Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
For first in private affairs no man is bound to stand to the event of a Lot which he never gave consent unto. In private affairs I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compel the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to do in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for marriage such a one of the twain which they like not of, yet they ought to give their consent with (it is a llearned mans instance, and that approved by him, of a Noble mans son) because having cast Lots for direction after invocation of Gods name in that business, the Lot had light upon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to bear one down, that she ought in conscience to have him and no other but him, and that without guilt ⟨p. 162⟩of sin and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had given such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily bind, not expecting mans privity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so bind, as tin Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend unto that which the Lot imposed upon him.
For first in priuate affaires no man is bound to stand to the euent of a Lot which hee neuer gaue consent vnto. In priuate affaires I say, because iin some cases the Law enableth the Magistrate to compell the parties contending, will they nill they, to bide by it; which yet khe is not permitted to doe in more cases, then in the letter of the Law are expressed. It were an idle thing, for a young-man to tell his Parents that of two Maidens motioned to him for mariage such a one of the twaine which they like not of, yet they ought to giue their consent with (it is a
learned mans instance, and that approued by him, of a Noble mans sonne) because hauing cast Lots for direction after inuocation of Gods name in that busines, the Lot had light vpon her. Much more idle yet were it for him to beare one downe, that she ought in conscience to haue him and no other but him, and that without guilt
⟨p. 162⟩
of sinne and disobedience she might not refuse him, because God in a Lot cast by him had giuen such a sentence. And yet were a Lot Gods oracle, it should necessarily binde, not expecting mans priuity or consent thereunto: yea where it was Gods oracle, it did necessarily so binde, as
in Sauls case nothing willing at the first, but enforced in some sort to condescend vnto that which the Lot imposed vpon him.
iAd tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, jubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.Ad tertij alicuius petitionē cuius interest, iubere potest contendentes sorti rem ō •i•tere • vel ad alterius petitionem, • dissidentium tantum intersit, alteram c•get. Greg. Toloss. syntag•. l. 34. c. 5.
kJudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à jure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.Iudiciū sortis locum non habet nisi in casibus à iure expressis Bartol. apud Gom•z ad leg. Taur leg. 38.
lBucer. in oper. Augl disput. con Jung.Bucer. in oper. Augl disput. cū Iung•.
Secondly by mutual consent it is no question but that men may alter and change their Lots either with other, as uLevinus and Marcellus sometime did at the request of the Senate upon suite made by the Sicilians whom Marcellus, one they sorely feared, was else to have had. But may any by mutual agreement alter Gods sentence, as xthe wife to leave her head and break the covenant of her God, ybecause her Husband is content to agree thereunto? Or to hold to a Lot where it was a divine Oracle, might zSaul so elected have surrendered his right to another, though the people should have been willing also to have yielded thereunto? Or might Matthias have resigned his place to Barsabas, and Barsabas by joint consent have taken it of him? Yet if in choice of a Minister for the Pest-house, should the Lot light on one that (as *Prochorus the Counterfeit fableth of John when he saw that by Lot he was to go over sea into Asia) should for fear presently sink down in a sound, and some other more hardy then he offer himself voluntarily to that office, were it not lawful to accept of him? or were it wisdom to refuse him, and press the ⟨p. 163⟩other to it so unfit for it?
Secondly by mutuall consent it is no question but that men may alter and change their Lots either with other, as uLeuinus and Marcellus sometime did at the request of the Senate vpon suite made by the Sicilians whom Marcellus, one they sorely feared, was else to haue had. But may any by mutuall agreement alter Gods sentence, as xthe wife to leaue her head and breake the couenant of her God, ybecause her Husband is content to agree thereunto? Or to hold to a Lot where it was a diuine Oracle, might zSaul so elected haue surrendred his right to another, though the people should haue benne willing also to haue yeelded thereunto? Or might Matthias haue resigned his place to Barsabas, and Barsabas by ioint consent haue taken it of him? Yet if in choise of a Minister for the Pest-house, should the Lot light on one that (as *Prochorus the Counterfait fableth of Iohn when hee saw that by Lot he was to go ouer sea into Asia) should for feare presently sinke downe in a sownd, and some other more hardie then he offer himselfe voluntarily to that office, were it not lawfull to accept of him? or were it wisedome to refuse him, and presse the ⟨p. 163⟩other to it so vnfit for it?
uInter ipsos Consules permutatio provinciarū facta est. Liu. l 26. anno 544.Inter ipsos Consules permutatio prouinciarū facta est. Liu. l 26. anno 544.
yconuencrat olim, Ut tu quod velles, faceres; nec non ego possem Indulg•ra mihi.-Junen. sat. 6.cōuencrat olim, Vt tu quod velles, faceres; nec non ego possem Indulg•ra mihi.-Iunen. sat. 6.
