Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
In which definition or description so conceived, (as in all other) are two things principally to be considered, the genus, as they term it, that containeth the matter; and the form or specific difference of the thing defined.
In which definition or description so conceiued, (as in all other) are two things principally to be considered, the genus, as they terme it, that containeth the matter; and the forme or specificall difference of the thing defined.
The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casual event, because that how soever in some kind of Lot some guess may be given, yet the event is mainly casual, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it unto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a little too far that define a ⟨p. 3⟩eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoever by the event whereof some hidden thing may be discovered. For many things are and may be done for the discovery of hidden and unknown truths, which yet come not within the nature and compass of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his servant to be light-fingered, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withal, and thereby to try his honesty which he hath in some jealousy, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses used ordinarily by those that are in place of authority and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discovery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lottery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is ever some event merely casual; as if a man to try whether his servant be a thief or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, together with others rolled up severally into water, to see which will unfold first, and thereby to determine and judge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltless of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that fTo use Lottery is to put a thing from skill and counsel to temerity and casualty. that
chief stroke in them; if we respect secondary causes.
The Genus, or the matter of a Lot is said to be a casualty, or some casuall euent, because that how soeuer in some kind of Lot some guesse may be giuen, yet the euent is mainly casuall, and it is the casualty of it, that is principally respected and necessarily required in it vnto the constitution of a Lot. Those therefore reach a litle too farre that define a ⟨p. 3⟩eLot to be the doing of any thing whatsoeuer by the euent whereof some hidden thing may be discouered. For many things are and may be done for the discouery of hidden and vnknowne truths, which yet come not within the nature and compasse of a Lot. For example; A man suspecting his seruant to be light-fingred, layeth money as a bait in his way to tempt him withall, and thereby to try his honestie which he hath in some iealousie, which yet is no kind of Lot: to omit many other courses vsed ordinarily by those that are in place of authoritie and judicature for the finding out of malefactors and the discouery of crimes, in which yet there is no kind of Lotery, no more then of casualty. Whereas the matter of a Lot is euer some euent meerely casuall; as if a man to try whether his seruant be a theefe or no, shall put a scroll with his name in it, togither with others rolled vp seuerally into water, to see which will vnfold first, and thereby to determine and iudge of the party suspected whether he be guilty or guiltlesse of that crime. To which purpose tend those sayings of good Authors, that fTo vse Loterie is to put a thing from skill and counsell to temeritie and casualty. that gA Lot is the child of chance. that hThe issue of Lots is not in mans power, but is such as casualty casteth on vs. that iIn Lotery there is no certainty. that kLots are not caried by reason and iudgement, nor by counsell and aduice: but lChance and casualtie striketh the ⟨p. 4⟩cheife stroke in them; if wee respect secondary causes.
eSorts propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, ut eius event• confiderato occultū liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, ut occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius eventu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.Sortes propriè dicuntur, cum aliquid fit, vt eius euent• confiderato occultū •liquid innetescat. Thom: sum: per 2•.2z. q. 95. a. 8. cum facimus aliquid, vt occultū aliquid nobis manifestetor. Ibid: art: 3. Nihil aliud est sortiri quā aliquid agere, ex enius euentu rē incognitam possimus deprehendere. Martyr. in 1 Sam: c. 10.
fSortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, ubi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dedivin: l. 2.Sortiri est casum & tem•ritatē spectare, vbi nec ratio nec consilium valeat. Cicer: dediuin: l. 2.
g[Greek or Hebrew] dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò [Greek or Hebrew] nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dixit Euripides. Plut. sympos. l. 2. c. 10. Quo loco malè vulgò 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 nullo sensu. Et, Animae filiā sortē, insptè Rhidig: antiq lect. 14. c. 15.
hSortis evenius nō est in nostra potestante, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.Sortis euenius nō est in nostra potestāte, sed quim casus tulerit. Ambr: ad Virgines.
iQuid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscentur atque ducuntur? Cicidivinat. l. 2.Quid in ••spotest esse certiquae fortuna monitu, pueri manu miscētur atque ducūtur? Cicidiuinat. l. 2.
kS•rs inter homi•es casu, non indicio agisol•t. Orig: ad Lev. hom: 9. Qui sorte legitur, humano indicio non ••mprehenditur. Ambros• in Luc. cap. 1. Quid enim sore •st? idē propemodū quod micare, quod talos ja•ere, quod tesseras, quibus in rebus temeritas & casus, non ratio, nec consilium valcat. Cicidivin: l. 2.S•rs inter homi•es casu, non indicio agisol•t. Orig: ad Lev. hom: 9. Qui sorte legitur, humano indicio non ••mprehenditur. Ambros• in Luc. cap. 1. Quid enim sore •st? idē propemodū quod micare, quod talos ia•ere, quod tesseras, quibꝰ in rebꝰ temeritas & casus, non ratio, nec consilium valcat. Cicidiuin: l. 2.
l[Greek or Hebrew]. Isocr: Areopag.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Isocr: Areopag.
