Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
§ 1. The ause of Lots and Lottery, as it is very ancient, so hath bin in all ages no less frequent among men of all sorts. And considering that those things that are most in use, are by means of mans corruption most subject to abuse;b it ought not to seem strange, if the like hath among the rest befallen Lots; if having been so much in use, they have not been free from much abuse; if having been used by so many, they have bin abused by the most. For cwhat Creature of God, or what Ordinance, be it civill or sacred, though good and holy in it self, is so happy, but that it receiveth, if not a deep tincture, yet at least some slight fully, from the foul hands or defiled fingers of the most that deal with it. That the lawful use therefore of this Ordinance may be wisely discerned and warily severed from ⟨p. 2⟩the abuse of it (d so that neither the use of it be wholly banished and abandoned in regard of the abuse, as where Friend and Flatterer are both indiscreetly thrust out together at one door; nor yet way be given to the abuse of it while the right use is admitted, as where the door is unheedily set open to Flattery while men hope to entertain Friendship;) is the main matter that in this whole Treatise is aimed at. Which that it may be the better and the more orderly performed, it will not be amiss that we endeavour to consider and conceive aright, in the first place what the nature of a Lot is in general; and next to that, what the several sorts thereof are; whereby the warrantable and unwarrantable use of them may the more plainly appear.
§ 1. THe avse of Lots and Lotery, as it is very ancient, so hath bin in all ages no less frequent among men of all sorts. And considering that those things that are most in vse, are by meanes of mans corruption most subiect to abuse;b it ought not to seeme strange, if the like hath among the rest befallen Lots; if hauing bene so much in vse, they haue not bene free from much abuse; if hauing bene vsed by so many, they haue bin abused by the most. For cwhat Creature of God, or what Ordinance, be it ciuill or sacred, though good and holy in it selfe, is so happy, but that it receiueth, if not a deepe tincture, yet at least some slight fully, from the foule hands or defiled fingers of the most that deale with it. That the lawfull vse therefore of this Ordinance may be wisely discerned and warily seuered from ⟨p. 2⟩the abuse of it (d so that neither the vse of it be wholy banished and abandoned in regard of the abuse, as where Frend and Flatterer are both indiscreetly thrust out togither at one dore; nor yet way be giuen to the abuse of it while the right vse is admitted, as where the dore is vnheedily set open to Flattery while men hope to entertaine Friendship;) is the maine matter that in this whole Treatise is aymed at. Which that it may be the better and the more orderly performed, it will not be amisse that we endeuor to consider and conceiue aright, in the first place what the nature of a Lot is in generall; and next to that, what the seuerall sorts thereof are; whereby the warrantable and vnwarrantable vse of them may the more plainely appeare.
aMultus & multiplex ubique sortium usus. Peucer. de divin: c. de sort: Vise sis & Hadr. Jun. miscel: l 2. c. 5. Nic: Serar. in Josh: tom: 2. c. 7. q 17. Mar: Delrio: disq: Mag: tō. 2. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3. &c. 4. q. 1, 3. Et insra cap. 4. per totum cap. 6. § 1, 2. & cap. 10. per totum.Multus & multiplex vbique sortium vsus. Peucer. de diuin: c. de sort: Vise sis & Hadr. Iun. miscel: l 2. c. 5. Nic: Serar. in Iosh: tom: 2. c. 7. q 17. Mar: Delrio: disq: Mag: tō. 2. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3. &c. 4. q. 1, 3. Et insra cap. 4. per totum cap. 6. § 1, 2. & cap. 10. per totum.
bAbusui maxim• sunt obnoxia, quae in usu sunt frequentissimo. Meisner: sobr: Philos: p 1. praef.Abusui maxim• sunt obnoxia, quae in vsu sunt frequentissimo. Meisner: sobr: Philos: p 1. praef.
§ 2. A Lot therefore may be well thus either defined or described, that it is a casualty or casual event purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt.
§ 2. A Lot therefore may be well thus either defined or described, that it is a casualty or casuall euent purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt.
In which definition or description so conceived, (as in all other) are two things principally to be considered, the genus, as they term it, that containeth the matter; and the form or specific difference of the thing defined.
