Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
The assumption is thus proved: uIn that Solomon calleth a Lot judgement, where he saith; *The judgement of it is of God: he showeth that xGod himself sitteth in judgement by it, and that ythe Lot is as Gods Deputy who is Judge of the world, whereby he himself determineth of things doubtful, and such as no art or wit of man is able to discover.
The assumption is thus proued: uIn that Salomon calleth a Lot iudgement, where he saith; *The iudgement of it is of God: he sheweth that xGod himselfe sitteth in iudgement by it, and that ythe Lot is as Gods Deputy who is Iudge of the world, whereby he himselfe determineth of things doubtfull, and such as no arte or wit of man is able to discouer.
uCartwr•n Prou. c. 16. Quod s•rt•m appellat judicium, &c.Cartwr•n Prou. c. 16. Quod s•rt•m appellat iudicium, &c.
xPers•rtē Deus ipse in judicio sed•at.Pers•rtē Deꝰ ipse in iudicio sed•at.
ySortem esse Dei mund• Judieu quasi vicarium, qua Deus ipse &c. decernit. Idem in c. 18Sortem esse Dei mund• Iudieu quasi vicarium, qua Deus ipse &c. decernit. Idem in c. 18
Yea not only zthe Scripture maketh a Lot so the sentence of God, as in the most weighty matters of God and man, aof life and death, bit is the very oracle and determination of Gods will, wherein a man must rest without any contradiction or motion to the contrary: but even cthe very Gentiles themselves also knew it to be Gods Oracle.
Yea not onely zthe Scripture maketh a Lot so the sentence of God, as in the most weighty matters of God and man, aof life and death, bit is the very oracle and determination of Gods will, wherein a man must rest without any contradiction or motion to the contrary: but euen cthe very Gentiles themselues also knew it to be Gods Oracle.
These proofs of the Assumption are unsound ⟨p. 157⟩and insufficient. For first for dthe testimony of Solomon; though the word therein used in his native sense and original signify properly ejudgement, and is therefore fone of the necessary attendants of a lawful Oath, as gthe learned well observe. Yet neither is a Lot there termed Judgement; though the word that naturally so signifieth be applied there unto it, and might be properly used of some special kind of it: Neither doth the word in the ordinary use of it only so signify, but is used more generally for any custom, or manner, or course, or carriage whatsoever, be it light or weighty, just or unjust; as where it is used of the profane and preposterous carriage hof Eli's sons towards Gods people; as also where it is applied to the superstitious and savage demeanour iof Baals Priests toward themselves: and in this general manner the best and most Interpreters there take it.* The word therefore there used is too weak a ground to bear a frame of such weight as is here built upon it. For as for Gods immediate sitting and sentencing in Lots, (of which further anon) the conceit of it breedeth a superstitious use of them; (the rather therefore to be abhorred:)m from some taint whereof that speech of nthe same Author cannot be freed where he saith, that oLots are available for the finding out of the most hidden things, as they have been used oft to that end: as also that pby them such doubtful ⟨p. 158⟩things may be determined, as no wit or skill of man is otherwise able to decide. For what hidden truth can by any Lot be discovered? or what can be decided or determined by a Lot, that might not be determined by any third party, yea by a child or Idiot, as well as by a Lot, if it should please the parties contending to refer themselves thereunto?
These proofes of the Assumption are vnsound ⟨p. 157⟩and insufficient. For first for dthe testimonie of Salomon; though the word therein vsed in his natiue sense and originall signifie properly eiudgement, and is therefore fone of the necessarie attendants of a lawfull Oath, as gthe learned well obserue. Yet neither is a Lot there tearmed Iudgement; though the word that naturally so signifieth be applied there vnto it, and might be properly vsed of some speciall kinde of it: Neither doth the word in the ordinary vse of it onely so signifie, but is vsed more generally for any custome, or manner, or course, or cariage whatsoeuer, be it light or weightie, iust or vniust; as where it is vsed of the prophane and proposterous cariage hof Elies sonnes towards Gods people; as also where it is applied to the superstitious and sauage demeanour iof Baals Preists toward themselues: and in this generall manner the best and most Interpreters there take it.* The word therefore there vsed is too weake a ground to beare a frame of such weight as is here built vpon it. For as for Gods immediate sitting and sentencing in Lots, (of which further anone) the conceipt of it breedeth a superstitious vse of them; (the rather therefore to be abhorred:)m from some taint whereof that speech of nthe same Authour cannot bee freed where he saith, that oLots are auaileable for the finding out of the most hidden things, as they haue beene vsed oft to that end: as also that pby them such doubtfull ⟨p. 158⟩
e[Greek or Hebrew] à [Greek or Hebrew] judicare, unde & [Greek or Hebrew] Ju•ex, & Su•es Consul Poenis apud Enniū, Liu•ū, Festum: inde enim m•lius Jos. Scalig. ad Eus•b quàm à [Greek or Hebrew] quasi [Greek or Hebrew]. Id ni ad Fest. & Drus. anim•d••. l. 2. c. 24.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 à 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 iudicare, vnde & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Iu•ex, & Su•es Consul Poenis apud Enniū, Liu•ū, Festum: inde enim m•lius Ios. Scalig. ad Eus•b quàm à 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 quasi 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Id ni ad Fest. & Drus. anim•d••. l. 2. c. 24.
