For first in private affairs no man is bound to stand to the event of a Lot which he never gave consent unto. In private affairs I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compel the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to do in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for marriage such a one of the twain which they like not of, yet they ought to give their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approved by him, of a Noble mans son) because having cast Lots for direction after invocation of Gods name in that business, the Lot had light upon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to bear one down, that she ought in conscience to have him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sin and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had given such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily bind, not expecting mans privity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so bind, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend unto that which the Lot imposed upon him.
For first in priuate affaires no man is bound to stand to the euent of a Lot which hee neuer gaue consent vnto. In priuate affaires I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compell the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to doe in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for mariage such a one of the twaine which they like not of, yet they ought to giue their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approued by him, of a Noble mans sonne) because hauing cast Lots for direction after inuocation of Gods name in that busines, the Lot had light vpon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to beare one downe, that she ought in conscience to haue him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sinne and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had giuen such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily binde, not expecting mans priuity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so binde, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend vnto that which the Lot imposed vpon him.
- iAd tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, jubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.Ad tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, iubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.
- kJudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à jure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.Iudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à iure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.
- lBucer. in oper. Augl disput. con Jung.Bucer. in oper. Augl disput. cū Iung•.
- t1. Sam. 10.22.