Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
§ 3. Now in these casual events there are two things concurring, as generally in all acts & events whatsoever. The one an act of the creature either reasonable or unreasonable; of the reasonable either led merely by guess and conjecture, as in drawing of cuts; or roving at all adventure, as in taking out of tickets shuffled and so blended together, that there is no place at all left for guess; of the unreasonable either moving it self naturally but uncertainly in regard of particular circumstances, as in divination by the flight of Fowls, and by their feeding or refusing their food, or moved by some other at all adventure, (for so far forth as any art or skill is used, so far forth it is not casual) and that so as it may take divers courses, or light diversly, if it be but one, as when a blind man or one blindfolded shooteth a shaft at random; or when boys play at cross and pile; or they must of necessity fall diversly though uncertain how, if they be many or more than one,as where divers dice or pawns are cast ⟨p. 15⟩out of the same box or hand, sundry balls or bowls out of the same lap or arm. The other is an act of the Creator, a providence or assistance either in general or special; and that for the most part general and mediate in ordinary casualties, sometime special and immediate in extraordinary events. A general providence, I say, ordinarily, as in all other things: For the prescience and providence, or, if you will, rather the will, pleasure, and omniscience of God extendeth it self in general unto all things, even to dthe lighting of a sparrow, eto the shedding of an hair. fGod (saith one well) is the author of all things, be they casual or other: gauthor, I say, as an other well distinguisheth, of the action, though disposer only not author of the evil, where any is, in it. If a providence of God therefore in all things, then in casual events also: and as in all things, so in casual events ordinarily, and no otherwise. If a h
That which is commonly called Chance, is yet by a certain course secretly guided:
§ 3. Now in these casuall euents there are two things concurring, as generally in all acts & euents whatsoeuer. The one an act of the creature either reasonable or vnreasonable; of the reasonable either led meerely by guesse and conjecture, as in drawing of cuts; or roauing at all aduenture, as in taking out of tickets shuffled and so blended togither, that there is no place at all left for guess; of the vnreasonable either mouing it selfe naturally but vncertainly in regard of particular circumstances, as in diuination by the flight of Fowles, and by their feeding or refusing their food, or moued by some other at all aduenture, (for so far forth as any art or skill is vsed, so far forth it is not casuall) and that so as it may take diuers courses, or light diuersly, if it be but one, as when a blind man or one blindfolded shooteth a shaft at random; or when boyes play at crosse and pile; or they must of necessitie fall diuersly though vncertaine how, if they be many or more than one,as where diuers dice or pawnes are cast ⟨p. 15⟩out of the same box or hand, sundry balls or bowles out of the same lap or arme. The other is an act of the Creator, a prouidence or assistance either in generall or speciall; and that for the most part generall and mediate in ordinary casualties, sometime speciall and immediate in extraordinary euents. A generall prouidence, I say, ordinarily, as in all other things: For the prescience and prouidence, or, if you will, rather the will, pleasure, and omniscience of God extendeth it selfe in generall vnto all things, euen to dthe lighting of a sparrow, eto the shedding of an haire. fGod (saith one well) is the author of all things, be they casuall or other: gauthor, I say, as an other well distingnisheth, of the action, though disposer onely not author of the euill, where any is, in it. If a prouidence of God therefore in all things, then in casuall euents also: and as in all things, so in casuall euents ordinarily, and no otherwise. If a hSparrow fall not without Gods permission, much lesse is any man slaine without Gods prouidence, who is therefore said to ioffer the man that is casually slaine, vnto the hand of him by whom he is slaine. In this regard well saith Augustine, that kThat which is commonly called Chance, is yet by a certaine course secretly guided:
eMatth: 10.30. Act: 27.34. Luk. 12.7. & 21.18. Possum dicer• porcorum qu•que se: as apud Deum numeratas, nedum capillos sanctorum. Tertull: de fuga.
fDeus omnium & fortuitorum & non fortuitorum. autor est. Mar•in: in Ram: dial: l. 1. c. 5. Aeterna lege cuncta decuerunt. Sen: provid: c. 5.Deus omnium & fortuitorum & non fortuitorum. autor est. Mar•in: in Ram: dial: l. 1. c. 5. Aeterna lege cuncta decuerunt. Sen: prouid: c. 5.
gAug: confess: l. 1. c. 10. Domine D •, ordinator & creator rerum omni•m naturalium, p•c•atorū autem tantum ordinator, non creator. Sic enim legendum, quod in vulgatu perperā, Peccatorū autem tantúm non ordinator: Prout idem alibi: de Civit: Det l. 5. c 9. Creator creatorum spirituum volunta•es bonas adiuvat, malas judicat, omnes ordinat. Et ibid: l. 14. c. 26. Omnipotenti D•o summo a• summè bono, creatori emnium naturarū, voluntatū autem bonarū adiutori ac remuneratori, malarū relictori & damnatori; utrarum• ordinatori &c. Nisi fortè cum Gomaro de provid: c. 12. leg•re lubeat, Tantamm•do ordinator.Aug: confess: l. 1. c. 10. Domine D •, ordinator & creator rerum omni•m naturalium, p•c•atorū autem tantum ordinator, nō creator. Sic enim legendum, quod in vulgatu perperā, Peccatorū autem tantúm non ordinator: Prout idem alibi: de Ciuit: Det l. 5. c 9. Creator creatorum spirituum volunta•es bonas adiuvat, malas iudicat, omnes ordinat. Et ibid: l. 14. c. 26. Omnipotenti D•o summo a• summè bono, creatori emnium naturarū, voluntatū autem bonarū adiutori ac remuneratori, malarū relictori & damnatori; vtrarum• ordinatori &c. Nisi fortè cum Gomaro de prouid: c. 12. leg•re lubeat, Tantamm•do ordinator.