In which definition or description so conceiued, (as in all other) are two things principally to be considered, the genus, as they terme it, that containeth the matter; and the forme or specificall difference of the thing defined.
The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casual event, because that how soever in some kind of Lot some guess may be given, yet the event is mainly casual, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it unto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a little too far that define a ⟨p. 3⟩eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoever by the event whereof some hidden thing may be discovered. For many things are and may be done for the discovery of hidden and unknown truths, which yet come not within the nature and compass of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his servant to be light-fingered, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withal, and thereby to try his honesty which he hath in some jealousy, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses used ordinarily by those that are in place of authority and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discovery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lottery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is ever some event merely casual; as if a man to try whether his servant be a thief or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, together with others rolled up severally into water, to see which will unfold first, and thereby to determine and judge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltless of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that fTo use Lottery is to put a thing from skill and counsel to temerity and casualty. that gA Lot is the child of chance. that hThe issue of Lots is not in mans power, but is such as casualty casteth on us. that iIn Lottery there is no certainty. that kLots are not carried by reason and judgement, nor by counsel and advice: but lChance and casualty striketh the ⟨p. 4⟩chief stroke in them; if we respect secondary causes.
The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casuall euent, because that how soeuer in some kind of Lot some guesse may be giuen, yet the euent is mainly casuall, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it vnto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a litle too farre that define a ⟨p. 3⟩eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoeuer by the euent whereof some hidden thing may be discouered. For many things are and may be done for the discouery of hidden and vnknowne truths, which yet come not within the nature and compasse of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his seruant to be light-fingred, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withall, and thereby to try his honestie which he hath in some iealousie, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses vsed ordinarily by those that are in place of authoritie and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discouery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lotery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is euer some euent meerely casuall; as if a man to try whether his seruant be a theefe or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, togither with others rolled vp seuerally into water, to see which will vnfold first, and thereby to determine and iudge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltlesse of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that fTo vse Loterie is to put a thing from skill and counsell to temeritie and casualty. that gA Lot is the child of chance. that hThe issue of Lots is not in mans power, but is such as casualty casteth on vs. that iIn Lotery there is no certainty. that kLots are not caried by reason and iudgement, nor by counsell and aduice: but lChance and casualtie striketh the ⟨p. 4⟩cheife stroke in them; if wee respect secondary causes.
eSorts propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, ut eius event• confiderato occultū liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, ut occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius eventu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.Sortes propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, vt eius euent• confiderato occultū •liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, vt occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius euentu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.
fSortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, ubi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dedivin: l. 2.Sortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, vbi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dediuin: l. 2.
g[Greek or Hebrew] dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò [Greek or Hebrew] nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.
hSortis evenius nō est in nostra potestante, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.Sortis euenius nō est in nostra potestāte, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.
iQuid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? Cicidivinat. l. 2.Quid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscētur atque ducūtur? Cicidiuinat. l. 2.
It was no Lot therefore, but a mere mockery of a Lot, that *Verres sometime used, when a Priest being to be chosen by Lot at Syracusa, “he caused the tickets or tokens that were cast into the Lot-pot to be signed all of them with one and the self same mans name: It was, I say, no Lottery, because there could be no casualty or uncertainty in the drawing of the tickets so signed. But of Chance or casualty we will speak more at large in the next Chapter.
It was no Lot therefore, but a meere mockery of a Lot, that *Verres sometime vsed, when a Priest being to be chosen by Lot at Syracusa, “he caused the tickets or tokens that were cast into the Lot-pot to be signed all of them with one and the selfe same mans name: It was, I say, no Lotery, because there could be no casualty or vncertainty in the drawing of the tickets so signed. But of Chance or casualty we will speake more at large in the next Chapter.
*Vise Cicer: in Verr: 4.
“The•mnesti nomen omnibus inscribi euravit.The•mnesti nomen omnibꝰ inscribi eurauit.