§ 10. Secondly for the instances alleged: To reason on this manner, Lots were once Gods Oracles in these and these cases: therefore they are so in all: or, Lots were sometime extraordinarily Gods Oracles in some cases whereunto they were by God then specially for that purpose assigned: therefore they are so always: both the consequence is unsound, and the consequent untrue. For first it followeth not; If sometime extraordinarily, then ever. qThe noise that David heard over his head in the mulberry-trees was Gods Oracle to him: shall the like rustling, that we may chance to hear in trees over our heads, be therefore a divine Oracle to us?r The Philistines speech to Jonathan and his Armour-bearer was as an Oracle of God to them: shall the like answer therefore be the same now to us? or must it needs therefore be ever such?
§ 10. Secondly for the instances alleadged: To reason on this manner, Lots were once Gods Oracles in these and these cases: therefore they are so in all: or, Lots were sometime extraordinarily Gods Oracles in some cases whereunto they were by God then specially for that purpose assigned: therefore they are so alwayes: both the consequence is vnsound, and the consequent vntrue. For first it followeth not; If sometime extraordinarily, then euer. qThe noise that Dauid heard ouer his head in the mulbery-trees was Gods Oracle to him: shall the like rustling, that wee may chaunce to heare in trees ouer our heads, be therefore a diuine Oracle to vs?r The Philistines speech to Ionathan and his Armour-bearer was as an Oracle of God to them: shall the like answere therefore be the same now to vs? or must it needes therefore bee euer such?
For first sGods Oracles and sentences are certain and constant: for this word and sentence is yea and amen as uhimself. And so were those Lots whereby God sometime gave sentence, as that which Achan was discovered by, which had it therefore ⟨p. 159⟩either been oft cast, or cast by divers persons at Gods appointment at once, would still constantly have *lighted on no Tribe but Jud•, no kindred but the Zarchites, no household but Zabdies, no person but Achan. But then an ordinary Lot xthere is nothing more uncertain, ready upon every new shaking of the Lot pot to give out a new sentence. For suppose we that some one Minister of a whole hundred in our head City should by Lot be selected to visit the Pesthouse, would the Lot drawn in this case 1four or five times together with never so great solemnity light certainly and constantly ever on the same man? Or suppose 2four or five several Companies in several places should, after the business solemnly by prayer commended to God, cast Lots upon the self-same employment among the same parties, were it certain, yea or probable that they should all light upon the same person? Or were it not trivolous, if not impious, therefore to say, that upon every second shaking or drawing GOD altereth his sentence, and so to accuse him of inconstancy; or that to several Companies he giveth a several sentence, and so to charge him with contradiction and contrariety?
For first sGods Oracles and sentences are certaine and constant: for this word and sentence is yea and amen as uhimselfe. And so were those Lots whereby God somtime gaue sentence, as that which Achan was discouered by, which had it therefore ⟨p. 159⟩either beene oft cast, or cast by diuers persons at Gods appointment at once, would still constantly haue *lighted on no Tribe but Iud•, no kindred but the Zarchites, no houshold but Zabdies, no person but Achan. But then an ordinary Lot xthere is nothing more vncertaine, ready vpon euery new shaking of the Lot pot to giue out a new sentence. For suppose we that some one Minister of a whole hundred in our head City should by Lot be selected to visite the Pesthouse, would the Lot drawne in this case 1foure or fiue times together with neuer so great solemnity light certainely and constantly euer on the same man? Or suppose 2foure or fiue seuerall Companies in seuerall places should, after the busines solemnly by praier commended to God, cast Lots vpon the selfe-same imployment among the same parties, were it certaine, yea or probable that they should all light vpon the same person? Or were it not triuolous, if not impious, therefore to say, that vpon euery second shaking or drawing GOD altreth his sentence, and so to accuse him of inconstancie; or that to seuerall Companies he giueth a seuerall sentence, and so to charge him with contradiction and contrariety?
