Thirdly, general Faith may stand with some kind of doubting, as nspecial Faith may stand with some kind of wavering. oNeither is it every sudden injection, or idle scruple, or snarling objection, though a man cannot assoil it, that maketh a mans actions unwarrantable unto him, or bringeth him within compass of that Apostolic censure, pHe that doubteth is condemned, because he doth not, what he doth, of Faith: and whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin. qA man may be certain of the lawfulness of a thing, having sure or sufficient ground for the same; and yet have some scruple arising in his mind about it otherwaies, which he cannot well avoid: as ra man may hold firmly some points of doctrine, as the Articles of his faith, though he be not able to answer every subtle sophism that against the same may be objected. And certainly sin civill actions not precisely and expressly determined in the word, a moral certainty, as some Casuists say well, doth suffice to keep a Christian man from incurring Gods displeasure, having done his best endeavour ⟨p. 235⟩to inform himself aright, and resting ready to yield unto any better information. Which moral certainty, yea and more then it, I see not why it may not be well had in the present point concerning the use of a lusorious Lot, notwithstanding the difference among those that be both learned and religious. For the ground whereof (to return that that here is objected) let thus much alone for the present be considered: that as ta reverend Minister of our Church now with the Lord, in conference with certain Separatists sometime well alleged, that It was a sufficient argument to prove the truth of our ministry in that such wrangling and cavilling Companions as they were, could not object ought against it, but what might well and easily be answered: so uit may be thought a sufficient warrant for the use of these Lots, in that the oppugners of them being men so learned, and so well read in Gods word, can say nothing against them (for by that they do say, when they strive of purpose to do their best in it, they show what they can say) but what either hath been or may be sufficiently answered by others.
Thirdly, generall Faith may stand with some kinde of doubting, as nspeciall Faith may stand with some kinde of wauering. oNeither is it euery sodaine iniection, or idle scruple, or snarling obiection, though a man cannot assoile it, that maketh a mans actions vnwarrantable vnto him, or bringeth him within compasse of that Apostolike censure, pHe that doubteth is condemned, because hee doth not, what he doth, of Faith: and whatsoeuer is not of Faith, is sinne. qA man may be certaine of the lawfulnes of a thing, hauing sure or sufficient ground for the same; and yet haue some scruple arising in his mind about it otherwaies, which he cannot well auoide: as ra man may hold firmly some points of doctrine, as the Articles of his faith, though he be not able to answer euery subtile sophisme that against the same may be obiected. And certainely sin ciuill actions not precisely and expresly determined in the word, a morall certainety, as some Casuists say well, doth suffice to keepe a Christian man from incurring Gods displeasure, hauing done his best endeauour ⟨p. 235⟩to enforme himselfe aright, and resting ready to yeeld vnto any better information. Which morall certaintie, yea and more then it, I see not why it may not be well had in the present point concerning the vse of a lusorious Lot, notwithstanding the difference among those that be both learned and religious. For the ground whereof (to returne that that here is obiected) let thus much alone for the present be considered: that as ta reuerend Minister of our Church now with the Lord, in conference with certaine Separatists sometime well alleadged, that It was a sufficient argument to proue the truth of our ministery in that such wrangling and cauilling Companions as they were, could not obiect ought against it, but what might well and easily be answered: so uit may be thought a sufficient warrant for the vse of these Lots, in that the oppugners of them being men so learned, and so well read in Gods word, can say nothing against them (for by that they doe say, when they striue of purpose to doe their best in it, they shew what they can say) but what either hath beene or may be sufficiently answered by others.
- nMark 9.24.
- oVise Joan. Nider. consol. timor. conscient. par. 3 cap. 1. & 12. & 13.Vise Ioan. Nider. consol. timor. conscient. par. 3 cap. 1. & 12. & 13.
- pRom. 14.23.
- qCertitudo moralis compatitur secis vacillationem quā dam animi aut haesitationem, vel suspitionem sive scrupulos, quos conuincere & c•mpescere melius quàm per contemptū nequeas. Gerson. de pollut. nocturn. confid. 3.Certitudo moralis compatitur secis vacillationem quā dam animi aut haesitationem, vel suspitionem siue scrupulos, quos conuincere & c•mpescere melius quàm per contemptū nequeas. Gerson. de pollut. nocturn. confid. 3.
- rVise Matthaeum de Cracon. in rational. divin. operam apud Nider. consolat. tim. consc. par. 3. c. 19.Vise Matthaeum de Cracon. in rational. diuin. operam apud Nider. consolat. tim. consc. par. 3. c. 19.
- sIn Moralibus sine civilibus non expressè determinatis certitudo probabilis sufficit. Nider. consol. part. 2. c. 13. & 14 & 18. & Gerson de contract.In Moralibꝰ sine ciuilibus non expressè determinatis certitudo probabilis sufficit. Nider. consol. part. 2. c. 13. & 14 & 18. & Gerson de contract.
- tW. Bradshaw, qui & id•m habet contra Johnson. rat. 1.W. Bradshaw, qui & id•m habet contra Iohnson. rat. 1.
- uProbatio quandoque fit eo ipso quod contrarium non probatur. Accurs. ad Cod. Just. l. 4. tit. 7. leg. 1 & ad lib. 7. tit. 23. leg. 11. & ad lib. 9. tit. 22. leg. 4.Probatio quandoque fit eo ipso quod contrarium non probatur. Accurs. ad Cod. Iust. l. 4. tit. 7. leg. 1 & ad lib. 7. tit. 23. leg. 11. & ad lib. 9. tit. 22. leg. 4.