hMatth: 10.29.
iExod: 21.13.
kQuae vulgò Fortuna appellatur, occul•o quodam ordine regitur. Aug: retract: l. 1. c. 1.
and that lEven in those things that we say come by chance or by adventure, respect ought to be had to a divine disposition. Yea in regard of this providence ⟨p. 16⟩by casualties oft checking mens counsels, is it said by Solomon, that mThe race goeth not always with the swiftest, nor the battle with the strongest, nor bread to the wisest, nor wealth to the skilfullest, nor grace to the cunningest; but Time and Chance befalleth them all. That which the Heathen man it may be saw when he said, that nMen ought not to rely overmuch on their counsel or forecast; for that ofortune, as saith he, or pGods providence by fortune, as much better another jumping almost in precise terms with Solomon saith, striketh a great stroke, and oft carieth things across to that we expect. Which as it is so in other casual events, so in Lots among others; of which Solomon saith therefore that qThe Lot is cast into the lap, but each disposition of it is of God. In which speech the spirit of God by Solomon, as divers rDivines of great, yea of good note expound him, implieth but thus much, that though nothing seem to be, or indeed is more casual than a Lot, where it is carried as it ought, yet there is a divine providence in the disposition of it; as there is the like also in all other events, of what nature and quality soever they be. And therefore look what is said by Solomon of a Lot in that place, the self-same is said selsewhere of all mens thoughts, and ways, and words, and works, and counsels, and courses, that they are disposed ⟨p. 17⟩by God, and are tnot absolutely in our power to give issue to them as we will. Thus is it true that Augustine saith, that uThose things that fall to us by Lot, are given us from God: according to that of the Psalmist, *The lines are fallen to me in a pleasant place, and I have a fair heritage: I praise the Lord for it. (Though that be spoken metaphorically not properly, as the former words show, xThe Lord is the portion of my part and of my cup; and the maintainer of my Lot.) But withal in like manner yall wealth whatsoever, be it zleft by decease of friends, or got by atravail and industry, or attained otherwise, and brest or sleep, and ca good wife, and dchildren are said to be Gods gifts, and to come all from him, who egiveth all things to all, and fworketh all things for all, and gin all.
and that lEuen in those things that we say come by chance or by aduenture, respect ought to be had to a diuine disposition. Yea in regard of this prouidence ⟨p. 16⟩by casualties oft checking mens counsels, is it said by Salomon, that mThe race goeth not alwaies with the swiftest, nor the battell with the strongest, nor bread to the wisest, nor wealth to the skilfullest, nor grace to the cunningest; but Time and Chance befalleth them all. That which the Heathen man it may be saw when he said, that nMen ought not to rely ouermuch on their counsell or forecast; for that ofortune, as saith he, or pGods prouidence by fortune, as much better another jumping almost in precise termes with Salomon saith, striketh a great stroke, and oft carieth things acrosse to that we expect. Which as it is so in other casuall euents, so in Lots among others; of which Salomon saith therefore that qThe Lot is cast into the lap, but each disposition of it is of God. In which speech the spirit of God by Salomon, as diuers rDiuines of great, yea of good note expound him, implieth but thus much, that though nothing seeme to be, or indeed is more casuall than a Lot, where it is caried as it ought, yet there is a diuine prouidence in the disposition of it; as there is the like also in all other euents, of what nature and quality soeuer they be. And therefore looke what is said by Salomon of a Lot in that place, the selfe-same is said selsewhere of all mens thoughts, and wayes, and words, and works, and counsels, and courses, that they are disposed ⟨p. 17⟩by God, and are tnot absolutely in our power to giue issue to them as we will. Thus is it true that A•gustine saith, that
lHoc totum, quód Forte, fortuitò &c. d•cimus, ad diu••ā providentiam revocate debemus. Idem ibid:Hoc totum, quód Forte, fortuitò &c. d•cimus, ad diu••ā prouidentiam revocate debemus. Idem ibid:
mEccles: 9.11.
nNommuliū oportet consilio credere; quia suam habet for•una rationem quod non expectas ex trans•erso fit; & suam super no• fortuna negotium curat. Patron. satyr▪Nōmuliū oportet consilio credere; quia suam habet for•una rationem quod non expectas ex trans•erso fit; & suam super no• fortuna negotium curat. P•trō. satyr▪
o[Greek or Hebrew]. Me•and: Hypobol: [Greek or Hebrew]. Ch•rem: Achil: Thersiticid: apud S•ob: lib. 1. cap. 10. & Plut: de Fortun: Vitā regit fortuna non sapi•ntia. A Callisthene dictum laudat Theophrastus Cicer: Tuscul: l 3.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Me•and: Hypobol: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Ch•rem: Achil: Thersiticid: apud S•ob: lib. 1. cap. 10. & Plut: de Fortun: Vitā regit fortuna non sapi•ntia. A Callisthene dictum laudat Theophrastꝰ Cicer: Tuscul: l 3.
p[Greek or Hebrew]. Plat de leg: l. 4. [Greek or Hebrew]. Tyrius Mx: serm: 3.