*Josh 7.16.17.18. Certissima est cognitio quaeper sortes à Deo temperatas habetur. Zanch. de sort.Iosh 7.16.17.18. Certissima est cognitio quaeper sortes à Deo temperatas habetur. Zanch. de sort.
x[Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de constit. princip. Sor•res est incertissima. Bar• in I•u. c. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de constit. princip. Sor•res est incertissima. Bar• in I•u. c. 1.
1As in the Tuscan Estate they draw five several times, and so five several persons for each office. See before chap 4 sect. 8.As in the Tuscan Estate they draw fiue seuerall times, and so fiue seuerall persons for each office. See before chap 4 sect. 8.
Secondly yGods oracles are ever according to justice and equity: but the sentence of a Lot is not certainly such. For suppose a matter of right, wherein he that ought to yield will not yield, by mutual consent therefore of necessity put to a Lot; dare any man say certainly that it shall go with him that hath right? Or in war, suppose a whole troupe put to cast Lots for their lines, among whom there ⟨p. 160⟩are many that are no way at all faulty, dare any say that the Death-lot shall light on no one of these, but upon those alone that indeed have deserved to die? as zin Achans case a man might well confidently say, that it should surely light on him that was the delinquent and on no other, whom by such means God had then given warrant to search for. No: 1a Lot regardeth no more right then wrong, 2no more guiltless then guilty, ready to go indifferently for or against either. It is none therefore of Gods sentence.
Secondly yGods oracles are euer according to iustice and equitie: but the sentence of a Lot is not certainely such. For suppose a matter of right, wherein he that ought to yeeld will not yeelde, by mutuall consent therefore of necessity put to a Lot; dare any man say certainely that it shall go with him that hath right? Or in warre, suppose a whole troupe put to cast Lots for their lines, among whom there ⟨p. 160⟩are many that are no way at all faulty, dare any say that the Death-lot shall light on no one of these, but vpon those alone that indeed haue deserued to die? as zin Achans case a man might well confidently say, that it should surely light on him that was the delinquent and on no other, whom by such meanes God had then giuen warrant to search for. No: 1a Lot regardeth no more right then wrong, 2no more guiltlesse then guilty, ready to go indifferently for or against either. It is none therefore of Gods sentence.
Thirdly, if a Lot were Gods sentence, 3what need men be so curious in examining and trying the fitness or unfitness of those that they admit to a Lot for the bearing of any Office either in Church or Common-weal? (For I spare to ask of the Popish sort, why they therefore forbear to elect Ecclesiastical Officers by Lot, if a Lot be Gods sentence; because such things, say they, must be done by the inspiration of Gods spirit•;a as if Gods spirit and his sentence were not sure to concur.) For is not bGod as well able to judge of their fitness or unfitness as man is? Or do they distrust God, and fear that he will be partial in his sentence, whose constant commendation is, that he is cno respectre of persons? The general care therefore in this kind of all those that use Lots in any such weighty affair, showeth evidently, that they do not esteem the Lots verdict Gods Oracle, but a sentence so uncertain, so inconsiderate, so heedless, that it might well run with them into a whirl-pool drawing Church and State after it, if by humane ⟨p. 161⟩caution it were not the more warily managed. Was there any such fear, think we, in the Lot that dSamuel cast for a King; or any need of such caution to have been observed in it?
Thirdly, if a Lot were Gods sentence, 3what need men be so curious in examining and trying the fitnesse or vnfitnesse of those that they admit to a Lot for the bearing of any Office either in Church or Common-weale? (For I spare to aske of the Popish sort, why they therefore forbeare to elect Ecclesiasticall Officers by Lot, if a Lot be Gods sentence; because such things, say they, must be done by the inspiration of Gods spirit•;a as if Gods spirit and his sentence were not sure to concurre.) For is not bGod as well able to iudge of their fitnesse or vnfitnesse as man is? Or doe they distrust God, and feare that he will be partiall in his sentence, whose constant commendation is, that he is cno respecter of persons? The generall care therefore in this kinde of all those that vse Lots in any such weightie affaire, sheweth euidently, that they doe not esteeme the Lots verdict Gods Oracle, but a sentence so vncertaine, so inconsiderate, so heedlesse, that it might well run with them into a whirle-poole drawing Church and State after it, if by humane ⟨p. 161⟩caution it were not the more warily managed. Was there any such feare, thinke wee, in the Lot that dSamuel cast for a King; or any need of such caution to haue beene obserued in it?
3[Greek or Hebrew]. ut Aristid. de Rhet•r. ad Plat.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. vt Aristid. de Rhet•r. ad Plat.
aHonour. 3. in Decretal. l. 5. tit. 21. c. 3. & Thom. de sort. c. 5.Honor. 3. in Decretal. l. 5. tit. 21. c. 3. & Thom. de sort. c. 5.