§ 3. The form or specific difference of a Lot is taken from the use and intent or purpose of the user, or that whereunto this casualty or casual event is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspense, or the discovery of some hidden and unknown truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casual events and accidents, and that maketh the casual event so used to be a Lot so justly accounted and called. Every Lot therefore is casual; and there can be no Lottery, where there is not casualty. But every casual event is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their lives, which yet come not the most of them within compass of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they never minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speak with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other business; the finding of some one thing while they look after an other, or while they look after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casual, but no lots; there is no lottery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth upon the will and purpose of the user, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it own nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casual thing or the casual occurrence of any such thing to the discovering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth unknown, event uncertain, or course unresolved, is to use it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giveth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lottery given by some others, who define mA Lot to be a casual event determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, nLottery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or uncertainty by the variable event or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selves.
§ 3. The forme or specificall difference of a Lot is taken from the vse and intent or purpose of the vser, or that whereunto this casualtie or casuall euent is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspence, or the discouery of some hidden and vnknowne truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casuall euents and accidents, and that maketh the casuall euent so vsed to be a Lot so iustly accounted and called. Euery Lot therefore is casuall; and there can be no Lotery, where there is not casualty. But euery casuall euent is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their liues, which yet come not the most of them within compasse of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they neuer minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speake with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other businesse; the finding of some one thing while they looke after an other, or while they looke after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casuall, but no lots; there is no lotery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth vpon the will and purpose of the vser, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it owne nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casuall thing or the casuall occurrence of any such thing to the discouering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth vnknowne, euent vncertaine, or course vnresolued, is to vse it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giueth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lotery giuen by some others, who define mA Lot to be a casuall euent determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, nLotery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or vncertainty by the variable euent or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selues.
mSorsest effectus fortuitus statuens de consilijs nostris. Aret. in problem: clas. 1. loc. 67.
nSortibus uti est ex vario eventu seu dispositione alicuius rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Proverb. c. 16.Sortibus vti est ex vario euentu seu dispositione alicuiꝰ rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Prouerb. c. 16.
Which latter definition, though it do not so exactly point out the precise matter of a Lot, as we shall afterward show, yet doth fully comprehend the proper use of a Lot, and that which justly maketh the casual event to be so termed and esteemed.
Which latter definition, though it do not so exactly point out the precise matter of a Lot, as we shall afterward shew, yet doth fully comprehend the proper vse of a Lot, and that which iustly maketh the casuall euent to be so termed and esteemed.
§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath been said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lottery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casual event. For that Lottery is not but where some question or controversy is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed upon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the means whereby questions and controversies are determined, of all these it is osome casualty or casual event only that is made choice of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly term Lottery. In regard whereof as they wander far from the right path in this point, pthat confound qthe suffrages or voices anciently used to be given either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquitting or casting of the party in question by casting of rbeans white or black, or of beads and stones, sor bones or shells ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, uHe would not trust his own Mother with the trial of his life when he could avoid it, for fear lest she should unwittingly cast in a black bean for a white:) with *the Lotteries used in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of employment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seem to shoot also no less wide in this business, xthat draw within the compass of Lottery ythe proof of Aaron's right to the Priesthood by that miraculous budding and fruit-bearing of his Almond-tree rod, zthe trials of quarrels in question of right by duels and combats, canonical purgations, aby taking of the Host or the Eucharist, as also bby fire and water anciently used even cin these parts, ddivination by mens names as foretelling their fortunes, and whether should prevail either against other, and the like:
§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath bene said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lotery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casuall euent. For that Lotery is not but where some question or controuersie is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed vpon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the meanes wherby questions and controuersies are determined, of all these it is osome casualtie or casuall euent onely that is made choise of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly terme Lotery. In regard whereof as they wander farre from the right path in this point, pthat confound qthe suffrages or voices anciently vsed to be giuen either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquiting or casting of the party in question by casting of rbeanes white or blacke, or of beades and stones, sor bones or shels ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, uHe would not trust his owne Mother with the tryall of his life when he could auoide it, for feare lest shee should vnwittingly cast in a blacke beane for a white:) with *the Loteries vsed in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of imployment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seeme to shoote also no lesse wide in this businesse,
oIn a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casual act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controversy. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.In a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casuall act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controuersie. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.