Yet sometime there is a more special and immediate providence in extraordinary cases and upon extraordinary occasions in these casual events, as in the hcasting of the man suddenly for fear of the enemy into the sepulchre of Elisha, who by Gods admirable work to grace the blessed memory of his faithful servant deceased, revived thereupon: as in the iLot whereby Jonah was sometime discovered; done, as Hierome well saith, knot by virtue of the Lot it self, much less of a Lot used by Heathen and Infidels, but by his will and providence that ruled, or rather over-ruled the uncertainty of it. And in this case is that true, which Bernard saith, that lThat which seems Chance to us, is as a word of God acquainting us with his will. That which is true indeed in general, if we consider Gods decreeing will of ⟨p. 18⟩whatsoever cometh to pass: for we know that it was Gods will it should be so, when we see it once fallen out so, and his will is manifested by his work, either for the doing of the thing it self, or for the permitting of it to be done. Otherwise if it be further understood of the manifestation of Gods approving will concerning somewhat to be done or left undone of us, it is not true in the general. For what word of God is there showing his will in this kind and this sense, when an Hare starteth out before a man in the way, or a Fowl flieth beside him, or he treadeth in some unclean thing unawares, and the like, more than in any other act whatsoever? unless we will give way to their lsuperstitious and frivolous conceits, that make such accidents ominous. Howbeit of extraordinary Lots cast by special instinct or express appointment of God, it is most true, and of such may well be understood those speeches of other of the Ancients, who call Lottery ma divine trial, and na divine sentence: and say that oa Lot discovereth to men Gods hidden will; and pmaketh it known openly what God judgeth secretly: as also that qA Lot is a matter in mans doubting manifesting Gods will. Which sayings all, if they be understood of Gods approving will what he would have done or not done of us, must of necessity be restrained to such Lots alone as God himself shall by some special means appoint to be used to that purpose.
Yet sometime there is a more speciall and immediate prouidence in extraordinary cases and vpon extraordinary occasions in these casuall euents, as in the hcasting of the man sodainly for feare of the enemie into the sepulchre of Elisha, who by Gods admirable worke to grace the blessed memory of his faithfull seruant deceased, reviued therevpon: as in the iLot whereby Ionas was sometime discouered; done, as Hierome well saith, knot by vertue of the Lot it selfe, much lesse of a Lot vsed by Heathen and Infidels, but by his will and prouidence that ruled, or rather ouer-ruled the vncertainty of it. And in this case is that true, which Bernard saith, that lThat which seemes Chance to vs, is as a word of God acquainting vs with his will. That which is true indeed in generall, if we consider Gods decreeing will of ⟨p. 18⟩whatsoeuer commeth to passe: for we know that it was Gods will it should be so, when we see it once fallen out so, and his will is manifested by his work, either for the doing of the thing it selfe, or for the permitting of it to be done. Otherwise if it be further vnderstood of the manifestation of Gods approuing will concerning somewhat to be done or left vndone of vs, it is not true in the generall. For what word of God is there shewing his will in this kind and this sense, when an Hare starteth out before a man in the way, or a Fowle flieth beside him, or he treadeth in some vncleane thing vnawares, and the like, more than in any other act whatsoeuer? vnlesse we will giue way to their lsuperstitious and friuolous conceits, that make such accidents ominous. Howbeit of extraordinary Lots cast by speciall instinct or expresse appointment of God, it is most true, and of such may well be vnderstood those speeches of other of the Auncients, who call Lotery ma diuine tryall, and na diuine sentence: and say that oa Lot discouereth to men Gods hidden will; and p
kDeprehendebatur Jonas non viribus sortium, & maximé sortibus Ethnicorū, sed voluntate eius qui sortes regebat inceri••. Hieron. in Jon: c. 1.Deprehendebatur Ionas non viribus sortium, & maximé sortibus Ethnicorū, sed voluntate eius qui sortes regebat inceri••. Hieron. in Ion: c. 1.
lQui nobi• casus videtur, serm• qu• dam Dei est, suam nobi• indicans voluntat•m. •ern. de divers: •erm. 26.Qui nobi• casus videtur, serm• qu• dam Dei est, suam nobi• indicans voluntat•m. •ern. de diuers: •erm. 26.
lDe quibu• latissi•ié I•an: Sarisber: in policrat: sive de nugis Curial: l. 1. c. 12.De quibu• latissi•ié I•an: Sarisber: in policrat: siue de nugis Curial: l. 1. c. 12.
mSors veluti divino pendet examine. Ambr: de Tob: c. 20.
The first conclusion: It is idle in matter of Casualty, ⟨p. 19⟩and so of Lottery, to confound the act of the Creator with the work of the creature; they being two several things distinct in themselves, which ought not therefore to be confounded in casual events more than in any other whatsoever. Yet thus many seem to do, and those men of some note, when they say, that rFortune or Chance is the same with Gods providence, and that they differ only in respect: as also, that sProvidence, Fate or Destiny, and Fortune or Casualty are in truth the same; yet so to be distinguished, that the first includes the two latter: For that Providence is the cause of all things that are done; which Providence in respect of things done necessarily is called Fate or Destiny, in respect of things done casually is called Fortune or Casualty. And therefore tThat (say they) which to the wise and godly is Gods singular Providence, to the foolish and profane is Fortune or Chance. The very like hereunto saith Lactaentius of nature, (as before him uSeneca,) which he confoundeth also with God. *Folly and error and blindness, saith he, and, as Cicero confesseth, the ignorance of causes brought in the names of Nature and Fortune. And again, xThis overthrow of piety brought in Natures ⟨p. 20⟩name: For when men knew not by whom the world was made, or would persuade men that nothing was made by the Deity; they said that yNature was the mother of all things, as if they should say that all things had sprung up naturally of themselves; which word while they use, they confess their own folly: Since zNature, severed from the divine power and providence, is just nothing. And the like error commit they when they define “Fortune a certain Goddess which by sundry casualties sporteth her self with defeating of mens purposes, because they understand not from whom those good or evil things come that befall them. It is true indeed, (as a aworthy man saith answering that objection of Atheists and Epicures, what will become of Fortune if there be a divine Providence in all things?) that if we speak of Fortune, as the bPoets paint her, blind, standing on a globe, turned about like a weathercock with every puff of wind &c. it is but either a poetical figmentc, that dmay as easily be done out by us as it is drawn by them:
The first conclusion: It is idle in matter of Casualty, ⟨p. 19⟩and so of Lotery, to confound the act of the Creator with the worke of the creature; they being two seuerall things distinct in themselues, which ought not therefore to be confounded in casuall euents more than in any other whatsoeuer. Yet thus many seeme to do, and those men of some note, when they say, that rFortune or Chance is the same with Gods prouidence, and that they differ onely in respect: as also, that sProuidence, Fate or Destinie, and Fortune or Casualtie are in truth the same; yet so to be distinguished, that the first includes the two latter: For that Prouidence is the cause of all things that are done; which Prouidence in respect of things done necessarily is called Fate or Destinie, in respect of things done casually is called Fortune or Casualtie. And therefore tThat (say they) which to the wise and godly is Gods singular Prouidence, to the foolish and prophane is Fortune or Chance. The very like herevnto saith Lactaentius of nature, (as before him uSeneca,) which he confoundeth also with God. *Folly and error and blindnes, saith he, and, as Cicero confesseth, the ignorance of causes brought in the names of Nature and Fortune. And againe, xThis ouerthrow of piety brought in Natures ⟨p. 20⟩name: For when men knew not by whom the world was made, or would perswade men that nothing was made by the Deity; they said that yNature was the mother of all things, as if they should say that all things had sprung vp naturally of themselues; which word while they vse, they confesse their owne folly: Since zNature, seuered from the diuine power and prouidence, is iust nothing. And the like error commit they when they define “
rFors five fortuna idem est quod [Greek or Hebrew]; sed differun• ratione significandi. Scalig: de subtil: exerc. 307. § 25.Fors fiue fortuna idem est quod 〈non-Latin alphabet〉; sed differun• ratione significandi. Scalig: de subtil: exerc. 307. § 25.