§. 11. Lastly, it a Lot were a divine sentence, eit were unalterable and unchangeable, such as men were ever bound to rest in and abide by, under danger of sin and disobedience, without further inquisition, consultation, consideration, or forecasting ought for the worse or the better. fMans sentence is sometime held such: Gods ever much more. Yea so it was in those Lots, wherein God extraordinarily gave sentence, as in gSauls and hMatthias his: whereas in ordinary Lots it is far otherwise.
§. 11. Lastly, it a Lot were a diuine sentence, eit were vnalterable and vnchangeable, such as men were euer bound to rest in and abide by, vnder danger of sinne and disobedience, without further inquisition, consultation, consideration, or forecasting ought for the worse or the better. fMans sentence is sometime held such: Gods euer much more. Yea so it was in those Lots, wherein God extraordinarily gaue sentence, as in gSauls and hMatthias his: whereas in ordinary Lots it is farre otherwise.
eQuibus in r•bus ad Deum consulendum ventum est, omnino stari indicio eius oportet. Jun. in Jon. c. 1.Quibus in r•bus ad Deum consulendum ventum est, omnino stari indicio eius oportet. Iun. in Ion. c. 1.
fEst. 1.19. & 8.8 Dan 6.8, 12. Gal. 3.15 Etiam ab hominibus judicata pro veritate haberi solent Jun. ib. Sententia, si••res judicata pro veritate accipitur. •lpian in Digest. lib. 1. tit. 5. leg 25. P•st reniudicatā nihil quaeritur. Idē ex Marci Imper. sententia, l. 42. •. 1. le. 56. quia res certa jam habetur. Accurs. Gloss.Est. 1.19. & 8.8 Dan 6.8, 12. Gal. 3.15 Etiam ab hominibus iudicata pro veritate haberi solent Iun. ib. Sententia, si••res iudicata pro veritate accipitur. •lpian in Digest. lib. 1. tit. 5. leg 25. P•st rēiudicatā nihil quaeritur. Idē ex Marci Imper. sententia, l. 42. •. 1. le. 56. quia res certa iam habetur. Accurs. Gloss.
For first in private affairs no man is bound to stand to the event of a Lot which he never gave consent unto. In private affairs I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compel the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to do in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for marriage such a one of the twain which they like not of, yet they ought to give their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approved by him, of a Noble mans son) because having cast Lots for direction after invocation of Gods name in that business, the Lot had light upon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to bear one down, that she ought in conscience to have him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sin and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had given such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily bind, not expecting mans privity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so bind, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend unto that which the Lot imposed upon him.
For first in priuate affaires no man is bound to stand to the euent of a Lot which hee neuer gaue consent vnto. In priuate affaires I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compell the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to doe in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for mariage such a one of the twaine which they like not of, yet they ought to giue their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approued by him, of a Noble mans sonne) because hauing cast Lots for direction after inuocation of Gods name in that busines, the Lot had light vpon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to beare one downe, that she ought in conscience to haue him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sinne and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had giuen such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily binde, not expecting mans priuity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so binde, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend vnto that which the Lot imposed vpon him.
iAd tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, jubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.Ad tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, iubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.
kJudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à jure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.Iudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à iure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.
lBucer. in oper. Augl disput. con Jung.Bucer. in oper. Augl disput. cū Iung•.
Secondly by mutual consent it is no question but that men may alter and change their Lots either with other, as uLevinus and Marcellus sometime did at the request of the Senate upon suite made by the Sicilians whom Marcellus, one they sorely feared, was else to have had. But may any by mutual agreement alter Gods sentence, as xthe wife to leave her head and break the covenant of her God, ybecause her Husband is content to agree thereunto? Or to hold to a Lot where it was a divine Oracle, might zSaul so elected have surrendered his right to another, though the people should have been willing also to have yielded thereunto? Or might Matthias have resigned his place to Barsabas, and Barsabas by joint consent have taken it of him? Yet if in choice of a Minister for the Pest-house, should the Lot light on one that (as *Prochorus the Counterfeit fableth of John when he saw that by Lot he was to go over sea into Asia) should for fear presently sink down in a sound, and some other more hardy then he offer himself voluntarily to that office, were it not lawful to accept of him? or were it wisdom to refuse him, and press the ⟨p. 163⟩other to it so unfit for it?
