Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall

Secondly an Action may have ^hwarrant sufficient by permission without precept or practise. For where God hath not limited the use of any Creature or ordinance, there he hath left the use of it free. Where he hath not determined the circumstances of any action, there what he hath not prohibited, that hath he permitted, and that is warrant sufficient for it. Where therefore circumstances are determined, the argument holdeth from the negative to make that unwarrantable, that is not either expressly or by good consequence enjoined. But where they are not determined, the argument is strong enough from the negative to prove that warrantable that is not either expressly or by just consequence prohibited.

Secondly an Action may haue ^hwarrant sufficient by permission without precept or practise. For where God hath not limited the vse of any Creature or ordinance, there he hath left the vse of it free. Where he hath not determined the circumstances of any action, there what he hath not prohibited, that hath he permitted, and that is warrant sufficient for it. Where therefore circumstances are determined, the argument holdeth from the negatiue to make that vnwarrantable, that is not either expresly or by good consequence enioyned. But where they are not determined, the argument is strong enough from the negatiue to proue that warrantable that is not either expresly or by iust consequence prohibited.

1. hVoluntas Dei dicitur praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, permissio. Lomb. sent. l. 1. d. 45. G.

For this cause in the point of Gods worship the argument holdeth ⁱfrom the negative for the substance of it, because ^k