sTriae ha•, Providentia, Fatum, Fortuna idem sunt reipsa: ratione tamen ita disting•untur, ut providentiae quasi t•tum videatur, reliqua verò• dua parts, nam providentia omniū causa est qua fiunt; cadē autem respectu corum quae necessarió fiun•, •Fatum, respectu veró corū quae fortuitó fieri videntur, Fortuna appellatur. D•unam: in R•m: dial: l. 1. c. 5.Triae ha•, Prouidentia, Fatum, Fortuna idem sunt reipsa: ratione tamen ita disting•untur, vt prouidentiae quasi t•tum videatur, reliqua verò• dua partes, nam prouidentia omniū causa est qua fiunt; cadē autem respectu corum quae necessarió fiun•, •Fatum, respectu veró corū quae fortuitó fieri videntur, Fortuna appellatur. D•unam: in R•m: dial: l. 1. c. 5.
tQuod sapientibus & pijs singulari• Dei provid•ntia est, id ins•pientibus & prophanis Fortuna dicitur. Ibid.Quod sapientibꝰ & pijs singulari• Dei prouid•ntia est, id ins•pientibus & prophanis Fortuna dicitur. Ibid.
or else at the best a symbolical emblem deciphering out the great uncertainty of casual events, of which we shall say more anon. And again it is no less true that the same eAuthor saith, that if by Fortune with Proclus, we understand a divine power coupling causes together which would of tiarre otherwise, that they may work to one and the same end; then are we to acknowledge such a power and providence not ⟨p. 21⟩in fcasual things and such as are uncertain alone, but in all other whatsoever, even those that be most certain. For gFortune is no other than but God nicknamed. But if we consider the term of Nature, and so of Fortune or Chance, as the Holy Ghost useth them; as Nature is a power or faculty in the creature distinct from Gods providence guiding and ruling, yea and oft over-ruling the same to such ends as he seeth good: so is Fortune or Chance also an affection or action of the creature distinct from the same providence whereby God likewise guideth and disposeth the same at his pleasure. As in natural effects therefore there is the work of the creature, which might be albeit there were no providence disposing it, but the creature for matter of direction were left wholly to it self: so is there the like also in casual events; which as they do now fall out, and yet are ordered, as all other things, by Gods providence either general or special; so would no doubt fall out the same oft-times that now they do, were there no providence at all, but the creature left to it own work and will. In regard whereof the Schoolman not unfitly saith, that hthere might be some use of some kind of Lot, although there were no providence at all to guide it, for that iin the same, the decision of the matter in question is referred wholly, as we shall see after, to the casual motion of the creature, without any special providence of the Creator required thereunto. In a word, if in casual events we consider ought beside the ••ature and the uncertain motion thereof, (uncertain (I say) to us, because not determinable by us, though determined ordinarily ⟨p. 20⟩[…] ⟨p. 21⟩[…] ⟨p. 22⟩by some natural cause or other:) there is nothing guiding them but Gods providence: which two things, the act of the creature, and Gods providence accompanying it, though never sundered or severed, yet are to be distinguished and distinctly considered, and not to be confounded the one with the other.
or else at the best a symbolicall embleme deciphering out the great vncertainty of casuall euents, of which we shall say more anon. And againe it is no lesse true that the same eAuthor saith, that if by Fortune with Proclus, we vnderstand a diuine power coupling causes togither which would of tiarre otherwise, that they may worke to one and the same end; then are we to acknowledge such a power and prouidence not ⟨p. 21⟩in fcasuall things and such as are vncertaine alone, but in all other whatsoeuer, euen those that be most certaine. For gFortune is no other than but God nicnamed. But if we consider the terme of Nature, and so of Fortune or Chance, as the Holy Ghost vseth them; as Nature is a power or facultie in the creature distinct from Gods prouidence guiding and ruling, yea and oft ouer-ruling the same to such ends as he seeth good: so is Fortune or Chance also an affection or action of the creature distinct from the same prouidence whereby God likewise guideth and disposeth the same at his pleasure. As in naturall effects therefore there is the worke of the creature, which might be albeit there were no prouidence disposing it, but the creature for matter of direction were left wholy to it selfe: so is there the like also in casuall euents; which as they do now fall out, and yet are ordered, as all other things, by Gods prouidence either generall or speciall; so would no doubt fall out the same oft-times that now they do, were there no prouidence at all, but the creature left to it owne worke and will. In regard whereof the Scholeman not vnfitly saith, that hthere might be some vse of some kind of Lot, although there were no prouidence at all to guide it, for that iin the same, the decision of the matter in question is referred wholy, as we shall see after, to the casuall motion of the creature, without any speciall prouidence of the Creator required therevnto. In a word, if in casuall euents we consider ought beside the ••ature and the vncertaine motion thereof, (vncertaine (I say) to vs, because not determinable by vs, though determined ordinarily ⟨p. 20⟩〈…〉
eMorn: ibid: vói sup:
fNon in vagi• tantum incertisqua quibusdam, sed in ce•tissimis, & in omnibus.