Secondly by mutuall consent it is no question but that men may alter and change their Lots either with other, as uLeuinus and Marcellus sometime did at the request of the Senate vpon suite made by the Sicilians whom Marcellus, one they sorely feared, was else to haue had. But may any by mutuall agreement alter Gods sentence, as xthe wife to leaue her head and breake the couenant of her God, ybecause her Husband is content to agree thereunto? Or to hold to a Lot where it was a diuine Oracle, might zSaul so elected haue surrendred his right to another, though the people should haue benne willing also to haue yeelded thereunto? Or might Matthias haue resigned his place to Barsabas, and Barsabas by ioint consent haue taken it of him? Yet if in choise of a Minister for the Pest-house, should the Lot light on one that (as *Prochorus the Counterfait fableth of Iohn when hee saw that by Lot he was to go ouer sea into Asia) should for feare presently sinke downe in a sownd, and some other more hardie then he offer himselfe voluntarily to that office, were it not lawfull to accept of him? or were it wisedome to refuse him, and presse the ⟨p. 163⟩other to it so vnfit for it?
uInter ipsos Consules permutatio provinciarū facta est. Liu. l 26. anno 544.Inter ipsos Consules permutatio prouinciarū facta est. Liu. l 26. anno 544.
yconuencrat olim, Ut tu quod velles, faceres; nec non ego possem Indulg•ra mihi.-Junen. sat. 6.cōuencrat olim, Vt tu quod velles, faceres; nec non ego possem Indulg•ra mihi.-Iunen. sat. 6.
Yea lastly in some case it were a sin for a man to retain that which by Lot is befallen him. For may a man with a good conscience keep his brothers right from him, which the iniquity of a Lot, for quietness sake yielded to by the other, hath against justice cast upon him, and say it is Gods sentence? yea may not the wronged party lawfully endeavour, by convincing him in conscience of the wrong that he hath done him, to recover his right, if he can? Or as aMatthias should have sinned in renouncing his Apostleship; so did not bPhannias that silly Idiot as well sin in accepting of the High-priestship, though assigned him by Lot? And yet by these mens positions should that Lot also be Gods sentence, and his choice thereby Gods immediate call to that office. A senseless conceit to suppose that any man should sin by following Gods call, by doing after Gods sentence.
Yea lastly in some case it were a sinne for a man to retaine that which by Lot is befalne him. For may a man with a good conscience keepe his brothers right from him, which the iniquitie of a Lot, for quietnesse sake yeelded to by the other, hath against iustice cast vpon him, and say it is Gods sentence? yea may not the wronged party lawfully endeauour, by conuincing him in conscience of the wrong that he hath done him, to recouer his right, if he can? Or as aMatthias should haue sinned in renouncing his Apostleship; so did not bPhannias that sely Idiote as well sinne in accepting of the High-preistship, though assigned him by Lot? And yet by these mens positions should that Lot also be Gods sentence, and his choise thereby Gods immediate call to that office. A senslesse conceipt to suppose that any man should sinne by following Gods call, by doing after Gods sentence.
§ 12. Where it is to be observed, that howsoever it is here pretended that the very Heathen held their Lotteries ever to be most religious and inviolable; yet in truth it is not so? cThey esteemed it indeed a very prudent and politic ordinance for the preventing of divers inconveniences; yea din some sort too religious, as in their public affairs it was ordered, in regard eof some superstitious rites used about it, as fabout all other their solemn, yet civill employments either public or private: And gin that regard held they it an heinous offence for any private man to alter the ⟨p. 164⟩course of any business which the state thereby had established.
§ 12. Where it is to be obserued, that howsoeuer it is here pretended that the very Heathen held their Loteries euer to be most religious and inuiolable; yet in truth it is not so? cThey esteemed it indeed a very prudent and politike ordinance for the preuenting of diuers inconueniences; yea din some sort too religious, as in their publike affaires it was ordered, in regard eof some superstitious rites vsed about it, as fabout all other their solemne, yet ciuill employments either publike or priuate: And gin that regard held they it an hainous offence for any priuate man to alter the ⟨p. 164⟩course of any busines which the state thereby had established.
cVise cap. 4. § 7.
dVise quae ibid. Huc per i•cum allusit Cic. Phil. 3. Prae•lara fu•t Se•atus in ill• di• religiosae provinciaerum sortiti•: divina verà opportunitas, ut quae cuique apt ae esset, eo cuique •b•••iret.Vise quae ibid. Huc per i•cum allusit Cic. Phil. 3. Prae•lara fu•t Se•atus in ill• di• religiosae prouinciaerum sortiti•: diuina verà opportunitas, vt quae cuique apt ae esset, eo cuique •b•••iret.
eHinc sortitio vitiosa, in qua •itus illi parum ritè obseruati. Liu. l. 41. an. 578.Hinc sortitio vitiosa, in qua •itus illi parum ritè obseruati. Liu. l. 41. ann. 578.