Yea lastly in some case it were a sin for a man to retain that which by Lot is befallen him. For may a man with a good conscience keep his brothers right from him, which the iniquity of a Lot, for quietness sake yielded to by the other, hath against justice cast upon him, and say it is Gods sentence? yea may not the wronged party lawfully endeavour, by convincing him in conscience of the wrong that he hath done him, to recover his right, if he can? Or as aMatthias should have sinned in renouncing his Apostleship; so did not bPhannias that silly Idiot as well sin in accepting of the High-priestship, though assigned him by Lot? And yet by these mens positions should that Lot also be Gods sentence, and his choice thereby Gods immediate call to that office. A senseless conceit to suppose that any man should sin by following Gods call, by doing after Gods sentence.
Yea lastly in some case it were a sinne for a man to retaine that which by Lot is befalne him. For may a man with a good conscience keepe his brothers right from him, which the iniquitie of a Lot, for quietnesse sake yeelded to by the other, hath against iustice cast vpon him, and say it is Gods sentence? yea may not the wronged party lawfully endeauour, by conuincing him in conscience of the wrong that he hath done him, to recouer his right, if he can? Or as aMatthias should haue sinned in renouncing his Apostleship; so did not bPhannias that sely Idiote as well sinne in accepting of the High-preistship, though assigned him by Lot? And yet by these mens positions should that Lot also be Gods sentence, and his choise thereby Gods immediate call to that office. A senslesse conceipt to suppose that any man should sinne by following Gods call, by doing after Gods sentence.
§ 12. Where it is to be observed, that howsoever it is here pretended that the very Heathen held their Lotteries ever to be most religious and inviolable; yet in truth it is not so? cThey esteemed it indeed a very prudent and politic ordinance for the preventing of divers inconveniences; yea din some sort too religious, as in their public affairs it was ordered, in regard eof some superstitious rites used about it, as fabout all other their solemn, yet civill employments either public or private: And gin that regard held they it an heinous offence for any private man to alter the ⟨p. 164⟩course of any business which the state thereby had established.
§ 12. Where it is to be obserued, that howsoeuer it is here pretended that the very Heathen held their Loteries euer to be most religious and inuiolable; yet in truth it is not so? cThey esteemed it indeed a very prudent and politike ordinance for the preuenting of diuers inconueniences; yea din some sort too religious, as in their publike affaires it was ordered, in regard eof some superstitious rites vsed about it, as fabout all other their solemne, yet ciuill employments either publike or priuate: And gin that regard held they it an hainous offence for any priuate man to alter the ⟨p. 164⟩course of any busines which the state thereby had established.
cVise cap. 4. § 7.
dVise quae ibid. Huc per i•cum allusit Cic. Phil. 3. Prae•lara fu•t Se•atus in ill• di• religiosae provinciaerum sortiti•: divina verà opportunitas, ut quae cuique apt ae esset, eo cuique •b•••iret.Vise quae ibid. Huc per i•cum allusit Cic. Phil. 3. Prae•lara fu•t Se•atus in ill• di• religiosae prouinciaerum sortiti•: diuina verà opportunitas, vt quae cuique apt ae esset, eo cuique •b•••iret.
eHinc sortitio vitiosa, in qua •itus illi parum ritè obseruati. Liu. l. 41. an. 578.Hinc sortitio vitiosa, in qua •itus illi parum ritè obseruati. Liu. l. 41. ann. 578.
fNihil ferò quondam maioris rei nis• auspicato, ne privatim quidem gerebatur. Cic. de divin. l. 1. Nostrinihil in bello sine extis agunt: nihil sine auspie••s domi habent. Ibid. Hinc Magistratum vitia creati. Cic. de divin. li. 2. Liu. l. 23. an•. 539. & •uet. Aug. c. 34.Nihil ferò quondam maioris rei nis auspicato, ne priuatim quidem gerebatur. Cic. de diuin. l. 1. Nostrinihil in bello sine extis agunt: nihil sine auspies domi habent. Ibid. Hinc Magistratum vitia creati. Cic. de diuin. li. 2. Liu. l. 23. an. 539. & uet. Aug. c. 34.