gDeus ipse est ali• nomine designatus. Ibid.
hDivisoria Sor• locū habere posset, etiamsi res humana fortuitò agerentur. Thom: de sortib: c. 5.Diuisoria Sor• locū habere posset, etiamsi res humana fortuitò agerentur. Thom: de sortib: c. 5.
iConting•t aliquē divisoria Sorte uti, non quas• requirat judicium divinum, sed quasi committens fortunae; quod maximè videtur in lud• taxillatori•. Thom: ibid.Conting•t aliquē diuisoria Sorte vti, non quas• requirat iudicium diuinum, sed quasi committens fortunae; quod maximè videtur in lud• taxillatori•. Thom: ibid.
§ 5. A second conclusion: The casualty of an event doth not simply of it self make it a work of Gods special or immediate providence. It is apparent: for there is oft-times a more special providence in many things that are not casual but contingent only, then in the most things that are casual. How many casual events daily befall us, even as many almost as we meet with men, or tread steps on our way, when every cast of our eye ministereth new variety of casualty, and every unexpected object bringeth a casual event with it; which yet no man will be so senseless as to account so many several works of special or immediate providence? And yet some one contingent event only among many other merely casual may be so, when they are not. For example; for a man on his way to be crossed oft by an Hare, to meet with many unknown, find a piece of old iron, spy a covey of Partridges, have his hat blown of his head, and the like, may well befall a man and be all merely casual. But for a mans friend out of suspicion of danger and fore-cast of distress that his friend may incur, to enforce his company upon him, whereas otherwise he should travail alone and is desirous so to do, and being in company with him to be a ⟨p. 23⟩means of saving his life by recovery upon a fall, or by rescue upon assault, were an event contingent rather than casual. And yet who would not acknowledge a more special providence of God in the latter that is less casual, or rather not casual at all but contingent only, deliberatory and voluntary, undertaken upon mature counsel and forecast, than in the former, that are or may be merely casual, and fall out beyond all expectation, without any forecast at all?
§ 5. A second conclusion: The casualtie of an euent doth not simply of it selfe make it a worke of Gods speciall or immediate prouidence. It is apparant: for there is oft-times a more speciall prouidence in many things that are not casuall but contingent only, then in the most things that are casuall. How many casuall euents daily befall vs, euen as many almost as we meete with men, or tread steps on our way, when euery cast of our eye ministreth new variety of casualtie, and euery vnexpected obiect bringeth a casuall euent with it; which yet no man will be so senselesse as to account so many seuerall works of speciall or immediate prouidence? And yet some one contingent euent onely among many other meerely casuall may be so, when they are not. For example; for a man on his way to be crossed oft by an Hare, to meete with many vnknowne, finde a peece of old yron, spie a couey of Partridges, haue his hat blowne of his head, and the like, may well befall a man and be all meerely casuall. But for a mans frend out of suspition of danger and fore-cast of distresse that his frend may incurre, to inforce his com•any vpon him, whereas otherwise he should trauaile alone and is desirous so to doe, and being in company with him to be a ⟨p. 23⟩meanes of sauing his life by recouery vpon a fall, or by rescue vpon assault, were an euent contingent rather than casuall. And yet who would not acknowledge a more speciall prouidence of God in the latter that is lesse casuall, or rather not casuall at all but contingent onely, deliberatory and voluntary, vndertaken vpon mature counsell and forecast, than in the former, that are or may be meerely casuall, and fall out beyond all expectation, without any forcecast at all?
It is true indeed that Gods providence is more manifested in things casually befalling us for good or evil, than in things that befall us contingently by means of men and their forecast and affection to us, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessary. Howbeit the providence of God ordinarily extendeth it self to all of them alike, and is more special sometime in some things not casual than in others that are such. Yea in the same event either casual or other may a more special providence of God be justly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man travelling over Salisbury plain to find a pitcher of water left occasionally there, having no need of it or use for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a special providence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as hSampson sometime, and ready to die for want of water to drink, to light on the like booty casually, as iHagar was directed by Gods Angel to a Well, he would have just cause to esteem it to ⟨p. 24⟩have a special providence of God in it, and might well term the place where he should so find it, as she did an other place where Gods Angel found her, kBeer lachai roi, or the Well of the living God that looked after me when I was near lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossly impious but would judge so of the other: yet both equally casual: the casualty of events therefore doth not of it self simply adjudge them to either.
It is true indeed that Gods prouidence is more manifested in things casually befalling vs for good or euill, than in things that befall vs contingently by meanes of men and their forecast and affection to vs, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessarie. Howbeit the prouidence of God ordinarily extendeth it selfe to all of them alike, and is more speciall sometime in some things not casuall than in others that are such. Yea in the same euent either casuall or other may a more speciall prouidence of God be iustly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man trauelling ouer Salisbury plaine to finde a pitcher of water left occasionally there, hauing no neede of it or vse for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a speciall prouidence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as hSampson sometime, and ready to die for want of water to drinke, to light on the like booty casually, as iHagar was directed by Gods Angell to a Well, he would haue iust cause to esteeme it to ⟨p. 24⟩haue a special prouidence of God in it, and might well terme the place where he should so finde it, as shee did an other place where Gods Angell found her, kBeer lachai roi, or the Well of the liuing God that looked after me when I was neere lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossely impious but would iudge so of the other: yet both equally casuall: the casualtie of euents therefore doth not of it selfe simply adjudge them to either.