pSerar. in Josh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: [Greek or Hebrew] Pythag: [Greek or Hebrew]. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in urnam co•iectis Judices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. [Greek or Hebrew] & [Greek or Hebrew]; cum de sortitioni•us i• utrumque dicatur.Serar. in Iosh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Pythag: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in vrnam co•iectis Iudices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; cum de sortitioni•us i• vtrumque dicatur.
q[Greek or Hebrew]. Suidas. Et inde [Greek or Hebrew] dicitur per i•cū A•istophani Equip: populus Atheniensis. i. [Greek or Hebrew], à fabis quibus [Greek or Hebrew] utebantur, Hesych: Suid: & Aristoph: Schol.
the means in these cases whereby the doubt or controversy is determined being not merely casual, and the decision of the doubt thereby therefore unproperly so termed.
the meanes in these cases whereby the doubt or controuersie is determined being not meerely casuall, and the decision of the doubt thereby therefore vnproperly so termed.
§ 5. Where let me add yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lottery, that the thing be casual that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casual, (I speak in regard of the creature both using and used) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩own nature, or in the conceit or counsel of those that make such use of it, any special relation otherwise to the business thereby to be decided. An instance or two will help to clear my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his friend, to say, I will ride, if it hold up by noon, if it do not, I will not stir abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the event of his journey, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that success in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualty, but that not considered as a casualty, but as having otherwise a peculiar relation to the business intended, and the conveniency or inconveniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lottery: In which point also some of the former Authors seem to fail, when they bring in edivination by the flight of Fowls, and by their eating or refusing their food under this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompany his friend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall go with you or you stay with me, and put off your journey to some other time: or being upon the way together, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to refer the question and controversy between them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowl, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is merely casual, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lottery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lottery is in general, to wit, A Lot some casualty or event merely casual purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lottery the deciding or determining of some question or controversy by such casual events considered as they are such.
§ 5. Where let me adde yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lotery, that the thing be casuall that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casuall, (I speake in regard of the creature both vsing and vsed) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩owne nature, or in the conceit or counsell of those that make such vse of it, any speciall relation otherwise to the businesse thereby to be decided. An instance or two will helpe to cleare my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his frend, to say, I will ride, if it hold vp by noone, if it doe not, I will not stirre abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the euent of his iourney, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that successe in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualtie, but that not considered as a casualtie, but as hauing otherwise a peculiar relation to the businesse intended, and the conueniency or inconueniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lotery: In which point also some of the former Authors seeme to faile, when they bring in ediuination by the flight of Fowles, and by their eating or refusing their food vnder this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompanie his frend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall goe with you or you stay with me, and put off your iourney to some other time: or being vpon the way togither, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to referre the question and controuersie betweene them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowle, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is meerely casuall, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lotery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lotery is in generall, to wit, A Lot some casualty or euent meerely casuall purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lotery the deciding or determining of some question or controuersie by such casuall euents considered as they are such.
e[Greek or Hebrew] Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.
§ 1. Now because Chance or Casualty beareth much sway in Lottery; Casual Events being the subject matter of Lots; the due consideration thereof will help not a little to the clearing of the nature of Lots and Lottery, and those Questions that are moved concerning the same.
§ 1. NOw because Chance or Casualty beareth much sway in Lotery; Casuall Euents being the subiect matter of Lots; the due consideration thereof will help not a litle to the clearing of the nature of Lots and Lotery, and those Questions that are moued concerning the same.
