Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature or the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so *some of the adverse party define Lottery out of xLyra, To use Lots is by a variable event of some sensible thing to determine some doubtful or uncertain matter. Which definition of Lottery containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.
The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature or the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so *some of the aduerse partie define Lotterie out of xLyra, To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull or vncertaine matter. Which definition of Lotterie containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.
the thing intended being such as the Lot by no natural power, either of the Creature using it, or used in it was able to effect: which kind of prayer hath no place, nor is lawful in ordinary or mere divisory Lots. For example:
In assigning and setting out tithe, it was not lawful, much less necessary, to pray God so to give a right Lot, that every Lamb or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainly or constantly so come to hand. But they prove not that prayer is part of a Lot or is in the Lot, as it is part of an oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the usual
definitions of an Oath may appear. In election of offices
⟨p. 155⟩
sacred or civill prayer is used or at least ought to be used: yet it followeth not therefore that prayer is a part of the choice, or that therefore the election in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a special providence and determining presence of God. Yea prayer may be used both before game and in game, as both before and at meat, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a special providence of God and a determining presence in it.
Neither doe the places produced proue it. They proue onely that Prayer was sometime vsed (but ma faithlesse praier nthe one of them without word or warrant) before an extraordinary Lot for an extraordinarie power and prouidence to direct the euent of it; othe thing entended being such as the Lot by no naturall power, either of the Creature vsing it, or vsed in it was able to effect: which kinde of praier hath no place, nor is lawfull in ordinarie or meere diuisory Lots. For example: pIn assigning and setting out tithe, it was not lawfull, much lesse necessary, to pray God so to giue a right Lot, that euery Lambe or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainely or constantly so come to hand. But they prooue not that praier is part of a Lot or is in the Lot, as it is part of an oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the vsuall qdefinitions of an Oath may appeare. In election of offices ⟨p. 155⟩sacred or ciuill praier is vsed or at least ought to be vsed: yet it followeth not therefore that praier is a part of the choise, or that therefore the election in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a speciall prouidence and determining presence of God. Yea praier may be vsed both before game and in game, as both before and at meate, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a speciall prouidence of God and a determining presence in it.
mPrecatur, sed pr•rsus absque omni fide. Mar•yr in Sam. c. 14.
qHoc est Jurare, Deum testari. Aug. in Psal. 109 Deum testē adhibere. Cic. Offic. l. 3. Quid est jurare, nisi jus veritatis Deo reddere. Aug. de verb. Ap. serm. 28. Jurare est testē adhibere Deum. Lo•b. sent. l. 3. d. 29. F. Deum in t•st•m vocare. Thom sum. par. 2a 2a. q. 89. a. 1, 4. & q. 98 a. 2. implo•are testimoniū Dei exhibendum. Ibid. q. 89. a. 1. Juramentum est Dei at•estatio ad veritatem sermonis nostri confirmandam. Calu. Instit. l. 2. c. 8. §. 23 inuocatio Dei qua petimus ut Deus fit testis de animo nostro quod fallere nolimus, & ut vinde• sit si fesellerimus Melanch loc. come. in definit. Juratio itaque ad inuocationē •ertinet. Ibid. de 2o praecept.Hoc est Iurare, Deum testari. Aug. in Psal. 109 Deum testē adhibere. Cic. Offic. l. 3. Quid est iurare, nisi ius veritatis Deo reddere. Aug. de verb. Ap. serm. 28. Iurare est testē adhibere Deum. Lo•b. sent. l. 3. d. 29. F. Deum in t•st•m vocare. Thom sum. par. 2a 2a. q. 89. a. 1, 4. & q. 98 a. 2. implo•are testimoniū Dei exhibendum. Ibid. q. 89. a. 1. Iuramentum est Dei at•estatio ad veritatem sermonis nostri confirmandam. Calu. Instit. l. 2. c. 8. §. 23 inuocatio Dei qua petimꝰ vt Deꝰ fit testis de animo nostro quod fallere nolimꝰ, & vt vinde• sit si fesellerimus Melanch loc. com. in definit. Iuratio itaque ad inuocationē •ertinet. Ibid. de 2o praecept.
Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it self, as rbefore hath been shown: there is much difference therefore between Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments and Oaths. For these things are holy of themselves and in their own nature, as the very definitions of them will soon show: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not always and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as ever, in our ordinary use; whereas no Lot is holy that we can use now adays; nor indeed was ever any so, save extraordinarily. But Gods taking of any thing sometime extraordinarily or from ordinary use to apply it to some holy and extraordinary use, doth not exempt the kind in general, but the thing only it self so used in special from civill or light and ordinary usage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the use of water in Baptism hindereth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptism, or that hath so been, but is not now. In ⟨p. 156⟩like manner when a Lot shall be extraordinarily used for a special sign of Gods immediate election and choice, whosoever shall then contemn or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and Gods name in so doing; but not whosoever shall use otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had been used in such a business before; there remaining no more holiness in it after that use is over, then in sthe bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himself to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.
Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it selfe, as rbefore hath beene shewen: there is much difference therefore betweene Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments and Oathes. For these things are holy of themselues and in their owne nature, as the very definitions of them will soone shew: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not alwaies and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as euer, in our ordinary vse; whereas no Lot is holy that we can vse now adaies; nor indeed was euer any so, saue extraordinarily. But Gods taking of any thing sometime extraordinarily or from ordinarie vse to apply it to some holy and extraordinary vse, doth not exempt the kinde in generall, but the thing onely it selfe so vsed in speciall from ciuill or light and ordinarie vsage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the vse of water in Baptisme hindreth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptisme, or that hath so beene, but is not now. In ⟨p. 156⟩like manner when a Lot shall be extraordinarily vsed for a speciall signe of Gods immediate election and choise, whosoeuer shall then contemne or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and Gods name in so doing; but not whosoeuer shall vse otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had beene vsed in such a busines before; there remaining no more holinesse in it after that vse is ouer, then in sthe bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.
The assumption is thus proved: uIn that Solomon calleth a Lot judgement, where he saith; *The judgement of it is of God: he showeth that xGod himself sitteth in judgement by it, and that ythe Lot is as Gods Deputy who is Judge of the world, whereby he himself determineth of things doubtful, and such as no art or wit of man is able to discover.
The assumption is thus proued: uIn that Salomon calleth a Lot iudgement, where he saith; *The iudgement of it is of God: he sheweth that xGod himselfe sitteth in iudgement by it, and that ythe Lot is as Gods Deputy who is Iudge of the world, whereby he himselfe determineth of things doubtfull, and such as no arte or wit of man is able to discouer.
uCartwr•n Prou. c. 16. Quod s•rt•m appellat judicium, &c.Cartwr•n Prou. c. 16. Quod s•rt•m appellat iudicium, &c.
xPers•rtē Deus ipse in judicio sed•at.Pers•rtē Deꝰ ipse in iudicio sed•at.
ySortem esse Dei mund• Judieu quasi vicarium, qua Deus ipse &c. decernit. Idem in c. 18Sortem esse Dei mund• Iudieu quasi vicarium, qua Deus ipse &c. decernit. Idem in c. 18
Yea not only zthe Scripture maketh a Lot so the sentence of God, as in the most weighty matters of God and man, aof life and death, bit is the very oracle and determination of Gods will, wherein a man must rest without any contradiction or motion to the contrary: but even cthe very Gentiles themselves also knew it to be Gods Oracle.
Yea not onely zthe Scripture maketh a Lot so the sentence of God, as in the most weighty matters of God and man, aof life and death, bit is the very oracle and determination of Gods will, wherein a man must rest without any contradiction or motion to the contrary: but euen cthe very Gentiles themselues also knew it to be Gods Oracle.