§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casual to one that is not casual to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsel foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seem such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiving hereof we are to consider that in casual events two things do concur, lignorance or want of fore-knowledge foreseeing them, and inconsiderateness, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the event of them uncertain to us: & uncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that mIgnorance of causes forged the term of Chance or Fortune: and that nChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or means whereby it is effected, is hid from us. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casual; but some of them are necessary, as that the Load-stone should attract iron and steel, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no known cause or certain reason can be rendered of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and natural, not casual events: some only contingent, as the return of Ague fits in an ordinary course is not casual, to speak properly, but contingent only at the most, even to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Again many things there are and come to pass daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casual to us, because they were not foreseen by us: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man travailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his own journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casual to him that an Hare then and there should cross him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casual unto him. Thus then may the same thing be casual to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseen and fore-known by the one and not by the other:
§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casuall to one that is not casuall to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsell foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seeme such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiuing hereof we are to consider that in casuall euents two things do concurre, lignorance or want of fore-knowledg foreseeing them, and inconsideratenes, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the euent of them vncertain to vs: & vncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that mIgnorance of causes forged the terme of Chance or Fortune: and that nChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or meanes whereby it is effected, is hid from vs. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casuall; but some of them are necessarie, as that the Load-stone should attract yron and steele, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no knowne cause or certaine reason can be rendred of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and naturall, not casuall euents: some onely contingent, as the returne of Ague fits in an ordinarie course is not casuall, to speake properly, but contingent on•ly at the most, euen to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Againe many things there are and come to passe daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casuall to vs, because they were not foreseene by vs: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man tra•ailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his owne journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casuall to him that an Hare then and there should crosse him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casuall vnto him. Thus then may the same thing be casuall to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseene and fore-knowne by the one and not by the other:
l[Greek or Hebrew] Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. divinat: l. 2.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. diuinat: l. 2.
mIgnoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.Ignoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.
nNihil aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cuius ratio & causa secreta est. Aug: contra Academ: l. 1. •. 1.
as oSauls meeting them that Samuel had foretold him of before, was casual to them he met, not casual to Samuel and Saul himself, the one that foresaw it by revelation from God, the other that fore-knew by relation from him.
as oSauls meeting them that Samuel had foretold him of before, was casuall to them he met, not casuall to Samuel and Saul himselfe, the one that foresaw it by reuelation from God, the other that fore-knew by relation from him.
Again, all counsel and fore-cast is excluded from casual events. Nothing that is done by advice, counsel or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. pWhat is done casually is done unadvisedly, saith Augustine. And qTemerity swayeth in casualty, not reason or advice, as we have formerly ⟨p. 26⟩showed. In regard whereof we use to say of those that speak inconsiderately and deal unadvisedly and unconstantly, that rthey deal as if they dealt by casualty, sor went by Lottery; that they speak• as tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus again may that be casual to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was uAhab's meeting Elijah casual to Ahab, but not casual to Elijah, who went of purpose to meet Ahab: thus *Jephthah's meeting his daughter and she him, was casual to him who expected her not, not casual to her whose purpose was to meet him.
Againe, all counsell and fore-cast is excluded from casuall euents. Nothing that is done by aduice, counsell or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. pWhat is done casually is done vnaduisedly, saith Augustine. And qTemeritie swaieth in casualty, not reason or aduice, as we haue formerly ⟨p. 26⟩shewed. In regard whereof we vse to say of those that speake inconsiderately and deale vnaduisedly and vnconstantly, that rthey deale as if they dealt by casualtie, sor went by Lotery; that they speak• as tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus againe may that be casuall to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was uAhabs meeting Elias casuall to Ahab, but not casuall to Elias, who went of purpose to meete Ahab: thus *Iephtaes meeting his daughter and shee him, was casuall to him who expected her not, not casuall to her whose purpose was to meete him.
pQuiequid cas• fit, te••rè fit. Aug: 83 q••st. 24.
qIn cas• temeritas, non ratio […] consiliu• vali•, C••: divin: l. 2.In cas• temeritas, non ratio 〈…〉 consiliu• vali•, C••: diuin: l. 2.
rReliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, ut noncommittamus ut •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, ut quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: [Greek or Hebrew].Reliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, vt noncommittamus vt •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, vt quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Xenoph. paed l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Xenoph. paed l. 1.
Yea thus many things seem casual when indeed they are not; xbeing thought to come by adventure, when they are done by art and advice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ystate to couple persons together by a slight and semblance of lottery, that they might seem to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had been with lately before in that place, seemed casual to his competitors, who before zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himself, or at least ato his groom who had laid the train before for it. bThus a man sendeth his servant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meet his mistress coming from market laden with meat; they meet accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meet casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. cThus the servant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honesty withal, whether he will restore it or retain it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conveyance used in Lots to make that seem casual that indeed is not, but is carried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be grown to a by-word, In Lottery is Bovery, that is, knavery or cozenage. Now howsoever in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seem casual that indeed are not so; yet to speak properly, it is rather the ignorance of events, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casual unto any; by means whereof it cometh oft to pass, that the same events are casual to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casual to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that dCasualty dependeth upon our ignorance; which therefore ethe more we know, the less we are subject unto.