It was no Lot therefore, but a mere mockery of a Lot, that *Verres sometime used, when a Priest being to be chosen by Lot at Syracusa, “he caused the tickets or tokens that were cast into the Lot-pot to be signed all of them with one and the self same mans name: It was, I say, no Lottery, because there could be no casualty or uncertainty in the drawing of the tickets so signed. But of Chance or casualty we will speak more at large in the next Chapter.
It was no Lot therefore, but a meere mockery of a Lot, that *Verres sometime vsed, when a Priest being to be chosen by Lot at Syracusa, “he caused the tickets or tokens that were cast into the Lot-pot to be signed all of them with one and the selfe same mans name: It was, I say, no Lotery, because there could be no casualty or vncertainty in the drawing of the tickets so signed. But of Chance or casualty we will speake more at large in the next Chapter.
*Vise Cicer: in Verr: 4.
“The•mnesti nomen omnibus inscribi euravit.The•mnesti nomen omnibꝰ inscribi eurauit.
§ 3. The form or specific difference of a Lot is taken from the use and intent or purpose of the user, or that whereunto this casualty or casual event is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspense, or the discovery of some hidden and unknown truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casual events and accidents, and that maketh the casual event so used to be a Lot so justly accounted and called. Every Lot therefore is casual; and there can be no Lottery, where there is not casualty. But every casual event is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their lives, which yet come not the most of them within compass of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they never minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speak with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other business; the finding of some one thing while they look after an other, or while they look after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casual, but no lots; there is no lottery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth upon the will and purpose of the user, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it own nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casual thing or the casual occurrence of any such thing to the discovering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth unknown, event uncertain, or course unresolved, is to use it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giveth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lottery given by some others, who define mA Lot to be a casual event determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, nLottery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or uncertainty by the variable event or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selves.
§ 3. The forme or specificall difference of a Lot is taken from the vse and intent or purpose of the vser, or that whereunto this casualtie or casuall euent is applied; which is said to be the deciding or determining of some doubt, whether it be the defining of some act to be done hanging yet in suspence, or the discouery of some hidden and vnknowne truth in things done or suspected to be done already. And this is that which distinguisheth a Lot from all other casuall euents and accidents, and that maketh the casuall euent so vsed to be a Lot so iustly accounted and called. Euery Lot therefore is casuall; and there can be no Lotery, where there is not casualty. But euery casuall euent is not consequently a Lot: For many things fall out casually, and do befall men so continually in the whole course of their liues, which yet come not the most of them within compasse of a Lot: as, meeting of those by the way that they neuer minded or once dreamed of; lighting on some one in the street or at the market, whom they desired to speake with, while they are going ⟨p. 5⟩about other businesse; the finding of some one thing while they looke after an other, or while they looke after nothing but go on in their way: These things and the like are casuall, but no lots; there is no lotery at all in them; because these things may befall a man will he, nil he, and do many times whether he regard them or no, whereas a Lot dependeth vpon the will and purpose of the vser, who by applying the thing zsed to such ends and purposes, maketh a Lot of that which otherwise in it owne nature were none. But for a man to apply such a casuall thing or the casuall occurrence of any such thing to the discouering, defining, deciding, determining or directing of any truth vnknowne, euent vncertaine, or course vnresolued, is to vse it as a Lot, and to make a Lot of it; this being that that giueth the very essence of a Lot to it. To this agreeth that definition of a Lot and Lotery giuen by some others, who define mA Lot to be a casuall euent determining our purposes: (though that be somewhat too scant, and comprehend but one kind;) and, nLotery (whereof more anon) to be the determining of some doubt or vncertainty by the variable euent or disposition of some sensible thing that we propound to our selues.
mSorsest effectus fortuitus statuens de consilijs nostris. Aret. in problem: clas. 1. loc. 67.
nSortibus uti est ex vario eventu seu dispositione alicuius rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Proverb. c. 16.Sortibus vti est ex vario euentu seu dispositione alicuiꝰ rei sensibilis propesitae, dubium aliquod determinare. Lyra in Num. cap. 34. & in Prouerb. c. 16.
Which latter definition, though it do not so exactly point out the precise matter of a Lot, as we shall afterward show, yet doth fully comprehend the proper use of a Lot, and that which justly maketh the casual event to be so termed and esteemed.
Which latter definition, though it do not so exactly point out the precise matter of a Lot, as we shall afterward shew, yet doth fully comprehend the proper vse of a Lot, and that which iustly maketh the casuall euent to be so termed and esteemed.