fNihil ferò quondam maioris rei nis• auspicato, ne privatim quidem gerebatur. Cic. de divin. l. 1. Nostrinihil in bello sine extis agunt: nihil sine auspie••s domi habent. Ibid. Hinc Magistratum vitia creati. Cic. de divin. li. 2. Liu. l. 23. an•. 539. & •uet. Aug. c. 34.Nihil ferò quondam maioris rei nis auspicato, ne priuatim quidem gerebatur. Cic. de diuin. l. 1. Nostrinihil in bello sine extis agunt: nihil sine auspies domi habent. Ibid. Hinc Magistratum vitia creati. Cic. de diuin. li. 2. Liu. l. 23. an. 539. & uet. Aug. c. 34.
But yet they reputed not the Lot to be so sacred and peremptory a sentence, but that they might reject those that it had lighted upon, if they either *already knew them, or fupon further trial found them to be unfit: Yea and but that otherwise they might and did usually go from it, sometime gin case of necessity, when by accident the party was disabled to do that which by Lot he ought to have done; sometime hin case of religion, the party being thereby restrained from going whither the Lot had assigned him; sometime iat the suit of the parties themselves; sometime kat the earnest entreaty of some others; sometime upon one consideration, and sometime upon another, lwhen after the Lots cast, upon better advice, they misdoubted that it might prove any way prejudicial to the public, if the course were not altered.
But yet they reputed not the Lot to be so sacred and peremptorie a sentence, but that they might reiect those that it had lighted vpon, if they either *already knew them, or fvpon further triall found them to be vnfit: Yea and but that otherwise they might and did vsually goe from it, sometime gin case of necessitie, when by accident the partie was disabled to doe that which by Lot he ought to haue done; sometime hin case of religion, the partie being thereby restrained from going whither the Lot had assigned him; sometime iat the suit of the parties themselues; sometime kat the earnest intreatie of some others; sometime vpon one consideration, and sometime vpon another, lwhen after the Lots cast, vpon better aduice, they misdoubted that it might proue any way preiudiciall to the publike, if the course were not altered.
*Corn. Scipioni Hispalli Fo •ùm Hispania provincia sort obu•nisset, ne illuc iret, Senatus decrevit, adiecta Hausa, quòd rectè facer• nescir•t. Vaeler. Max l. 6. c. 3.Corn. Scipioni Hispalli Fo •ùm Hispania prouincia sorte obu•nisset, ne illuc iret, Senatus decreuit, adiecta •ausa, quòd rectè facer• nescir•t. Vaeler. Max l. 6. c. 3.
fHinc [Greek or Hebrew] actions. Demost. & Lysiae. Et [Greek or Hebrew]. Demos•h. in Aristag. 1. Et [Greek or Hebrew], qui r•i•ctis sufficiebantur. Vise cap. 5 § 4.Hinc 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 actiones. Demost. & Lysiae. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Demos•h. in Aristag. 1. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, qui r•i•ctis sufficiebantur. Vise cap. 5 § 4.
gComi•ijs Coss. quiae Aemylius cuius sortis ea cura erat, occurrer• non potuit, Flaminius Roman venit. Liu. l 39. an. 568.Comi•ijs Coss. quiae Aemylius cuius sortis ea cura erat, occurrer• non potuit, Flaminius Roma• venit. Liu. l 39. ann. 568.
hFlaminē cui Sardinia provincia evenerat. Pont. Max. ad sacra retinuit. vicit religio. làem l. 37. anno 565.Flaminē cui Sardinia prouincia euenerat. Pont. Max. ad sacra retinuit. vicit religio. làem l. 37. anno 565.
In which kind they are, as deservedly to be approved and commended; so to be preferred before the superstitious Jews, who mrather then they would break the order of the Priestly employment in set courses at first settled by Lot, suffered the service of God for some space of time in the siege of their City to be wholly neglected, because all the Priests of that course then present there were utterly destroyed, that ought at that time to have done the service.
In which kinde they are, as deseruedly to be approued and commended; so to be preferred before the superstitious Iewes, who mrather then they would breake the order of the Priestly imployment in set courses at first setled by Lot, suffred the seruice of God for some space of time in the siege of their Citie to be wholly neglected, because all the Priests of that course then present there were vtterly destroied, that ought at that time to haue done the seruice.
mEx Joseph. capti•. l. 6. c. 8. & contra Apion. l. 2. ad•ò nefas putabant [Greek or Hebrew] confundere. Jos. Scal•de emend. temp.Ex Ioseph. capti•. l. 6. c. 8. & contra Apion. l. 2. ad•ò nefas putabant 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 confundere. Ios. Scal•de emend. temp.