1. The name of it.
2. The nature of the thing so named.
3. Two distinct Acts concurring in it.
4. And lastly, certain conclusions or aphorisms concerning it.
1. The name of it.
2. The nature of the thing so named.
3. Two distinct Acts concurring in it.
4. And lastly, certaine conclusions or aphorisms concerning it.
First for the name or term of Chance or Casualty, albeit it be by some utterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a term according to the just analogy & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, used by the Holy Ghost himself in Gods book both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of bSolomon, the wisest (of a mere man) that ever was since Adam, where he saith, that cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft delse-where in that book. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely egreater and wiser than Solomon, fthe very power and wisdom of God, our Saviour Christ himself, in the parable of the Jew that journeying to Jericho fell among thieves, who as he lay wounded half alive and half dead, a Priest is said to have gcome by Chance that way: where the Evangelist Luke to express in Greek what our Saviour spake in Syriac, useth a word precisely answering han other used by Solomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same root. I might add divers other places, where this term is ielsewhere used in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though khe repent himself in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blind Goddess, and ascribed unto her what they should have given unto God; yet withal he explaineth himself that lhe meant nothing thereby but the casual event of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well used, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩mReligion condemneth not, nor inhibiteth such kind of speeches, as to say, Peradventure such a thing shall be, or, Perchance it may be, or, Such a thing came to pass by chance or casualty.
First for the name or terme of Chance or Casualtie, albeit it be by some vtterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a terme according to the iust analogie & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, vsed by the Holy Ghost himselfe in Gods booke both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of bSalomon, the wisest (of a meere man) that euer was since Adam, where he saith, that cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft dels-where in that booke. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely egreater and wiser than Salomon, fthe very power and wisdome of God, our Sauiour Christ himselfe, in the parable of the Iew that journeying to Iericho fell among theeues, who as he lay wounded halfe aliue and halfe dead, a Priest is said to haue gcome by Chance that way: where the Euangelist Luke to expresse in Greeke what our Sauiour spake in Syriack, vseth a word precisely answering han other vsed by Salomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same roote. I might adde diuers other places, where this terme is ielsewhere vsed in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though khe repent himselfe in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blinde Goddesse, and ascribed vnto her what they should haue giuen vnto God; yet withall he explaineth himselfe that lhe ment nothing thereby but the casuall euent of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well vsed, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩
cEccles 9.11. [Greek or Hebrew] quod Plato de leg: l. 4 [Greek or Hebrew].Eccles 9.11. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 quod Plato de leg: l. 4 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
dEccles. 9.2, 3. [Greek or Hebrew] & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 [Greek or Hebrew] casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.Eccles. 9.2, 3. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.
h[Greek or Hebrew] evenire, contingere: unde Gracī • [Greek or Hebrew]: sed & Lati•um curro, & occurro. Avenar. & Guichard. & inde nomen [Greek or Hebrew].
•
an illegible letter
〈…〉
illegible words
〈non-Latin alphabet〉
Greek or Hebrew the transcribers did not key
▪
illegible punctuation
⟨p. 12⟩
a page break in the printed book
S•rs inter homi•es casu, non indicio agisol•t. Orig: ad Lev. hom: 9. Qui sorte legitur, humano indicio non ••mprehenditur. Ambros• in Luc. cap. 1. Quid enim sore •st? idē propemodū quod micare, quod talos ja•ere, quod tesseras, quibus in rebus temeritas & casus, non ratio, nec consilium valcat. Cicidivin: l. 2.S•rs inter homi•es casu, non indicio agisol•t. Orig: ad Lev. hom: 9. Qui sorte legitur, humano indicio non ••mprehenditur. Ambros• in Luc. cap. 1. Quid enim sore •st? idē propemodū quod micare, quod talos ia•ere, quod tesseras, quibꝰ in rebꝰ temeritas & casus, non ratio, nec consilium valcat. Cicidiuin: l. 2.
l[Greek or Hebrew]. Isocr: Areopag.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Isocr: Areopag.
diuination by mens names as foretelling their fortunes, and whether should preuaile either against other, and the like:
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Suidas. Et inde 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dicitur per i•cū A•istophani Equi•: populus Atheniensis. i. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, à fabis quibus 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vtebantur, Hesych: Suid: & Aristoph: Schol.
r[Greek or Hebrew]. Lysias in Agorat. [Greek or Hebrew] Ulpian ad Demost: in Timar:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Lysias in Agorat. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Vlpian ad Demost: in Timar:
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Ulpian: ibid. [Greek or Hebrew] Aristoph: in Vesp: & Equ••: quas Hesych: [Greek or Hebrew]. Pollux o•om: lib. 8. cap. 1. Suidas & Schol: Arist: ex Epaphroditi Lexico [Greek or Hebrew] interpretantur.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Vlpian: ibid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Aristoph: in Vesp: & Equ••: quas Hesych: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Poll•x o•om: lib. 8. cap. 1. Suidas & Schol: Arist: ex Epaphroditi Lexico 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 interpretantur.