But yet they reputed not the Lot to be so sacred and peremptory a sentence, but that they might reject those that it had lighted upon, if they either *already knew them, or fupon further trial found them to be unfit: Yea and but that otherwise they might and did usually go from it, sometime gin case of necessity, when by accident the party was disabled to do that which by Lot he ought to have done; sometime hin case of religion, the party being thereby restrained from going whither the Lot had assigned him; sometime iat the suit of the parties themselves; sometime kat the earnest entreaty of some others; sometime upon one consideration, and sometime upon another, lwhen after the Lots cast, upon better advice, they misdoubted that it might prove any way prejudicial to the public, if the course were not altered.
But yet they reputed not the Lot to be so sacred and peremptorie a sentence, but that they might reiect those that it had lighted vpon, if they either *already knew them, or fvpon further triall found them to be vnfit: Yea and but that otherwise they might and did vsually goe from it, sometime gin case of necessitie, when by accident the partie was disabled to doe that which by Lot he ought to haue done; sometime hin case of religion, the partie being thereby restrained from going whither the Lot had assigned him; sometime iat the suit of the parties themselues; sometime kat the earnest intreatie of some others; sometime vpon one consideration, and sometime vpon another, lwhen after the Lots cast, vpon better aduice, they misdoubted that it might proue any way preiudiciall to the publike, if the course were not altered.
*Corn. Scipioni Hispalli Fo •ùm Hispania provincia sort obu•nisset, ne illuc iret, Senatus decrevit, adiecta Hausa, quòd rectè facer• nescir•t. Vaeler. Max l. 6. c. 3.Corn. Scipioni Hispalli Fo •ùm Hispania prouincia sorte obu•nisset, ne illuc iret, Senatus decreuit, adiecta •ausa, quòd rectè facer• nescir•t. Vaeler. Max l. 6. c. 3.
fHinc [Greek or Hebrew] actions. Demost. & Lysiae. Et [Greek or Hebrew]. Demos•h. in Aristag. 1. Et [Greek or Hebrew], qui r•i•ctis sufficiebantur. Vise cap. 5 § 4.Hinc 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 actiones. Demost. & Lysiae. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Demos•h. in Aristag. 1. Et 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, qui r•i•ctis sufficiebantur. Vise cap. 5 § 4.
gComi•ijs Coss. quiae Aemylius cuius sortis ea cura erat, occurrer• non potuit, Flaminius Roman venit. Liu. l 39. an. 568.Comi•ijs Coss. quiae Aemylius cuius sortis ea cura erat, occurrer• non potuit, Flaminius Roma• venit. Liu. l 39. ann. 568.
hFlaminē cui Sardinia provincia evenerat. Pont. Max. ad sacra retinuit. vicit religio. làem l. 37. anno 565.Flaminē cui Sardinia prouincia euenerat. Pont. Max. ad sacra retinuit. vicit religio. làem l. 37. anno 565.
In which kind they are, as deservedly to be approved and commended; so to be preferred before the superstitious Jews, who mrather then they would break the order of the Priestly employment in set courses at first settled by Lot, suffered the service of God for some space of time in the siege of their City to be wholly neglected, because all the Priests of that course then present there were utterly destroyed, that ought at that time to have done the service.
In which kinde they are, as deseruedly to be approued and commended; so to be preferred before the superstitious Iewes, who mrather then they would breake the order of the Priestly imployment in set courses at first setled by Lot, suffred the seruice of God for some space of time in the siege of their Citie to be wholly neglected, because all the Priests of that course then present there were vtterly destroied, that ought at that time to haue done the seruice.
mEx Joseph. capti•. l. 6. c. 8. & contra Apion. l. 2. ad•ò nefas putabant [Greek or Hebrew] confundere. Jos. Scal•de emend. temp.Ex Ioseph. capti•. l. 6. c. 8. & contra Apion. l. 2. ad•ò nefas putabant 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 confundere. Ios. Scal•de emend. temp.
