allowable for the auoiding of a greater;) there dwill no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the vncertaine hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed. Or more particularly for the present busines: A matter of meere indifferency, that is, such as a man may lawfully either doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he do or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of an other, or to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in game (or the vsing of it in any busines, be it serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferency to the hazard of an vncertaine euent, to wit, who shall ioine or stand out, who shall leade or follow, who shall ouercome or yeeld to the other side &c. which are matters meerely indifferent, such as may without sinne bee either done or forborne, either ⟨p. 131⟩done the one way or the other. The Vse therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not euill simply in it selfe.
cSorsest resinc•• tissima q•ares gra••es quaelibet non ••ss•nt desin•ri. Baro •n Jon. c. 1 Non ••cet v•i in causis judiciali•us aut criminalibus, vel in obe•ndis neg•tijs mer•at•rijs vet belli•is. Ibid. N•c imm•ri•ò notatus à Tiberio S•n•tor Rom quod uxor•m pridiè sorti•i••e ductam p•strid•è repud•sset. S•et. Tiber. c. 35.Sorsest resinc•• tissima q•ares gra••es quaelibet non ••ss•nt desin•ri. Baro •n Ion. c. 1 Nō ••cet v•i in causis iudiciali•ꝰ aut criminalibus, vel in obe•ndis negtijs meratrijs vet belliis. Ibid. Nc immriò notatus à Tiberio Sntor Rom quod vxorm pridiè sortiie ductam pstridè repudsset. Set. Tiber. c. 35.
§ 6. Thirdly, if the Use of Lots in game be of it self evil, then must it needs be a sin either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charity in the second. For every moral evil must needs be a ebreach of Gods Law, the whole sum and substance whereof being comprised in those ften Edicts of those gtwo Tables, every breach thereof must of necessity be brought within compass of the one of those twain, and so consequently convinced to be a branch either of Impiety against the one, or of Iniquity against the other.
§ 6. Thirdly, if the Vse of Lots in game be of it selfe euill, then must it needes be a sinne either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charity in the second. For euery morall euill must needes be a ebreach of Gods Law, the whole summe and substance whereof being comprised in those ften Edicts of those gtwo Tables, euery breach thereof must of necessitie be brought within compasse of the one of those twaine, and so consequently conuinced to be a branch either of Impiety against the one, or of Iniquitie against the other.
e[Greek or Hebrew]. 1. Joan. 3.4. [Greek or Hebrew]. R•m. 4.15.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. 1. Ioan. 3.4. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. R•m. 4.15.
fDeut. 10.4 decem verba: fine dec•m edi••a. Sic enim Est. 3.15. & 4.3. & 8.14. &c. [Greek or Hebrew]Deut. 10.4 decem verba: fine dec•m edi••a. Sic enim Est. 3.15. & 4.3. & 8.14. &c. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉
To spend time and words in proving that the use of a Lot in game as it is a Lot, is not against Charity, as that it is no breach of Charity for men to draw Cuts or cast Arrows, who shall boule or shoot first, were both superfluous and ridiculous; superfluous, because it were to prove what no man denieth; ridiculous, because it were to confute what no wise man will avow. And yet to charge a lusorious Lot with Impiety, hath as little ground as the other.
To spend time and words in proouing that the vse of a Lot in game as it is a Lot, is not against Charitie, as that it is no breach of Charity for men to draw Cuts or cast Arrowes, who shall boule or shoote first, were both superfluous and ridiculous; superfluous, because it were to proue what no man denieth; ridiculous, because it were to confute what no wise man wil avow. And yet to charge a lusorious Lot with Impietie, hath as little ground as the other.
For the manifesting here of let thus much be considered, that all Impiety may be referred to these htwo heads, either the profaning of hallowed things, or the hallowing of things profane: since it cannot be imagined how any impiety should be ⟨p. 132⟩committed but either by denying holy things their due respect, or by giving the same where it is not due. But lusorious Lots are not of themselves guilty in either of these kinds. In the latter kind even their greatest adversaries will clear them, there being no colour to charge them with the hallowing of ought that is not otherwise holy. And in the former kind they may be cleared also by the grounds of Gods Law, to wit, from the profaning of ought that is holy. For the thing used in them is a Lot: and nothing can be profaned by them but what is used in them: (by Lots, I mean simply as they are Lots, for to make Lots of holy things, as of parcels of Scripture, or of the Elements consecrate in the Sacrament, &c. is not any thing concerning the nature of a Lot, but an abuse cleaving to it in some particular mens practise of it, and such as is to be severed therefore in this our discourse from it.) But a Lot is no holy thing, either of it self and in it own nature, or by virtue of any divine institution. For of these two sorts are all holy things whatsoever, either they are holy of themselves and in their own nature, as iGod himself, and khis titles and attributes are, or else they come to be such, whereas in their own nature they are not, by means of some special divine institution sanctifying and severing them to some holy use, as lthe Ark, mthe Tabernacle, nthe Temple, othe 7. day of the world before Christ, and pthe first day of the week since Christ. Now in neither of these respects can a Lot be said to be holy, not of it self, or in it own nature, for it is nothing else but any ⟨p. 133⟩casual event applied to the determining or deciding of some doubt: Where the matter of it, a mere casualty, as it is a casualty having no holiness at all in it of it self (for qthen should all casualties in like manner be such) can much less gain or procure any holiness to it self by any mans application of it to any end whatsoever, much less by the applying of it to a profane or common end, be it more or less weighty.