§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath been said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lottery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casual event. For that Lottery is not but where some question or controversy is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed upon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the means whereby questions and controversies are determined, of all these it is osome casualty or casual event only that is made choice of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly term Lottery. In regard whereof as they wander far from the right path in this point, pthat confound qthe suffrages or voices anciently used to be given either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquitting or casting of the party in question by casting of rbeans white or black, or of beads and stones, sor bones or shells ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, uHe would not trust his own Mother with the trial of his life when he could avoid it, for fear lest she should unwittingly cast in a black bean for a white:) with *the Lotteries used in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of employment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seem to shoot also no less wide in this business, xthat draw within the compass of Lottery ythe proof of Aaron's right to the Priesthood by that miraculous budding and fruit-bearing of his Almond-tree rod, zthe trials of quarrels in question of right by duels and combats, canonical purgations, aby taking of the Host or the Eucharist, as also bby fire and water anciently used even cin these parts, ddivination by mens names as foretelling their fortunes, and whether should prevail either against other, and the like:
§ 4. Out of that therefore which hath bene said of the nature of a Lot may be raised, as I take it, somewhat a better definition, or at least description ⟨p. 6⟩of Lotery, to wit, that it is the deciding or determining of a doubt by some casuall euent. For that Lotery is not but where some question or controuersie is of some sort or other, a doubt of somewhat whither done or not done, or by whom, or in what manner done, or some deliberation concerning somewhat to be done or not done, or to be done either in this or that sort, which is by the Lot to be decided and determined, is a matter out of question, not denied of any, but agreed vpon by all. Now whereas many and sundry, yea infinite in a manner are the meanes wherby questions and controuersies are determined, of all these it is osome casualtie or casuall euent onely that is made choise of for the determining of the doubt in that which we properly terme Lotery. In regard whereof as they wander farre from the right path in this point, pthat confound qthe suffrages or voices anciently vsed to be giuen either in election of Magistrates and Officers, or in matter of judicature for the acquiting or casting of the party in question by casting of rbeanes white or blacke, or of beades and stones, sor bones or shels ⟨p. 7⟩whole or holed tinto a pitcher or other vessel prepared to that purpose; (whereunto Alcibiades alluded sometime when he said, uHe would not trust his owne Mother with the tryall of his life when he could auoide it, for feare lest shee should vnwittingly cast in a blacke beane for a white:) with *the Loteries vsed in the like manner for the disposing of some offices and places of imployment also in the State, as if they were of the same nature, whereas indeed they are not. So they seeme to shoote also no lesse wide in this businesse,
oIn a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casual act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controversy. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.In a Lot there must be 2 things: 1 a casuall act: & 2 the applying of that act to the determination of some controuersie. Perkins Cases of Consc: l. 3. s. 4. q. 2. resp. 2.
pSerar. in Josh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: [Greek or Hebrew] Pythag: [Greek or Hebrew]. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in urnam co•iectis Judices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. [Greek or Hebrew] & [Greek or Hebrew]; cum de sortitioni•us i• utrumque dicatur.Serar. in Iosh: c. 7. q. 17. ex Plut: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Pythag: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Suffragiadicit, qua fabis ferebantur. ••. Steph: •ectè. Fabis & calculis in vrnam co•iectis Iudices legeba•t & suffragia forebant. Chy•re: in Ind: c. 1. & Lavat: in Prou: c. 16. Et contra Valla & Porta de suffragijs interpretantur quod Thucyd: l. 8. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; cum de sortitioni•us i• vtrumque dicatur.
q[Greek or Hebrew]. Suidas. Et inde [Greek or Hebrew] dicitur per i•cū A•istophani Equip: populus Atheniensis. i. [Greek or Hebrew], à fabis quibus [Greek or Hebrew] utebantur, Hesych: Suid: & Aristoph: Schol.
the means in these cases whereby the doubt or controversy is determined being not merely casual, and the decision of the doubt thereby therefore unproperly so termed.
the meanes in these cases whereby the doubt or controuersie is determined being not meerely casuall, and the decision of the doubt thereby therefore vnproperly so termed.
§ 5. Where let me add yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lottery, that the thing be casual that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casual, (I speak in regard of the creature both using and used) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩own nature, or in the conceit or counsel of those that make such use of it, any special relation otherwise to the business thereby to be decided. An instance or two will help to clear my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his friend, to say, I will ride, if it hold up by noon, if it do not, I will not stir abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the event of his journey, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that success in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualty, but that not considered as a casualty, but as having otherwise a peculiar relation to the business intended, and the conveniency or inconveniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lottery: In which point also some of the former Authors seem to fail, when they bring in edivination by the flight of Fowls, and by their eating or refusing their food under this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompany his friend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall go with you or you stay with me, and put off your journey to some other time: or being upon the way together, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to refer the question and controversy between them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowl, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is merely casual, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lottery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lottery is in general, to wit, A Lot some casualty or event merely casual purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lottery the deciding or determining of some question or controversy by such casual events considered as they are such.