True it is indeed that in the Civill Law nall Appeal is denied ordinarily from the sentence of a Lot: But that is, not (as some of them fondly say) obecause the sentence of a Lot is the sentence of Fortune, or of God, who hath no superior in this world• but rather, as others, with better colour of reason; because pthis course is taken for more speedy dispatch; because qby flying from it in divers cases they shall but hinder either other from ever coming to any issue; because a Lot is the most equal and indifferent course that can be and no corruption or partiality can be charged upon it: and lastly rbecause commonly it is by mutual consent that matters are put thereunto, sin which case their own act justly concludeth either side: tAgreeable whereunto is that of Plato, who in his State inhibiteth all appeal from those Judges that the parties themselves have made choice of by mutual consent; As also uin the Athenian Estate, though they might appeal to the principal Judges, from such Arbiters or Umpires as by Lot were assigned ⟨p. 166⟩them; yet *from such as by mutual agreement they had referred themselves unto, it is apparent that they could have no appeal.
True it is indeed that in the Ciuill Law nall Appeale is denied ordinarily from the sentence of a Lot: But that is, not (as some of them fondly say) obecause the sentence of a Lot is the sentence of Fortune, or of God, who hath no superiour in this world• but rather, as others, with better colour of reason; because pthis course is taken for more speedie dispatch; because qby flying from it in diuers cases they shall but hinder either other from euer comming to any issue; because a Lot is the most equall and indifferent course that can be and no corruption or partialitie can be charged vpon it: and lastly rbecause commonly it is by mutuall consent that matters are put thereunto, sin which case their owne act iustly concludeth either side: tAgreeable whereunto is that of Plato, who in his State inhibiteth all appeale from those Iudges that the parties themselues haue made choise of by mutuall consent; As also uin the Athe•ian Estate, though they might appeale to the principall Iudges, from such Arbiters or Vmpiers as by Lot were assigned ⟨p. 166⟩them; yet *from such as by mutuall agreement they had referred themselues vnto, it is apparent that they could haue no appeale.
nA judicio sort is appellari no• potest. Baldus. B•rtol. & Jason apud Gom•z. ad Taur. leg. 38. &. Greg. Tolos. appel. l. 2. c. 16. A bonorum division inter fr• tressorte facta non datur recursus Par. de Put. dear milit. num. 2. t•m. 16. Nicel. de concord. gloss 6 fall. 45 num. 86. Bon•rum divisions for. e facta non s•lent refringi. Re•uf. de appel•.art. 3. num 6 A judicio sor•u non potest peti resti•utio in integrū. Maran. specul. part. 6. act. 2. R• stitutio post sortem denegaturetiā min•ri. Franch. sum. 3 Cod. in 6.A iudicio sort is appellari no• potest. Baldus. B•rtol. & Iason apud Gom•z. ad Taur. leg. 38. &. Greg. Tolos. appel. l. 2. c. 16. A bonorum diuisione inter fr• tressorte facta non datur recursus Par. de Put. dere milit. num. 2. t•m. 16. Nicel. de concord. gloss 6 fall. 45 num. 86. Bon•rum diuisiones sor. e facta non s•lent refringi. Re•uf. de appel•.art. 3. num 6 A iudicio sor•u non potest peti resti•utio in integrū. Maran. specul. part. 6. act. 2. R• stitutio post sortem denegaturetiā minri. Franch. sum. 3 Cod. in 6.
Let me add one thing further that in some cases at the civill Law, though no remedy ordinarily be granted in a division by Lot made with some inequality, because 1the hazard of lighting upon the less part and so of sustaining the loss was alike unto either; yet it is the opinion of good Lawyers, that xif the inequality be over-great, the Magistrate may lawfully interpose his authority for the redressing of the wrong.
Let me adde one thing further that in some cases at the ciuill Law, though no remedy ordinarily bee granted in a diuision by Lot made with some inequalitie, because 1the hazard of lighting vpon the lesse part and so of sustaining the losse was alike vnto either; yet it is the opinion of good Lawyers, that xif the inequalitie be ouer-great, the Magistrate may lawfully interpose his authoritie for the redressing of the wrong.
1Qui sentit damnum, sensisset lucrum, si, quod p•tuit, ei sors fa•isset. Sigism. Sca••h. de appell. quaest. 16. l• mit. 6.
xNon procedit limita•i•, si ad sse• enormis l•sio, &c. Idem ibid. A sort itaque qua•d•que appellatur. Ibid.Non procedit limita•i•, si ad sse• enormis l•sio, &c. Idem ibid. A sorte itaque qua•d•que appellatur. Ibid.