For the manifesting here of let thus much be considered, that all Impiety may be referred to these htwo heads, either the prophaning of hallowed things, or the hallowing of things prophane: since it cannot be imagined how any impiety should be ⟨p. 132⟩committed but either by denying holy things their due respect, or by giuing the same where it is not due. But lusorious Lots are not of themselues guilty in either of these kindes. In the latter kinde euen their greatest aduersaries will cleare them, there being no colour to charge them with the hallowing of ought that is not otherwise holy. And in the former kinde they may be cleared also by the grounds of Gods Law, to wit, from the prophaning of ought that is holy. For the thing vsed in them is a Lot: and nothing can bee prophaned by them but what is vsed in them: (by Lots, I meane simply as they are Lots, for to make Lots of holy things, as of parcels of Scripture, or of the Elements consecrate in the Sacrament, &c. is not any thing concerning the nature of a Lot, but an abuse cleauing to it in some particular mens practise of it, and such as is to be seuered therefore in this our discourse from it.) But a Lot is no holy thing, either of it selfe and in it owne nature, or by vertue of any diuine institution. For of these two sorts are all holy things whatsoeuer, either they are holy of themselues and in their owne nature, as iGod himselfe, and khis titles and attributes are, or else they come to be such, whereas in their owne nature they are not, by meanes of some speciall diuine institution sanctifying and seuering them to some holy vse, as lthe Arke, mthe Tabernacle, nthe Temple, othe 7. day of the world before Christ, and pthe first day of the weeke since Christ. Now in neither of these respects can a Lot be said to be holy, not of it selfe, or in it owne nature, for it is nothing else but any ⟨p. 133⟩
Neither is a Lot holy by any divine institution; since every such institution must have warrant from some word; and there cannot be produced any word of institution whereby Lots are specially sanctified and set apart to such uses as may bring them within the compass of things holy and sacred. If any particular Lots have at sometime been so used, that can no more impart holiness to all Lots in general, then the religious use of rwater in Baptism, yea in the sBaptism of our SAVIOUR, and the sacred use of tbread and wine in the Lords supper can umake all water or all bread and wine in general to be holy, and so consequently debar men of the ordinary and common use of those creatures either for the necessity of nature or for lawful delight.
Neither is a Lot holy by any diuine institution; since euery such institution must haue warrant from some word; and there cannot be produced any word of institution whereby Lots are specially sanctified and set apart to such vses as may bring them within the compasse of things holy and sacred. If any particular Lots haue at sometime beene so vsed, that can no more impart holinesse to all Lots in generall, then the religious vse of rwater in Baptisme, yea in the sBaptisme of our SAVIOVR, and the sacred vse of tbread and wine in the Lords supper can umake all water or all bread and wine in generall to be holy, and so consequently debarre men of the ordinarie and common vse of those creatures either for the necessity of nature or for lawfull delight.
uVi•e Casau•. ad Baron. annal. an. 31. num. 19. contra Chrysost. ••mil. de bapt. Chr. & Jacob. de Vitria•. c. 54.Vi•e Casau•. ad Baron. annal. ann. 31. num. 19. contra Chrysost. ••mil. de bapt. Chr. & Iacob. de Vitria•. c. 54.
. Sortes illic••ae ad lucrum lus•mu• ad•ibitae. Piscat. in Jo•. c. 1. Ludicrous Lots are not beseeming Christians. Eas•ie history of Gospel.
Ludꝰ taxillatoriꝰ vitio vanitatis non caret. Them de sort. c. 5. Talorū Tabularumqu• qu•s chartas vocant, lud•s, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 relegamus. Zuingl. de adolesc. form § 3. Alusus est sor•is, cùm ad ludu• iocumque adhibetur. Cartwr. in Prou. c. 16. Sortes illic••ae ad lucrum lus•mu• ad•ibitae. Piscat. in Io•. c. 1. Ludicrous Lots are not beseeming Christians. Eas•ie historie of Gospell.
mChartarū & sortiū & divinationis ludi ab avaris & perditis inuenti, non sol•m nostr• dogmati, sed publicis ve•erū moribus unà cum aleareiecti. V•later. comment l. 29 c. 12. Aleam non cognoscere Eutopienses suos. Moru• lib. 2. quod & de Japonilus Gadus quem Grimston transtuli•.Chartarū & sortiū & diuinationis ludi ab auaris & perditis inuenti, non sol•m nostr• dogmati, sed publicis ve•erū moribus vnà cum aleareiecti. V•later. comment l. 29 c. 12. Aleam non cognoscere Eutopienses suos. Moru• lib. 2. quod & de Iaponilus Gadus quem Grimston transtuli•.
the offices themselues were not put by them to Lot, but the distribution of particular duties or stations among those of the same office) I see not what should banish them out of our disports, more then out of other our (though serious, yet) ciuill affaires.
Psalm 84 10
. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 ad limen residere. Le• Iud. Limen frequē tare. Iun. abiectus Vulg. ad locum cō munem & ignobilem reijci. Calui•. be a doore-keeper. Angl. constāt. Seruus esse perpetuus, posti affix••, vt
bParum it aque cau•è Martyr ad 1. Sam. c. 10. sortibus de•ignabantur Sacerdotia.
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
••
•
•
•
•
d[Greek or Hebrew] •• [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. l. 6. Vise & quae supra c 5. § 5.6. [Greek or Hebrew]. S•er apud Xen•ph. [Greek or Hebrew].〈non-Latin alphabet〉••〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. l. 6. Vise & quae supra c 5. § 5.6. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. S•er apud Xen•ph. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
casuall euent applied to the determining or deciding of some doubt: Where the matter of it, a meere casualtie, as it is a casualtie hauing no holinesse at all in it of it selfe (for
then should all casualties in like manner be such) can much lesse gaine or procure any holinesse to it selfe by any mans application of it to any end whatsoeuer, much lesse by the applying of it to a prophane or common end, be it more or lesse weightie.