§ 5. Where let me adde yet one thing further, that it is not only necessary in the matter of Lotery, that the thing be casuall that is applied to the deciding of a doubt, but that it be thereto applied so far forth as it is casuall, (I speake in regard of the creature both vsing and vsed) not as it hath either in it ⟨p. 8⟩owne nature, or in the conceit or counsell of those that make such vse of it, any speciall relation otherwise to the businesse thereby to be decided. An instance or two will helpe to cleare my meaning herein. For a man therefore requested to ride abroad on a rainy day with his frend, to say, I will ride, if it hold vp by noone, if it doe not, I will not stirre abroad: or for a man being crossed casually by an Hare on his way, to conjecture thereby of the euent of his iourney, and to determine thereupon of proceeding or stay, or of this or that successe in the same; there is in either of these cases a doubt decided by a casualtie, but that not considered as a casualtie, but as hauing otherwise a peculiar relation to the businesse intended, and the conueniency or inconueniency of it effected by it in the one and presaged by it in the other, and therefore making no Lotery: In which point also some of the former Authors seeme to faile, when they bring in ediuination by the flight of Fowles, and by their eating or refusing their food vnder this head. But for a man pressed in that manner to accompanie his frend, to say, we will draw cuts whether we shall stay or go, or whether I shall goe with you or you stay with me, and put off your iourney to some other time: or being vpon the way togither, and disagreeing in opinion concerning the shaping of their course, to referre the question and controuersie betweene them to be decided by the flight of the next Fowle, or the footing of some Beast that hath gone before them on the way: here is matter of casualty regarded as it is meerely casuall, and in that respect applied to decide ⟨p. 9⟩the present doubt, which no man therefore, I suppose, will deny to be Lotery indeed. And thus we see what both a Lot and Lotery is in generall, to wit, A Lot some casualty or euent meerely casuall purposely applied to the deciding of some doubt: and Lotery the deciding or determining of some question or controuersie by such casuall euents considered as they are such.
e[Greek or Hebrew] Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Delrio disq. mag. l. 4. c. 2. q. 7. § 3.
§ 1. Now because Chance or Casualty beareth much sway in Lottery; Casual Events being the subject matter of Lots; the due consideration thereof will help not a little to the clearing of the nature of Lots and Lottery, and those Questions that are moved concerning the same.
§ 1. NOw because Chance or Casualty beareth much sway in Lotery; Casuall Euents being the subiect matter of Lots; the due consideration thereof will help not a litle to the clearing of the nature of Lots and Lotery, and those Questions that are moued concerning the same.
1. The name of it.
2. The nature of the thing so named.
3. Two distinct Acts concurring in it.
4. And lastly, certain conclusions or aphorisms concerning it.
1. The name of it.
2. The nature of the thing so named.
3. Two distinct Acts concurring in it.
4. And lastly, certaine conclusions or aphorisms concerning it.
First for the name or term of Chance or Casualty, albeit it be by some utterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a term according to the just analogy & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, used by the Holy Ghost himself in Gods book both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of bSolomon, the wisest (of a mere man) that ever was since Adam, where he saith, that cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft delse-where in that book. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely egreater and wiser than Solomon, fthe very power and wisdom of God, our Saviour Christ himself, in the parable of the Jew that journeying to Jericho fell among thieves, who as he lay wounded half alive and half dead, a Priest is said to have gcome by Chance that way: where the Evangelist Luke to express in Greek what our Saviour spake in Syriac, useth a word precisely answering han other used by Solomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same root. I might add divers other places, where this term is ielsewhere used in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though khe repent himself in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blind Goddess, and ascribed unto her what they should have given unto God; yet withal he explaineth himself that lhe meant nothing thereby but the casual event of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well used, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩mReligion condemneth not, nor inhibiteth such kind of speeches, as to say, Peradventure such a thing shall be, or, Perchance it may be, or, Such a thing came to pass by chance or casualty.
First for the name or terme of Chance or Casualtie, albeit it be by some vtterly condemned, and held foolish and heathenish; yet is it a terme according to the iust analogie & proportion of Tongues ⟨p. 10⟩and Languages, vsed by the Holy Ghost himselfe in Gods booke both in the Old and New Testament. In the Old Testament by the pen of bSalomon, the wisest (of a meere man) that euer was since Adam, where he saith, that cTime and Chance befalleth all men, or all things: as also oft dels-where in that booke. In the New Testament by the mouth of one infinitely egreater and wiser than Salomon, fthe very power and wisdome of God, our Sauiour Christ himselfe, in the parable of the Iew that journeying to Iericho fell among theeues, who as he lay wounded halfe aliue and halfe dead, a Priest is said to haue gcome by Chance that way: where the Euangelist Luke to expresse in Greeke what our Sauiour spake in Syriack, vseth a word precisely answering han other vsed by Salomon, and springing (as may be probably surmised) from the same roote. I might adde diuers other places, where this terme is ielsewhere vsed in holy writ, but these two shall suffice. Augustine therefore, though khe repent himselfe in his Retractations that he named Chance or Fortune rather so oft in his writings; and it liked him not so well in regard of the abuse of that name among the Heathen, who held Fortune for a blinde Goddesse, and ascribed vnto her what they should haue giuen vnto God; yet withall he explaineth himselfe that lhe ment nothing thereby but the casuall euent of things; in which sense he acknowledgeth that it may be well vsed, and granteth that ⟨p. 11⟩
cEccles 9.11. [Greek or Hebrew] quod Plato de leg: l. 4 [Greek or Hebrew].Eccles 9.11. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 quod Plato de leg: l. 4 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
dEccles. 9.2, 3. [Greek or Hebrew] & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 [Greek or Hebrew] casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.Eccles. 9.2, 3. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 & 3.19. ter. & 2.14, 15 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 casus acc•dit, vel conting•t.
h[Greek or Hebrew] evenire, contingere: unde Gracī • [Greek or Hebrew]: sed & Lati•um curro, & occurro. Avenar. & Guichard. & inde nomen [Greek or Hebrew].