True it is indeed that in the Civill Law nall Appeal is denied ordinarily from the sentence of a Lot: But that is, not (as some of them fondly say) obecause the sentence of a Lot is the sentence of Fortune, or of God, who hath no superior in this world• but rather, as others, with better colour of reason; because pthis course is taken for more speedy dispatch; because qby flying from it in divers cases they shall but hinder either other from ever coming to any issue; because a Lot is the most equal and indifferent course that can be and no corruption or partiality can be charged upon it: and lastly rbecause commonly it is by mutual consent that matters are put thereunto, sin which case their own act justly concludeth either side: tAgreeable whereunto is that of Plato, who in his State inhibiteth all appeal from those Judges that the parties themselves have made choice of by mutual consent; As also uin the Athenian Estate, though they might appeal to the principal Judges, from such Arbiters or Umpires as by Lot were assigned ⟨p. 166⟩them; yet *from such as by mutual agreement they had referred themselves unto, it is apparent that they could have no appeal.
True it is indeed that in the Ciuill Law nall Appeale is denied ordinarily from the sentence of a Lot: But that is, not (as some of them fondly say) obecause the sentence of a Lot is the sentence of Fortune, or of God, who hath no superiour in this world• but rather, as others, with better colour of reason; because pthis course is taken for more speedie dispatch; because qby flying from it in diuers cases they shall but hinder either other from euer comming to any issue; because a Lot is the most equall and indifferent course that can be and no corruption or partialitie can be charged vpon it: and lastly rbecause commonly it is by mutuall consent that matters are put thereunto, sin which case their owne act iustly concludeth either side: tAgreeable whereunto is that of Plato, who in his State inhibiteth all appeale from those Iudges that the parties themselues haue made choise of by mutuall consent; As also uin the Athe•ian Estate, though they might appeale to the principall Iudges, from such Arbiters or Vmpiers as by Lot were assigned ⟨p. 166⟩them; yet *from such as by mutuall agreement they had referred themselues vnto, it is apparent that they could haue no appeale.
nA judicio sort is appellari no• potest. Baldus. B•rtol. & Jason apud Gom•z. ad Taur. leg. 38. &. Greg. Tolos. appel. l. 2. c. 16. A bonorum division inter fr• tressorte facta non datur recursus Par. de Put. dear milit. num. 2. t•m. 16. Nicel. de concord. gloss 6 fall. 45 num. 86. Bon•rum divisions for. e facta non s•lent refringi. Re•uf. de appel•.art. 3. num 6 A judicio sor•u non potest peti resti•utio in integrū. Maran. specul. part. 6. act. 2. R• stitutio post sortem denegaturetiā min•ri. Franch. sum. 3 Cod. in 6.A iudicio sort is appellari no• potest. Baldus. B•rtol. & Iason apud Gom•z. ad Taur. leg. 38. &. Greg. Tolos. appel. l. 2. c. 16. A bonorum diuisione inter fr• tressorte facta non datur recursus Par. de Put. dere milit. num. 2. t•m. 16. Nicel. de concord. gloss 6 fall. 45 num. 86. Bon•rum diuisiones sor. e facta non s•lent refringi. Re•uf. de appel•.art. 3. num 6 A iudicio sor•u non potest peti resti•utio in integrū. Maran. specul. part. 6. act. 2. R• stitutio post sortem denegaturetiā minri. Franch. sum. 3 Cod. in 6.
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things may be determined, as no wit or skill of man is otherwise able to decide. For what hidden truth can by any Lot be discouered? or what can be decided or determined by a Lot, that might not bee determined by any third party, yea by a childe or Idiote, as well as by a Lot, if it should please the parties contending to referre themselues thereunto?
I•• a •entum hos debet ba•er• comites, veritatē, iustitiam, iudiciū. Hier. in Ie•. c. 4 & ap•d Grat. c. 2.2. q. •. & Thomsum. 22 2ae. q. 89. a 3.
h• Sam. 2.13. [Greek or Hebrew]• Sam. 2.13. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉
oValet ad verum reconditissamarum peru•stigatio•ē.Valet ad verum reconditissamarum peru•stigatio•ē.