These proofs of the Assumption are unsound ⟨p. 157⟩and insufficient. For first for dthe testimony of Solomon; though the word therein used in his native sense and original signify properly ejudgement, and is therefore fone of the necessary attendants of a lawful Oath, as gthe learned well observe. Yet neither is a Lot there termed Judgement; though the word that naturally so signifieth be applied there unto it, and might be properly used of some special kind of it: Neither doth the word in the ordinary use of it only so signify, but is used more generally for any custom, or manner, or course, or carriage whatsoever, be it light or weighty, just or unjust; as where it is used of the profane and preposterous carriage hof Eli's sons towards Gods people; as also where it is applied to the superstitious and savage demeanour iof Baals Priests toward themselves: and in this general manner the best and most Interpreters there take it.* The word therefore there used is too weak a ground to bear a frame of such weight as is here built upon it. For as for Gods immediate sitting and sentencing in Lots, (of which further anon) the conceit of it breedeth a superstitious use of them; (the rather therefore to be abhorred:)m from some taint whereof that speech of nthe same Author cannot be freed where he saith, that oLots are available for the finding out of the most hidden things, as they have been used oft to that end: as also that pby them such doubtful ⟨p. 158⟩things may be determined, as no wit or skill of man is otherwise able to decide. For what hidden truth can by any Lot be discovered? or what can be decided or determined by a Lot, that might not be determined by any third party, yea by a child or Idiot, as well as by a Lot, if it should please the parties contending to refer themselves thereunto?
These proofes of the Assumption are vnsound ⟨p. 157⟩and insufficient. For first for dthe testimonie of Salomon; though the word therein vsed in his natiue sense and originall signifie properly eiudgement, and is therefore fone of the necessarie attendants of a lawfull Oath, as gthe learned well obserue. Yet neither is a Lot there tearmed Iudgement; though the word that naturally so signifieth be applied there vnto it, and might be properly vsed of some speciall kinde of it: Neither doth the word in the ordinary vse of it onely so signifie, but is vsed more generally for any custome, or manner, or course, or cariage whatsoeuer, be it light or weightie, iust or vniust; as where it is vsed of the prophane and proposterous cariage hof Elies sonnes towards Gods people; as also where it is applied to the superstitious and sauage demeanour iof Baals Preists toward themselues: and in this generall manner the best and most Interpreters there take it.* The word therefore there vsed is too weake a ground to beare a frame of such weight as is here built vpon it. For as for Gods immediate sitting and sentencing in Lots, (of which further anone) the conceipt of it breedeth a superstitious vse of them; (the rather therefore to be abhorred:)m from some taint whereof that speech of nthe same Authour cannot bee freed where he saith, that oLots are auaileable for the finding out of the most hidden things, as they haue beene vsed oft to that end: as also that pby them such doubtfull ⟨p. 158⟩
e[Greek or Hebrew] à [Greek or Hebrew] judicare, unde & [Greek or Hebrew] Ju•ex, & Su•es Consul Poenis apud Enniū, Liu•ū, Festum: inde enim m•lius Jos. Scalig. ad Eus•b quàm à [Greek or Hebrew] quasi [Greek or Hebrew]. Id ni ad Fest. & Drus. anim•d••. l. 2. c. 24.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 à 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 iudicare, vnde & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Iu•ex, & Su•es Consul Poenis apud Enniū, Liu•ū, Festum: inde enim m•lius Ios. Scalig. ad Eus•b quàm à 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 quasi 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Id ni ad Fest. & Drus. anim•d••. l. 2. c. 24.
§ 10. Secondly for the instances alleged: To reason on this manner, Lots were once Gods Oracles in these and these cases: therefore they are so in all: or, Lots were sometime extraordinarily Gods Oracles in some cases whereunto they were by God then specially for that purpose assigned: therefore they are so always: both the consequence is unsound, and the consequent untrue. For first it followeth not; If sometime extraordinarily, then ever. qThe noise that David heard over his head in the mulberry-trees was Gods Oracle to him: shall the like rustling, that we may chance to hear in trees over our heads, be therefore a divine Oracle to us?r The Philistines speech to Jonathan and his Armour-bearer was as an Oracle of God to them: shall the like answer therefore be the same now to us? or must it needs therefore be ever such?
§ 10. Secondly for the instances alleadged: To reason on this manner, Lots were once Gods Oracles in these and these cases: therefore they are so in all: or, Lots were sometime extraordinarily Gods Oracles in some cases whereunto they were by God then specially for that purpose assigned: therefore they are so alwayes: both the consequence is vnsound, and the consequent vntrue. For first it followeth not; If sometime extraordinarily, then euer. qThe noise that Dauid heard ouer his head in the mulbery-trees was Gods Oracle to him: shall the like rustling, that wee may chaunce to heare in trees ouer our heads, be therefore a diuine Oracle to vs?r The Philistines speech to Ionathan and his Armour-bearer was as an Oracle of God to them: shall the like answere therefore be the same now to vs? or must it needes therefore bee euer such?