To draw all to an head then and so to end with this argument, let any man endued with ordinary reason judge how a Lot can be said to be a sacred Oracle, and a divine sentence, that neither absolutely tieth any man for matter of fact, nor doth certainly determine ought in question of right, that never speaketh certainly, and would oft speak unadvisedly, if by humane caution it were not limited before what it should say.
To draw all to an head then and so to end with this argument, let any man endued with ordinarie reason iudge how a Lot can be said to be a sacred Oracle, and a diuine sentence, that neither absolutely tieth any man for matter of fact, nor doth certainely determine ought in question of right, that neuer speaketh certainely, and would oft speake vnaduisedly, if by humane caution it were not limited before what it should say.
§ 13. Now these were the arguments taken from the nature of Lots. The next argument is drawn from the proper use and end of them. And herein they reason sometime from the affirmative, sometime from the negative.
§ 13. Now these were the arguments taken from the nature of Lots. The next argument is drawne from the proper vse and end of them. And herein they reason sometime from the affirmatiue, sometime from the negatiue.
From the affirmative thus:
yWhatsoever God hath sanctified to a proper end, is not to be perverted to a worse endz.
But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controversies*.
Therefore man is not to pervert them to a worse; ⟨p. 167⟩viz. to play, and by playing to get away another mens money, which without controversy is his own.
From the affirmatiue thus:
yWhatsoeuer God hath sanctified to a proper end, is not to be peruerted to a worse endz.
But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controuersies*.
Therefore man is not to peruert them to a worse; ⟨p. 167⟩viz. to play, and by playing to get away another mens money, which without controuersie is his owne.
This argument thus conceived is faulty two ways. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be perverted, or perversely used; but whether the use of Lots questioned be a perverting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither again is the question whether men may use Lots playing for money (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it be lawful or no, I shall not need now to discuss.) much less, whether they may be used in game to that end, to get another mans money from him, or no; (which is no general use of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is used only at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall join, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be used in sport.
This argument thus conceiued is faultie two waies. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be peruerted, or peruersly vsed; but whether the vse of Lots questioned be a peruerting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither againe is the question whether men may vse Lots playing for money (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it be lawfull or no, I shall not neede now to discusse.) much lesse, whether they may be vsed in game to that end, to get another mans money from him, or no; (which is no generall vse of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is vsed onely at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall ioyne, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be vsed in sport.
Secondly there is more inferred in the conclusion then was in the premisses, and that which followeth not from ought in them. For the use of a Lot in play is ever to decide some question or controversy, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controversy truly so termed; otherwise it were no Lot.
Secondly there is more inferred in the conclusion then was in the premisses, and that which followeth not from ought in them. For the vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controuersie truely so tearmed; otherwise it were no Lot.
For the mending of these faults the argument may better be conceived on this manner:
That which God hath sanctified to some proper use, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse use.
But aGod hath sanctified Lots to this proper use, ⟨p. 168⟩to wit, the deciding of controversies in matters of weight.
A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other use, much less to a worse.
For the mending of these faults the argument may better be conceiued on this manner:
That which God hath sanctified to some proper vse, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse vse.
But aGod hath sanctified Lots to this proper vse, ⟨p. 168⟩to wit, the deciding of controuersies in matters of weight.
A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other vse, much lesse to a worse.
aTheir proper use is to decide great controversies Perkins gold. chain, chap. 20. on precep. 3.Their proper vse is to decide great controuersies Perkins gold. chaine, chap. 20. on precep. 3.
The Proposition is proved by ban instance of the Temple, set apart for prayer, which the Jews therefore are reproved for applying to market and merchandise.
The Proposition is proued by ban instance of the Temple, set apart for praier, which the Iewes therefore are reproued for applying to market and merchandise.
The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Solomon, cThe Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty. For dthe other place is but an instance that a Lot once was by Gods own appointment so used. It is amplified à simile, eby the like use of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought fto prove that Solomons purpose in those words before alleged is to show the only lawful use of a Lot; (viz. to end controversies which otherwise conveniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mighty to yield;) thus: gAs when the Apostle saith, hAn Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach us, that men use an Oath to end controversies; (which every man knoweth,) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure only for that use of necessary deciding of doubts of importance among men: so the like words used of a Lot must be understood in the same sense▪ not so much to teach us that a Lot ended such controversies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it only for that use.