§ 2. Secondly for the nature of the thing so named, albeit some say that nit is nothing, as othe same is said of sin, and therefore deserveth no name, save that Nothing it self must needs have some name, to express not so much what it is, as what it is not. Yet *Chance and Casualty is indeed something, & may be defined a Contingency or uncertainty severed from fore-cast & fore-sight. Contingency or uncertainty I term it, to seclude it from necessity & certainty. For where necessity is or certainty, there can be no Casualty; "Casualty & Certainty ever expelling either other. I add, severed from fore-cast and fore-sight, to distinguish casualty from such contingency, as is accompanied with either of these twain, either directed by fore-cast, or determined by foresight, which either of them both jointly & severally exclude casualty. Chance or casualty thus conceived is an affection or adjunct both of efficients and of effects. In regard of the former, it is by the pancient Philosophers marshalled commonly among the causes in the rank of Efficients, though some qlater ones ⟨p. 12⟩going more exactly to work, acknowledge it to be rather an Affection of an Efficient, or an Adjunct manner of Efficiency than an efficient cause of or in it self. In regard of the latter, Chance or Casualty is by a Trope ordinarily used to signify the Effect it self so affected: And so take I it here, and consider it in the matter of a Lot, as the use of Authors well warranteth it, and as rChristian Writers in these Questions most usually understand it, for a Casual Event, that is, an Event contingent, not directed or determined by any fore-cast or fore-sight. A Contingent, I say, that is, an uncertain or variable Event, as all grant it to be: And that again so uncertain as the uncertainty of it is not directed or determined by the skill, counsel, or fore-cast of him to whom it is casual; not that it is not effected and produced by known natural causes, but that neither his skill or counsel hath any hand in the directing of those causes in the producing of that effect, nor his fore-cast can determine what the effect will be in particular but by mere conjecture only.
§ 2. Secondly for the nature of the thing so named, albeit some say that nit is nothing, as othe same is said of sin, and therefore deserueth no name, saue that Nothing it selfe must needs haue some name, to expresse not so much what it is, as what it is not. Yet *Chance and Casualty is indeed something, & may be defined a Contingencie or vncertainty seuered from fore-cast & fore-sight. Contingencie or vncertainty I terme it, to seclude it from necessitie & certainty. For where necessitie is or certainty, there can be no Casualty; "Casualty & Certainty euer expelling either other. I adde, senered from fore-cast and fore-sight, to distinguish casualty from such contingency, as is accompanied with either of these twaine, either directed by fore-cast, or determined by foresight, which either of them both ioyntly & seuerally exclude casualty. Chance or casualty thus conceiued is an affection or adiunct both of efficients and of effects. In regard of the former, it is by the pancient Philosophers marshalled cōmonly among the causes in the ranke of Efficients, though some qlater ones ⟨p. 12⟩going more exactly to worke, acknowledge it to be rather an Affection of an Efficient, or an Adjunct manner of Efficiency than an efficient cause of or in it selfe. In regard of the latter, Chance or Casualtie is by a Trope ordinarily vsed to signifie the Effect it selfe so affected: And so take I it here, and consider it in the matter of a Lot, as the vse of Authors well warranteth it, and as rChristian Writers in these Questions most vsually vnderstand it, for a Casuall Euent, that is, an Euent contingent, not directed or determined by any fore-cast or fore-sight. A Contingent, I say, that is, an vncertaine or variable Euent, as all grant it to be: And that againe so vncertaine as the vncertainty of it is not directed or determined by the skill, counsell, or fore-cast of him to whom it is casuall; not that it is not effected and produced by knowne naturall causes, but that neither his skill or counsell hath any hand in the directing of those causes in the producing of that effect, nor his fore-cast can determine what the effect will be in particular but by meere conjecture onely.
nFortuna quid est• nihil est. Fors nihil est; ne nomen quidem, tanquam rem quampiam, cam decuit habere. Scalig: de subtil: exere: 307. § 25.
oM•litiae nihil est. Ambr. fuga sec: Malum nihil est. Aug: s•lil•q. l. 1. cap. 1. & Isid: de sum: bono l. 1. c. 11. Mal•m nihil est aliud nisi boni privatio. Aug: Enchir: 11. Peccatum nihil est; & nihili f•unt cum peccan• homines; sicut idolum nihil est. Idem in Joan: tract• 1. [Greek or Hebrew]. Basil ho•. 8. Nemo quarat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Aug: de Civit: Dei l. 12. c. 7.M•litiae nihil est. Ambr. fuga sec: Malum nihil est. Aug: s•lil•q. l. 1. cap. 1. & Isid: de sum: bono l. 1. c. 11. Mal•m nihil est aliud nisi boni priuatio. Aug: Enchir: 11. Peccatum nihil est; & nihili f•unt cum peccan• homines; sicut idolum nihil est. Idem in Ioan: tract• 1. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Basil ho•. 8. Nemo quarat efficientem causam malae voluntatis: non enim est efficiens sed deficiens; quia nec illa effectio est sed defectio. Aug: de Ciuit: Dei l. 12. c. 7.