pDerebus d•bijs null h•minū art •ut ingeni• inu• stigandis Si• Cellar. a•Josh. c. 7 q. 19 Vuiness sortibus ad veritatē e• concursu divino, generally saltem corto, speciali incer•o, probabilitamen. At rectè P••cer dedivi•. Divi•. •orie sunt sorte•, qu• oracula excudunt, abdita & abstrusa errant, ignota••ciunt, incerta confirmant, impendentia prospiciunt, &c quorum a•tor & dispensator Diabolus, non Deus. Et ips• Sera•. ib. q 20. V•tita sunt sortes quibus incrimina inquiritur.Derebꝰ d•bijs null h•minū arte •ut ingeni• inu• stigandis Si• Se•ar. a• I•sh. c. 7 q. 19 Vuiness sortibꝰ ad veritatē e• concursu diuino, generali saltem corto, speciali incer•o, probabilitamen. At rectè P••cer dediui•. Diui•. •orie sunt sorte•, qu• oracula excudunt, abdita & abstrusa er•unt, ignota••ciunt, incerta confirmant, impendentia prospiciunt, &c quorū a•tor & dispensator Diabolꝰ, non Deꝰ. Et ips• Sera•. ib. q 20. V•tita sunt sortes quibꝰ incrimina inquiritur.
2As in the Venetian Estate, four several companies cast Lots for the nomination of the same Offices. Ibid.As in the Venetian Estate, foure seuerall companies cast Lots for the nomination of the same Offices. Ibid.
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gVise qua sup. cap. 4. §. 7.
iDuo deprecati sunt ne in provincias irent, &c. Liu. l. 41. an. 578.Duo deprecati sunt ne in prouincias irent, &c. Liu. l. 41. ann. 578.
lVise exempla varia cap. 5. §. 6. quibus addequod Liu. l. 9. Fabius alienae sortis victor belli, in suam provinciam exercitum reduxit.Vise exempla varia cap. 5. §. 6. quibus addequod Liu. l. 9. Fabius alienae sortis victor belli, in suam prouinciam exercitum reduxit.
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oQuia fors vel fortuna, sive vol••tas divi•a in mundo superiorem non habet. Jason. Bald. Bart. Decius Rebuff. & alij apud Sca•ch. de appell. q. 16. limit. 6.Quia fors vel fortuna, siue vol••tas diui•a in mundo superiorem non habet. Iason. Bald. Bart. Decius Rebuff. & alij apud Sca•ch. de appell. q. 16. limit. 6.
pQuia facilioris judicij & actus causa ita placuit. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16.Quia facilioris iudicij & actus causa ita placuit. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16.
qAlioqui see mutuò impediunt. Idem syntagm. l. 34. c. 5.Alioqui se mutuò impediunt. Idem syntagm. l. 34. c. 5.
rQuod inter contenden•es itae placmerit: & à judicio quod ipsi elegerunt appellare nequeuns. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16 Ipsi fortune see submiserunt. Pan•rm. in 5. Decret. de Sortil. ad parendun• eventui see obligarunt. Pe•cer. de divi•at.Quod inter contenden•es itae placmerit: & à iudicio quod ipsi elegerunt appellare nequeuns. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16 Ipsi fortun• se submiserunt. Pan•rm. in 5. Decret. de Sortil. ad parendun• euentui se obligarunt. Pe•cer. de diui•at.
sA indicibus quos communis consensus elegerit, non licéat provocare. Con•i•. Mileu. can. 24. apud Grat. c. 2. q. 6. & Cr•spet. in sum. Idem habit & Conc. Carth. 3• can. 10. sed & Asri•. 1. can. 89. Summum enim qu•sque causa suae indicem facit, quemcunque elegit. Plin. prafat. hist. •at.A indicibus quos communis consensus elegerit, non licéat prouocare. Con•i•. Mileu. can. 24. apud Grat. c. 2. q. 6. & Cr•spet. in sum. Idem hab•t & Conc. Carth. 3• can. 10. sed & Asri•. 1. can. 89. Summum enim qu•sque causa suae indicem facit, quemcunque elegit. Plin. prafat. hist. •at.
t[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. lib. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. lib. 6.
u[Greek or Hebrew] à quibus appellare licebat ad Indices: [Greek or Hebrew], à quorum arbitri• re tantum integra recedere licebat. Bud. in commentar. Graec. ex D•mosth. in Ap•ob. Itaque recté Plin. praefat. •. u. plurimu• interest sortiatur quis indicem an eligat.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 à quibus appellare licebat ad Indices: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, à quorum arbitri• re tantum integra recedere licebat. Bud. in commentar. Graec. ex D•mosth. in Ap•ob. Itaque recté Plin. praefat. •. u. plurimu• interest sortiatur quis indicem an eligat.
*[Greek or Hebrew] (Arbitrum loquitur ex mutuo consensu detectū ) [Greek or Hebrew]. Lex Athenieus. apud Demosth. in Midiam.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 (Arbitrum loquitur ex mutuo consensu detectū ) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Lex Athenieus. apud Demosth. in Midiam.