t[Greek or Hebrew]. Pollux l. 8. c 1. item Hesych: & Schol: Aristoph: vesp. visendus Casaub. ad Athen. l. 10. c. 18.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Pollux l. 8. c 1. item Hesych: & Schol: Aristoph: vesp. visendus Casaub. ad Athen. l. 10. c. 18.
u[Greek or Hebrew]. Plut. Apophth.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plut. Apophth.
*[Greek or Hebrew]. Hesych: [Greek or Hebrew]. Et •inc Aristoph: Eccles [Greek or Hebrew] S•bal:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Hesych: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et •inc Aristoph: Eccles 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 S•bal:
xDelrio disquis. Mag. l. 4. c 2. q•. § 2 •d sort•• divinitori•• [Greek or Hebrew] refer•. Sch•ider: in lex pē tagl. ad divisorias.Delrio disquis. Mag. l. 4. c 2. q•. § 2 •d sort•• diuinitori••〈non-Latin alphabet〉 refer•. Sch•ider: in lex pē tagl. ad diuisorias.
yNum. 17.18.
zDelr•odisq Mag. l. 4. c. 4. q 4 § 2. per monomachi•m.
aIbid q 2. per sacramentū Euchar.Ibid q 2. per sacramentū Euchar.
bIbid. q. 4 § 1 per aquam & ignem.
cVise C•md: Brit: & Versteg. c. 3.
dDelrio: ibid. c. 2. q. 7 § [Greek or Hebrew] sortibus adnumerat. & Bodin. damonoma c. 6. & Peu•er: de divinat.Delrio: ibid. c. 2. q. 7 § 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 sortibus adnumerat. & Bodin. damonoma c. 6. & Peu•er: de diuinat.
Religion condemneth not, nor inhibiteth such kinde of speeches, as to say, Peraduenture such a thing shall be, or, Perchance it may be, or, Such a thing came to passe by chance or casualtie.
〈non-Latin alphabet〉 euenire, contingere: vnde Gracī •〈non-Latin alphabet〉: sed & Lati•um curro, & occurro. Avenar. & Guichard. & inde nomen 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
i1 King. 5.4. [Greek or Hebrew] occursus malus Vet: & Vatab: mali Trem: & Jun: Ruth 2.3. [Greek or Hebrew] ac cidit autem. Vet: evenit eventus. Vatab: casu accidit. Jun: forte fortuna inciderat. Leo Jud: her hap was to light on. &c. Reg: Bibl: Ang:1 King. 5.4. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 occursus malus Vet: & Vatab: mali Trem: & Iun: Ruth 2.3. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 ac cidit autem. Vet: euenit euentus. Vatab: casu accidit. Iun: forte fortuna inciderat. Leo Iud: her hap was to light on. &c. Reg: Bibl: Ang:
kNon mihi pla•es toties me •ppellass• Fortunam. Aug: retract. l. 1. c. 1. Poenitet me sic illam nominasse Fortunam, cum videam homines habere in p•ssima consuetudine, & ubidici debet, Hoc Deus veluit, dicere, Hoc voluit Fortuna. ibid.Non mihi pla•es toties me •ppellass• Fortunam. Aug: retract. l. 1. c. 1. Poenitet me sic illam nominasse Fortunam, cum videam homines habere in p•ssima consuetudine, & vbidici debet, Hoc Deus veluit, dicere, Hoc voluit Fortuna. ibid.
lQuamuis non Deam aliquam hoc nomine volnerim intelligi, sed fortuitum rerum eventum. ibid.Quamuis non Deam aliquam hoc nomine volnerim intelligi, sed fortuitum rerum euentum. ibid.
mUnde & illa ver b• sunt, quae nulla religio dicere prohibet, forte, forsā, forsitan, fortuitè. Ibid.Vnde & illa ver b• sunt, quae nulla religio dicere prohibet, forte, forsā, forsitan, fortuitè. Ibid.