*Est aliquid: nec enim serm• communis inane. Gerson super Magnif. [Greek or Hebrew]. Philo de cons•i•: Prine:Est aliquid: nec enim serm• communis inan•. Gerson super Magnif. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philo de consi: Prine:
For the better conceiving hereof all Events may be referred to three heads: sThey are either Necessary, Contingent but not Casual, or Contingent and Casual.
For the better conceiuing hereof all Euents may be referred to three heads: sThey are either Necessary, Contingent but not Casuall, or Contingent and Casuall.
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Anaxagor: apud Plut: piac: phil: l. 1. c. 29. [Greek or Hebrew] (m•lè vulg•) [Greek or Hebrew] [Greek or Hebrew]. Amphion apud Aristot: rhetor: l 2. c. 19. [Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de i•g: l. 10. Est causa fortuita, est naturalis, est v•lunturia. Aug: ciu: l. 5. c. 10.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Anaxagor: apud Plut: piac: phil: l. 1. c. 29. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 (m•lè vulg•) 〈non-Latin alphabet〉〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Amphion apud Aristot: rhetor: l 2. c. 19. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de i•g: l. 10. Est causa fortuita, est naturalis, est v•lunturia. Aug: ciu: l. 5. c. 10.
tNecessary are such as fall out naturally always ⟨p. 13⟩alike in a certain and constant course, and cannot do otherwise, unless some supernatural power countermand and over-rule them, and the causes producing them: Such kind of events are the motion of the Heavens, the course of the Sun, for the fire to burn combustible matter cast into it, and the like. uContingent and not casual are such as are so done one way, as they may or might have been done some other way, but that uncertainty is determined by the knowledge, art, fore-cast, and skill, or by the advice, counsel, deliberation, or free election of those whom they concern or befall: as for a man on his way to go on or stand still, to go forward or backward, it being in his power & determinable by his own will and advice to do the one or the other. Contingent and casual are such xas might fall out in like sort diversly, and are ynot determined by any art or fore-cast, counsel or skill in regard of the person to whom they are casual, or whom they casually befall. Thus for a man travailing on the way, without fore-cast of ought in that kind, to espy the Eclipse of the Sun falling out at that instant in the river where he rideth in to water his horse: the Eclipse of the Sun here is natural and necessary, his seeing or not seeing of it is contingent or voluntary, his espying it in that place going in for no such end is merely casual and accidentary. Thus he that slew Ahab by casualty, is said to have drawn his bow ain simplicity, intending, it seemeth, nothing less than that his arrow should there light where it did, being shot out at all adventure by him, the uncertain motion not directed ⟨p. 14⟩or determined by the will or skill of the shooter to the mark that it hit. So the slaughter of the person that is casually slain, is said to be done bsuddenly, inconsiderately, not out of enmity, not of set purpose or by a train, the party that did it cnot eying or seeing him, nor seeking his hurt whom he slew: all which terms and phrases used by the Spirit of God in that case, tend not only to express the uncertainty of the event, but to remove also all knowledge and counsel, all fore-sight and fore-cast, whereby that uncertainty might be determined by the party that was agent in that act.
tNecessary are such as fall out naturally alwaies ⟨p. 13⟩alike in a certaine and constant course, and cannot doe otherwise, vnlesse some supernaturall power countermand and ouer-rule them, and the causes producing them: Such kind of euents are the motion of the Heauens, the course of the Sunne, for the fire to burne combustible matter cast into it, and the like. uContingent and not casuall are such as are so done one way, as they may or might haue bene done some other way, but that vncertainty is determined by the knowledge, art, fore-cast, and skill, or by the aduice, counsell, deliberation, or free election of those whom they concerne or befall: as for a man on his way to go on or stand still, to go forward or backward, it being in his power & determinable by his owne will and aduice to do the one or the other. Contingent and casuall are such xas might fall out in like sort diuersly, and are ynot determined by any art or fore-cast, counsell or skill in regard of the person to whom they are casuall, or whom they casually befall. Thus for a man trauailing on the way, without fore-cast of ought in that kind, to espie the Eclipse of the Sunne falling out at that instant in the riuer where he rideth in to water his horse: the Eclipse of the Sunne here is naturall and necessary, his seeing or not seeing of it is contingent or voluntary, his espying it in that place going in for no such end is meerely casuall and accidentary. Thus he that slew Achab by casualtie, is said to haue drawne his bow ain simplicitie, intending, it seemeth, nothing lesse than that his arrow should there light where it did, being shot out at all aduenture by him, the vncertaine motion not directed ⟨p. 14⟩or determined by the will or skill of the shooter to the marke that it hit. So the slaughter of the person that is casually slaine, is said to be done bsodainly, inconsiderately, not out of enmitie, not of set purpose or by a traine, the party that did it cnot eying or seeing him, nor seeking his hurt whom he slew: all which termes and phrases vsed by the Spirit of God in that case, tend not onely to expresse the vncertainty of the euent, but to remoue also all knowledge and counsell, all fore-sight and fore-cast, whereby that vncertainty might be determined by the party that was agent in that act.