For first sGods Oracles and sentences are certain and constant: for this word and sentence is yea and amen as uhimself. And so were those Lots whereby God sometime gave sentence, as that which Achan was discovered by, which had it therefore ⟨p. 159⟩either been oft cast, or cast by divers persons at Gods appointment at once, would still constantly have *lighted on no Tribe but Jud•, no kindred but the Zarchites, no household but Zabdies, no person but Achan. But then an ordinary Lot xthere is nothing more uncertain, ready upon every new shaking of the Lot pot to give out a new sentence. For suppose we that some one Minister of a whole hundred in our head City should by Lot be selected to visit the Pesthouse, would the Lot drawn in this case 1four or five times together with never so great solemnity light certainly and constantly ever on the same man? Or suppose 2four or five several Companies in several places should, after the business solemnly by prayer commended to God, cast Lots upon the self-same employment among the same parties, were it certain, yea or probable that they should all light upon the same person? Or were it not trivolous, if not impious, therefore to say, that upon every second shaking or drawing GOD altereth his sentence, and so to accuse him of inconstancy; or that to several Companies he giveth a several sentence, and so to charge him with contradiction and contrariety?
For first sGods Oracles and sentences are certaine and constant: for this word and sentence is yea and amen as uhimselfe. And so were those Lots whereby God somtime gaue sentence, as that which Achan was discouered by, which had it therefore ⟨p. 159⟩either beene oft cast, or cast by diuers persons at Gods appointment at once, would still constantly haue *lighted on no Tribe but Iud•, no kindred but the Zarchites, no houshold but Zabdies, no person but Achan. But then an ordinary Lot xthere is nothing more vncertaine, ready vpon euery new shaking of the Lot pot to giue out a new sentence. For suppose we that some one Minister of a whole hundred in our head City should by Lot be selected to visite the Pesthouse, would the Lot drawne in this case 1foure or fiue times together with neuer so great solemnity light certainely and constantly euer on the same man? Or suppose 2foure or fiue seuerall Companies in seuerall places should, after the busines solemnly by praier commended to God, cast Lots vpon the selfe-same imployment among the same parties, were it certaine, yea or probable that they should all light vpon the same person? Or were it not triuolous, if not impious, therefore to say, that vpon euery second shaking or drawing GOD altreth his sentence, and so to accuse him of inconstancie; or that to seuerall Companies he giueth a seuerall sentence, and so to charge him with contradiction and contrariety?
*Josh 7.16.17.18. Certissima est cognitio quaeper sortes à Deo temperatas habetur. Zanch. de sort.Iosh 7.16.17.18. Certissima est cognitio quaeper sortes à Deo temperatas habetur. Zanch. de sort.
x[Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de constit. princip. Sor•res est incertissima. Bar• in I•u. c. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de constit. princip. Sor•res est incertissima. Bar• in I•u. c. 1.
1As in the Tuscan Estate they draw five several times, and so five several persons for each office. See before chap 4 sect. 8.As in the Tuscan Estate they draw fiue seuerall times, and so fiue seuerall persons for each office. See before chap 4 sect. 8.
Secondly yGods oracles are ever according to justice and equity: but the sentence of a Lot is not certainly such. For suppose a matter of right, wherein he that ought to yield will not yield, by mutual consent therefore of necessity put to a Lot; dare any man say certainly that it shall go with him that hath right? Or in war, suppose a whole troupe put to cast Lots for their lines, among whom there ⟨p. 160⟩are many that are no way at all faulty, dare any say that the Death-lot shall light on no one of these, but upon those alone that indeed have deserved to die? as zin Achans case a man might well confidently say, that it should surely light on him that was the delinquent and on no other, whom by such means God had then given warrant to search for. No: 1a Lot regardeth no more right then wrong, 2no more guiltless then guilty, ready to go indifferently for or against either. It is none therefore of Gods sentence.