The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Salomon, cThe Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty. For dthe other place is but an instance that a Lot once was by Gods owne appointment so vsed. It is amplified à simili, eby the like vse of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought fto proue that Salomons purpose in those words before alledged is to shew the only lawfull vse of a Lot; (viz. to end controuersies which otherwise conueniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mightie to yeeld;) thus: gAs when the Apostle saith, hAn Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach vs, that men vse an Oath to end controuersies; (which euery man knoweth,) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure onely for that vse of necessarie deciding of doubts of importance among men: so the like words vsed of a Lot must be vnderstood in the same sense▪ not so much to teach vs that a Lot ended such controuersies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it onely for that vse.
eThe proper end of a Lot, as of an Oath, is to end a controversy. Balmford. dial. ground 2.The proper end of a Lot, as of an Oath, is to end a controuersie. Balmford. dial. ground 2.
fFenner of recreate. spec. rule 4. reas 1.Fenner of recreat. spec. rule 4. reas 1.
lVise exempla varia cap. 5. §. 6. quibus addequod Liu. l. 9. Fabius alienae sortis victor belli, in suam provinciam exercitum reduxit.Vise exempla varia cap. 5. §. 6. quibus addequod Liu. l. 9. Fabius alienae sortis victor belli, in suam prouinciam exercitum reduxit.
•
oQuia fors vel fortuna, sive vol••tas divi•a in mundo superiorem non habet. Jason. Bald. Bart. Decius Rebuff. & alij apud Sca•ch. de appell. q. 16. limit. 6.Quia fors vel fortuna, siue vol••tas diui•a in mundo superiorem non habet. Iason. Bald. Bart. Decius Rebuff. & alij apud Sca•ch. de appell. q. 16. limit. 6.
pQuia facilioris judicij & actus causa ita placuit. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16.Quia facilioris iudicij & actus causa ita placuit. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16.
qAlioqui see mutuò impediunt. Idem syntagm. l. 34. c. 5.Alioqui se mutuò impediunt. Idem syntagm. l. 34. c. 5.
rQuod inter contenden•es itae placmerit: & à judicio quod ipsi elegerunt appellare nequeuns. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16 Ipsi fortune see submiserunt. Pan•rm. in 5. Decret. de Sortil. ad parendun• eventui see obligarunt. Pe•cer. de divi•at.Quod inter contenden•es itae placmerit: & à iudicio quod ipsi elegerunt appellare nequeuns. Gregor. Tolos. de appell. l. 2. c. 16 Ipsi fortun• se submiserunt. Pan•rm. in 5. Decret. de Sortil. ad parendun• euentui se obligarunt. Pe•cer. de diui•at.
sA indicibus quos communis consensus elegerit, non licéat provocare. Con•i•. Mileu. can. 24. apud Grat. c. 2. q. 6. & Cr•spet. in sum. Idem habit & Conc. Carth. 3• can. 10. sed & Asri•. 1. can. 89. Summum enim qu•sque causa suae indicem facit, quemcunque elegit. Plin. prafat. hist. •at.A indicibus quos communis consensus elegerit, non licéat prouocare. Con•i•. Mileu. can. 24. apud Grat. c. 2. q. 6. & Cr•spet. in sum. Idem hab•t & Conc. Carth. 3• can. 10. sed & Asri•. 1. can. 89. Summum enim qu•sque causa suae indicem facit, quemcunque elegit. Plin. prafat. hist. •at.
t[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de leg. lib. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de leg. lib. 6.
u[Greek or Hebrew] à quibus appellare licebat ad Indices: [Greek or Hebrew], à quorum arbitri• re tantum integra recedere licebat. Bud. in commentar. Graec. ex D•mosth. in Ap•ob. Itaque recté Plin. praefat. •. u. plurimu• interest sortiatur quis indicem an eligat.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 à quibus appellare licebat ad Indices: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, à quorum arbitri• re tantum integra recedere licebat. Bud. in commentar. Graec. ex D•mosth. in Ap•ob. Itaque recté Plin. praefat. •. u. plurimu• interest sortiatur quis indicem an eligat.
*[Greek or Hebrew] (Arbitrum loquitur ex mutuo consensu detectū ) [Greek or Hebrew]. Lex Athenieus. apud Demosth. in Midiam.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 (Arbitrum loquitur ex mutuo consensu detectū ) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Lex Athenieus. apud Demosth. in Midiam.