tNecessarium est quod aliter se habere non po••st. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3. Hinc Thales, [Greek or Hebrew]. Laert: vit: philos: & Flut: plac: l. 1. c. 25. [Greek or Hebrew]. •'ut. conviu: 7. Sap: & Grammatici [Greek or Hebrew]. Etymol. & Eustath.Necessarium est quod aliter se habere non po••st. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3. Hinc Thales, 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Laert: vit: philos: & Flut: plac: l. 1. c. 25. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. •'ut. conviu: 7. Sap: & Grammatici 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Etymol. & Eustath.
u[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot: analyt: pr: l. 1. c. 12. Contingens quod vel esse, vel non esse potest. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot: analyt: pr: l. 1. c. 12. Contingens quod vel esse, vel non esse potest. Kecker: system: l. 2. c. 3.
xQuid est aliud sors, quid fortuna, quid c•sus, quid eventus, nisi cam sic aliquid cecidit, sic evenit, ut vel nō • cadere atque evenire, vel aliter cadere aetque evenire potuerit? Cic: de divin: l. 2.Quid est aliud sors, quid fortuna, quid c•sus, quid euentus, nisi cam sic aliquid cecidit, sic euenit, vt vel nō • cadere atque euenire, vel aliter cadere aetque euenire potuerit? Cic: de diuin: l. 2.
y[Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot. analy•: pr: l. 1. c. 12. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot: physic: l 2. c. 5, 6. & 3.5 [Greek or Hebrew]. Menand. apud Stob: l. 1. c. 10.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot. analy•: pr: l. 1. c. 12. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot: physic: l 2. c. 5, 6. & 3.5 . Menād. apud Stob: l. 1. c. 10.
diuination by mens names as foretelling their fortunes, and whether should preuaile either against other, and the like:
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Suidas. Et inde 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 dicitur per i•cū A•istophani Equi•: populus Atheniensis. i. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉, à fabis quibus 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 vtebantur, Hesych: Suid: & Aristoph: Schol.
r[Greek or Hebrew]. Lysias in Agorat. [Greek or Hebrew] Ulpian ad Demost: in Timar:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Lysias in Agorat. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Vlpian ad Demost: in Timar:
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Ulpian: ibid. [Greek or Hebrew] Aristoph: in Vesp: & Equ••: quas Hesych: [Greek or Hebrew]. Pollux o•om: lib. 8. cap. 1. Suidas & Schol: Arist: ex Epaphroditi Lexico [Greek or Hebrew] interpretantur.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Vlpian: ibid. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Aristoph: in Vesp: & Equ••: quas Hesych: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Poll•x o•om: lib. 8. cap. 1. Suidas & Schol: Arist: ex Epaphroditi Lexico 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 interpretantur.
t[Greek or Hebrew]. Pollux l. 8. c 1. item Hesych: & Schol: Aristoph: vesp. visendus Casaub. ad Athen. l. 10. c. 18.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Pollux l. 8. c 1. item Hesych: & Schol: Aristoph: vesp. visendus Casaub. ad Athen. l. 10. c. 18.
u[Greek or Hebrew]. Plut. Apophth.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plut. Apophth.
*[Greek or Hebrew]. Hesych: [Greek or Hebrew]. Et •inc Aristoph: Eccles [Greek or Hebrew] S•bal:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Hesych: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Et •inc Aristoph: Eccles 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 S•bal:
xDelrio disquis. Mag. l. 4. c 2. q•. § 2 •d sort•• divinitori•• [Greek or Hebrew] refer•. Sch•ider: in lex pē tagl. ad divisorias.Delrio disquis. Mag. l. 4. c 2. q•. § 2 •d sort•• diuinitori••〈non-Latin alphabet〉 refer•. Sch•ider: in lex pē tagl. ad diuisorias.
yNum. 17.18.
zDelr•odisq Mag. l. 4. c. 4. q 4 § 2. per monomachi•m.
aIbid q 2. per sacramentū Euchar.Ibid q 2. per sacramentū Euchar.
bIbid. q. 4 § 1 per aquam & ignem.
cVise C•md: Brit: & Versteg. c. 3.
dDelrio: ibid. c. 2. q. 7 § [Greek or Hebrew] sortibus adnumerat. & Bodin. damonoma c. 6. & Peu•er: de divinat.Delrio: ibid. c. 2. q. 7 § 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 sortibus adnumerat. & Bodin. damonoma c. 6. & Peu•er: de diuinat.
Religion condemneth not, nor inhibiteth such kinde of speeches, as to say, Peraduenture such a thing shall be, or, Perchance it may be, or, Such a thing came to passe by chance or casualtie.