Secondly yGods oracles are euer according to iustice and equitie: but the sentence of a Lot is not certainely such. For suppose a matter of right, wherein he that ought to yeeld will not yeelde, by mutuall consent therefore of necessity put to a Lot; dare any man say certainely that it shall go with him that hath right? Or in warre, suppose a whole troupe put to cast Lots for their lines, among whom there ⟨p. 160⟩are many that are no way at all faulty, dare any say that the Death-lot shall light on no one of these, but vpon those alone that indeed haue deserued to die? as zin Achans case a man might well confidently say, that it should surely light on him that was the delinquent and on no other, whom by such meanes God had then giuen warrant to search for. No: 1a Lot regardeth no more right then wrong, 2no more guiltlesse then guilty, ready to go indifferently for or against either. It is none therefore of Gods sentence.
Thirdly, if a Lot were Gods sentence, 3what need men be so curious in examining and trying the fitness or unfitness of those that they admit to a Lot for the bearing of any Office either in Church or Common-weal? (For I spare to ask of the Popish sort, why they therefore forbear to elect Ecclesiastical Officers by Lot, if a Lot be Gods sentence; because such things, say they, must be done by the inspiration of Gods spirit•;a as if Gods spirit and his sentence were not sure to concur.) For is not bGod as well able to judge of their fitness or unfitness as man is? Or do they distrust God, and fear that he will be partial in his sentence, whose constant commendation is, that he is cno respectre of persons? The general care therefore in this kind of all those that use Lots in any such weighty affair, showeth evidently, that they do not esteem the Lots verdict Gods Oracle, but a sentence so uncertain, so inconsiderate, so heedless, that it might well run with them into a whirl-pool drawing Church and State after it, if by humane ⟨p. 161⟩caution it were not the more warily managed. Was there any such fear, think we, in the Lot that dSamuel cast for a King; or any need of such caution to have been observed in it?
Thirdly, if a Lot were Gods sentence, 3what need men be so curious in examining and trying the fitnesse or vnfitnesse of those that they admit to a Lot for the bearing of any Office either in Church or Common-weale? (For I spare to aske of the Popish sort, why they therefore forbeare to elect Ecclesiasticall Officers by Lot, if a Lot be Gods sentence; because such things, say they, must be done by the inspiration of Gods spirit•;a as if Gods spirit and his sentence were not sure to concurre.) For is not bGod as well able to iudge of their fitnesse or vnfitnesse as man is? Or doe they distrust God, and feare that he will be partiall in his sentence, whose constant commendation is, that he is cno respecter of persons? The generall care therefore in this kinde of all those that vse Lots in any such weightie affaire, sheweth euidently, that they doe not esteeme the Lots verdict Gods Oracle, but a sentence so vncertaine, so inconsiderate, so heedlesse, that it might well run with them into a whirle-poole drawing Church and State after it, if by humane ⟨p. 161⟩caution it were not the more warily managed. Was there any such feare, thinke wee, in the Lot that dSamuel cast for a King; or any need of such caution to haue beene obserued in it?
3[Greek or Hebrew]. ut Aristid. de Rhet•r. ad Plat.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. vt Aristid. de Rhet•r. ad Plat.
aHonour. 3. in Decretal. l. 5. tit. 21. c. 3. & Thom. de sort. c. 5.Honor. 3. in Decretal. l. 5. tit. 21. c. 3. & Thom. de sort. c. 5.
§. 11. Lastly, it a Lot were a divine sentence, eit were unalterable and unchangeable, such as men were ever bound to rest in and abide by, under danger of sin and disobedience, without further inquisition, consultation, consideration, or forecasting ought for the worse or the better. fMans sentence is sometime held such: Gods ever much more. Yea so it was in those Lots, wherein God extraordinarily gave sentence, as in gSauls and hMatthias his: whereas in ordinary Lots it is far otherwise.
§. 11. Lastly, it a Lot were a diuine sentence, eit were vnalterable and vnchangeable, such as men were euer bound to rest in and abide by, vnder danger of sinne and disobedience, without further inquisition, consultation, consideration, or forecasting ought for the worse or the better. fMans sentence is sometime held such: Gods euer much more. Yea so it was in those Lots, wherein God extraordinarily gaue sentence, as in gSauls and hMatthias his: whereas in ordinary Lots it is farre otherwise.
eQuibus in r•bus ad Deum consulendum ventum est, omnino stari indicio eius oportet. Jun. in Jon. c. 1.Quibus in r•bus ad Deum consulendum ventum est, omnino stari indicio eius oportet. Iun. in Ion. c. 1.