〈non-Latin alphabet〉 euenire, contingere: vnde Gracī •〈non-Latin alphabet〉: sed & Lati•um curro, & occurro. Avenar. & Guichard. & inde nomen 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
i1 King. 5.4. [Greek or Hebrew] occursus malus Vet: & Vatab: mali Trem: & Jun: Ruth 2.3. [Greek or Hebrew] ac cidit autem. Vet: evenit eventus. Vatab: casu accidit. Jun: forte fortuna inciderat. Leo Jud: her hap was to light on. &c. Reg: Bibl: Ang:1 King. 5.4. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 occursus malus Vet: & Vatab: mali Trem: & Iun: Ruth 2.3. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 ac cidit autem. Vet: euenit euentus. Vatab: casu accidit. Iun: forte fortuna inciderat. Leo Iud: her hap was to light on. &c. Reg: Bibl: Ang:
kNon mihi pla•es toties me •ppellass• Fortunam. Aug: retract. l. 1. c. 1. Poenitet me sic illam nominasse Fortunam, cum videam homines habere in p•ssima consuetudine, & ubidici debet, Hoc Deus veluit, dicere, Hoc voluit Fortuna. ibid.Non mihi pla•es toties me •ppellass• Fortunam. Aug: retract. l. 1. c. 1. Poenitet me sic illam nominasse Fortunam, cum videam homines habere in p•ssima consuetudine, & vbidici debet, Hoc Deus veluit, dicere, Hoc voluit Fortuna. ibid.
lQuamuis non Deam aliquam hoc nomine volnerim intelligi, sed fortuitum rerum eventum. ibid.Quamuis non Deam aliquam hoc nomine volnerim intelligi, sed fortuitum rerum euentum. ibid.
mUnde & illa ver b• sunt, quae nulla religio dicere prohibet, forte, forsā, forsitan, fortuitè. Ibid.Vnde & illa ver b• sunt, quae nulla religio dicere prohibet, forte, forsā, forsitan, fortuitè. Ibid.
•
•
p[Greek or Hebrew]. Epicur: [Greek or Hebrew]. Anaxag: & St•ici. [Greek or Hebrew].Plato. [Greek or Hebrew]. Aristot: Vise Plutare: de philos: placit: l. 1. c. 29. & Aristot: physic: l. 2. c. 4, 5. & Stob: l. 1. c. 10.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Epicur: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Anaxag: & St•ici. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.Plato. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Aristot: Vise Plutare: de philos: placit: l. 1. c. 29. & Aristot: physic: l. 2. c. 4, 5. & Stob: l. 1. c. 10.
qAdiunctum potius quam efficien• dicenda videtur. Tal•us in Ram: l. 1. c. 5. quod de Fat• Aristot: [Greek or Hebrew]. Stob: l. 1. c. 10.Adiunctum potius quam efficien• dicenda videtur. Tal•us in Ram: l. 1. c. 5. quod de Fat• Aristot: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Stob: l. 1. c. 10.
rFortunā intellig• fortuitū rerun eventū, Aug. retract: l. 1. c. 1. Casus est eventus inopinatus. Both: consol: lib. 5. pros. 1. [Greek or Hebrew] nō est cansa, sed eventus inexpectatus. Aret: probl: part: 1. loc: 57. Casus significat interdum motū naturalem ad quem eventus sequitur, sed non ex ordinatione naturae, & sic dicitur causa per accidens; vel ponitur pro qua•is causa non intendente cum quem producit effectū, & sic etiam fortunā complectitur: interdum ver• significat ili•• it sum fortuitum eventum ab illa causa per accidens manantem. Keckerm: system: Log. l. 1. c. 15.Fortunā intellig• fortuitū rerū euentū, Aug. retract: l. 1. c. 1. Casus est euentꝰ inopinatꝰ. Boeth: consol: lib. 5. pros. 1. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 nō est cansa, sed euentus inexpectatꝰ. Aret: probl: part: 1. loc: 57. Casus significat interdum motū naturalem ad quem euentꝰ sequitur, sed non ex ordinatione naturae, & sic dicitur causa per accidens; vel ponitur pro qua•is causa non intendente cum quem producit effectū, & sic etiam fortunā complectitur: interdum ver• significat ili•• it sum fortuitum euentum ab illa causa per accidens manantem. Keckerm: system: Log. l. 1. c. 15.
〈non-Latin alphabet〉
a1 King. 32.34. [Greek or Hebrew] in integritate, sive in simplicitate sua, nihil minus cogitans quam Achab• percutere. I•n.1 King. 32.34. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 in integritate, siue in simplicitate sua, nihil minus cogitans quam Achab• percutere. I•n.
bNum: 35.22. [Greek or Hebrew] derepente. [Greek or Hebrew] absque inimic•t•a. [Greek or Hebrew] non •• insidijs, sive de industria. Jun:Num: 35.22. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 derepente. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 absque inimic•t•a. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 non •• insidijs, siue de industria. Iun:
c[Greek or Hebrew] cum non videret eum: inconsideratè. Jun: [Greek or Hebrew] nec malum eius quaereret. Num. 35.23.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 cum non videret eum: inconsideratè. Iun: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉 nec malum eius quaereret. Num. 35.23.