fEst. 1.19. & 8.8 Dan 6.8, 12. Gal. 3.15 Etiam ab hominibus judicata pro veritate haberi solent Jun. ib. Sententia, si••res judicata pro veritate accipitur. •lpian in Digest. lib. 1. tit. 5. leg 25. P•st reniudicatā nihil quaeritur. Idē ex Marci Imper. sententia, l. 42. •. 1. le. 56. quia res certa jam habetur. Accurs. Gloss.Est. 1.19. & 8.8 Dan 6.8, 12. Gal. 3.15 Etiam ab hominibus iudicata pro veritate haberi solent Iun. ib. Sententia, si••res iudicata pro veritate accipitur. •lpian in Digest. lib. 1. tit. 5. leg 25. P•st rēiudicatā nihil quaeritur. Idē ex Marci Imper. sententia, l. 42. •. 1. le. 56. quia res certa iam habetur. Accurs. Gloss.
For first in private affairs no man is bound to stand to the event of a Lot which he never gave consent unto. In private affairs I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compel the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to do in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for marriage such a one of the twain which they like not of, yet they ought to give their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approved by him, of a Noble mans son) because having cast Lots for direction after invocation of Gods name in that business, the Lot had light upon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to bear one down, that she ought in conscience to have him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sin and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had given such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily bind, not expecting mans privity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so bind, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend unto that which the Lot imposed upon him.
For first in priuate affaires no man is bound to stand to the euent of a Lot which hee neuer gaue consent vnto. In priuate affaires I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compell the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to doe in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for mariage such a one of the twaine which they like not of, yet they ought to giue their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approued by him, of a Noble mans sonne) because hauing cast Lots for direction after inuocation of Gods name in that busines, the Lot had light vpon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to beare one downe, that she ought in conscience to haue him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sinne and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had giuen such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily binde, not expecting mans priuity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so binde, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend vnto that which the Lot imposed vpon him.
iAd tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, jubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.Ad tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, iubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.
kJudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à jure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.Iudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à iure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.
lBucer. in oper. Augl disput. con Jung.Bucer. in oper. Augl disput. cū Iung•.
things may be determined, as no wit or skill of man is otherwise able to decide. For what hidden truth can by any Lot be discouered? or what can be decided or determined by a Lot, that might not bee determined by any third party, yea by a childe or Idiote, as well as by a Lot, if it should please the parties contending to referre themselues thereunto?
I•• a •entum hos debet ba•er• comites, veritatē, iustitiam, iudiciū. Hier. in Ie•. c. 4 & ap•d Grat. c. 2.2. q. •. & Thomsum. 22 2ae. q. 89. a 3.
h• Sam. 2.13. [Greek or Hebrew]• Sam. 2.13. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉
oValet ad verum reconditissamarum peru•stigatio•ē.Valet ad verum reconditissamarum peru•stigatio•ē.
pDerebus d•bijs null h•minū art •ut ingeni• inu• stigandis Si• Cellar. a•Josh. c. 7 q. 19 Vuiness sortibus ad veritatē e• concursu divino, generally saltem corto, speciali incer•o, probabilitamen. At rectè P••cer dedivi•. Divi•. •orie sunt sorte•, qu• oracula excudunt, abdita & abstrusa errant, ignota••ciunt, incerta confirmant, impendentia prospiciunt, &c quorum a•tor & dispensator Diabolus, non Deus. Et ips• Sera•. ib. q 20. V•tita sunt sortes quibus incrimina inquiritur.Derebꝰ d•bijs null h•minū arte •ut ingeni• inu• stigandis Si• Se•ar. a• I•sh. c. 7 q. 19 Vuiness sortibꝰ ad veritatē e• concursu diuino, generali saltem corto, speciali incer•o, probabilitamen. At rectè P••cer dediui•. Diui•. •orie sunt sorte•, qu• oracula excudunt, abdita & abstrusa er•unt, ignota••ciunt, incerta confirmant, impendentia prospiciunt, &c quorū a•tor & dispensator Diabolꝰ, non Deꝰ. Et ips• Sera•. ib. q 20. V•tita sunt sortes quibꝰ incrimina inquiritur.
2As in the Venetian Estate, four several companies cast Lots for the nomination of the same Offices. Ibid.As in the Venetian Estate, foure seuerall companies cast Lots for the nomination of the same Offices. Ibid.