Yea thus many things seeme casuall when indeed they are not; xbeing thought to come by aduenture, when they are done by art and aduice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ystate to couple persons togither by a slight and semblance of lotery, that they might seeme to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had bene with lately before in that place, seemed casuall to his competitors, who before zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himselfe, or at least ato his groome who had laid the traine before for it. bThus a man sendeth his seruant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meete his mistres comming from market laden with meat; they meete accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meete casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. cThus the seruant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honestie withall, whether he will restore it or retaine it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conueyance vsed in Lots to make that seeme casuall that indeed is not, but is caried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be growne to a by-word, In Lotery is Bouery, that is, knauery or cosenage. Now howsoeuer in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seeme casuall that indeed are not so; yet to speake properly, it is rather the ignorance of euents, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casuall vnto any; by meanes whereof it commeth oft to passe, that the same euents are casuall to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casuall to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that d
x[Greek or Hebrew]. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. ut tectè legit Casa•b:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. vt tectè legit Casa•b:
y[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se judicium Religioni & Fortune committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse• Justin: •ist: l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se iudicium Religioni & For•un• committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse Iustin: ist: l. 1.
§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casual unto him; yea nothing cometh contingently, but gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his prescience and providence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to pass necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is uncertainty: but hall things are certain with him, who hath done already what he will do or will have done; and with whom whatsoever ever shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For iThere is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God. kHe disannulleth the devices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsel shall ever stand, and his purposes shall always take place. Nothing casually; because he lseeth all, and mknoweth all; yea nhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that ever shall be. For ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternity, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and prescience being coeternal with himself and his own essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well known to him as his own are. For ⟨p. 29⟩pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholly knowest it, saith David: and thou understandest my thoughts long before. And qThou alone knowest all mens hearts, saith Solomon. And again, rAll things are naked and broken up to him with whom we have to do. Yea as he foreseeth and foreknoweth all things ere they are; so she seeth and knoweth all things past, present and future at once. tWe are as men on the way, that see who go before them or with them, but see not who come behind them: God is as one standing aloft on a sentinel, that seeth all both before and behind under one view at one instant. That which the Psalmist seemeth to allude unto when he saith, that uGod looketh down from heaven and seeth all Adams sons; from his place of abode he views all the inhabitants of the world: and as he framed and fashioned the hearts of each of them, so he taketh notice of all their works.
§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casuall vnto him; yea nothing commeth contingently, but gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to passe necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his praescience and prouidence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to passe necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is vncertainty: but hall things are certaine with him, who hath done already what he will do or will haue done; and with whom whatsoeuer euer shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For iThere is no wisdome, nor vnderstanding, nor counsell against God. kHe disanulleth the deuices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsell shall euer stand, and his purposes shall alwaies take place. Nothing casually; because he lseeth all, and mknoweth all; yea nhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that euer shall be. For ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternitie, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and praescience being coeternall with himselfe and his owne essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well knowne to him as his owne are. For ⟨p. 29⟩pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholy knowest it, saith Dauid: and thou vnderstandest my thoughts long before. And
fDeo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) ut•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• provid: c. 5.Deo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) vt•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• prouid: c. 5.
gDeus necessariò & immutabiliter novit & praenovit universa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.Deus necessariò & immutabiliter nouit & praenouit vniuersa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.
hApud Deum quippe jam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futur•m est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in Psal. 104. In D•i dispositione jam facta sunt, quaecunque, futura sunt, qui nō aliter novit facienda quā facta. Id•m de civit: Dei l. 10. •. 12. Omnia enim quaecunque voluit, non solum praeterita, vel praesentiae, sed etiam futura jam fecit. Ibid. l. 22. c. 2. Et ideò tanquā praeterita dicuntur quae futura sunt, quia Deo & futura tam certa sunt, tamquā praeterita sint. Id •• in Psal. 43.Apud Deum quippe iam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futurm est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in
God therefore foreseeing all things ere any of them are, there can none of them fall out casually in regard of his Majesty. But needs must he foresee all things even ere they are, when there is nothing that he doth not ever see: and *there is nothing but he ever seeth it, that seeth all things at once.
God therefore foreseeing all things ere any of them are, there can none of them fall out casually in regard of his Maiesty. But needs must he foresee all things euen ere they are, when there is nothing that he doth not euer see: and *there is nothing but he euer seeth it, that seeth all things at once.
*Omni• fi••• videt, quorum nullum est quod non semper vid•t. Aug: trinit: l. 15. c. 14. Deus omnia semp•• videt & simul. Lomb: sent: l. 1. d. 39. D.
Again, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his providence and eternal counsel all things are guided and governed, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himself. So ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 30⟩that even xthose things that seem most disorderly in themselves, yet are ordered with him. For not only ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but even zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternal counsel and unsearchable wisdom, that 1even by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore coming to pass but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknown, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that 2Nothing was casual with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; 3whatsoever is done by casualty, is done unadvisedly: whatsoever is done unadvisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to pass casually, the whole world is not administered by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered 4might exclude as well all contingency in regard of uncertainty, as all casualty in events, but must of necessity be understood of the events of things only as they regard God; with whom, because he fore-seeth all things before they fall out, and fore-determineth all things how they shall fall out, none of those events are casual, that are most ⟨p. 31⟩casual unto us, none contingent of those many that are contingent unto us.
Againe, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his prouidence and eternall counsell all things are guided and gouerned, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himselfe. So ⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉⟨p. 30⟩that euen xthose things that seeme most disorderly in themselues, yet are ordred with him. For not only ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but euen zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternall counsell and vnsearchable wisdome, that 1euen by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore comming to passe but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknowne, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that 2Nothing was casuall with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; 3whatsoeuer is done by casualtie, is done vnaduisedly: whatsoeuer is done vnaduisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to passe casually, the whole world is not administred by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered 4
xApud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata video tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.Apud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata vide• tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.
yEph: 1.11. Heb: 13.2•.
zAct: 2.23. & 3.18. & 4 27, 28.
1Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, implevit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, impleuit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.
2[Greek or Hebrew] Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Calvin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque divini necessariò fiunt universa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eveniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Caluin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque diuini necessariò fiunt vniuersa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eueniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.
3Qaicquid casu fit, temerè fit. quicquid temerè fit, non fit providentia. si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non provideniia universus mundus administratur. Aug: 83. quaest. 24.
The lines are fallen to me in a pleasant place, and I haue a faire heritage: I praise the Lord for it. (Though that be spoken metaphorically not properly, as the former words shew,
〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plat• de leg: l. 4. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Tyrius M•x: serm: 3.
qProu: 16.33.
rJun: No sortem quidem ipsam caesu fortuito con•ingere, sed Deum providentia sua, qui•quid sor•e acidst, sigillatim disponere; quam & in infinitum rebus omnibus singulariter adhibet. Lavat: V•iversa & singula, etiam quae temerè accidere videntur, arcana Dei providentia gulernari. Malder: ad 22.2•. Thom: de superstit. tract: 10. c. 7. dub. 9. H•• solum dicitur, sortes non ita esse fortuitas, quin etiam temerè in s•num missae, magna Dei pro•identia temperentur. Rhodolph: B•in: in Prov. Nihil in rebus humanis ger• sine nutu & dispensation divina: ne sorts quidem a'iter cade•e quam moderatione divina.Iun: No sortem quidem ipsam caesu fortuito con•ingere, sed Deum prouidentia sua, qui•quid sor•e accid•t, sigillatim disponere; quam & in infinitum rebus omnibus singulariter adhibet. Lavat: V•iuersa & singula, etiam quae temerè accidere videntur, arcana Dei prouidentia gulernari. Malder: ad 22.2•. Thom: de superstit. tract: 10. c. 7. dub. 9. H•• solum dicitur, sortes non ita esse fortuitas, quin etiam temerè in s•num missae, magna Dei pro•identia temperentur. Rhodolph: B•in: in Prov. Nihil in rebus humanis ger• sine nutu & dispensati•ne diuina: ne sortes quidem a'iter cade•e quam moderatione diuina.
uSolent, quae sorte dantur, divinitum dari Aug: de Ge•: ad lit: l. 10. c. 18.Solent, quae sorte dantur, diuinitum dari Aug: de Ge•: ad lit: l. 10. c. 18.
A Lot is a matter in mans doubting manifesting Gods will. Which sayings all, if they be vnderstood of Gods approuing will what he would haue done or not done of vs, must of necessitie be restrained to such Lots alone as God himself shal by some speciall meanes appoint to be vsed to that purpose.
Sors veluti diuino pendet examine. Ambr: de Tob: c. 20.
nElecti sunt duo judicio humano, & electus de duobus unus judicio divino. Aug: in Psal: 30. de Matthia Act: 1.26.Electi sunt duo iudicio humano, & electus de duobus vnꝰ iudicio diuino. Aug: in Psal: 30. de Matthia Act: 1.26.
oQuae Dei voluntas continet in occulto sors homin•bus declaraet in manifesto. Origeu: in Josh: hom: 23.Quae Dei voluntas continet in occulto sors homin•bꝰ declaraet in manifesto. Origeu: in Iosh: hom: 23.
pDei judicium, quod est in occulto, sors pandit in publico. Ibid.Dei iudicium, quod est in occulto, sors pandit in publico. Ibid.
qSors res est in dubitatione humana divinā indicans voluntat•m. Aug: in Psal: 30.Sors res est in dubitatione humana diuinā indicans voluntat•m. Aug: in Psal: 30.
Fortune a certaine Goddesse which by sundry casualties sporteth her selfe with defeating of mens purposes, because they vnderstand not from whom those good or euill things come that befall them. It is true indeed, (as a
worthy man saith answering that obiection of Atheists and Epicures, what will become of Fortune if there be a diuine Prouidence in all things?) that if we speake of Fortune, as the
may as easily be done out by vs as it is drawne by them:
uQuid aliud est Nae•ura quam Deus, & divina ratio toti mundo & paertib•• eiu• inserta. Sen: de benef: l. 4. c. 7. Ne• Natura sine Deo est, nec Deus sine Natura, sed id […] est virumque; nec distat Natura, Faetum, Fortunae: omnia eiusdem Dei sunt nomina varié utenti• suae potestate. Ibid. c. 8. Jovi nome• omne convenis. vis illum Fatum vocare? non errabis. hi• est ex quo s•spensae sunt omnia; causa ca•sarum. Vis illum providentiam dicere? recté di•es. est enim cuiu• consilio huic mundo providetur, ut inconcussus •at &c. Vis illum Naturam vocare? no• peccabū est enim ex quo nata sunt omnia; tuius spiritu vinimus. Vis illum vocare Mundum? non faelleris, ipse enim est totum quod vides; totus suis partibus inditus, & see sustinens vi sua, Idem quest: nature: lib. 2. cap. 45.Quid aliud est Nae•ura quam Deus, & diuina ratio toti mundo & paertib•• eiu• inserta. Sen: de benef: l. 4. c. 7. Ne• Natura sine Deo est, nec Deus sine Natura, sed id 〈…〉 est virumque; nec distat Natura, Faetum, Fortunae: omnia eiusdem Dei sunt nomina varié vtenti• suae potestate. Ibid. c. 8. Ioui nome• omne convenis. vis illum Fatum vocare? non errabis. hi• est ex quo s•spensae sunt omnia; causa ca•sarum. Vis illum prouidentiam dicere? recté di•es. est enim cuiu• consilio huic mundo prouidetur, vt inconcussus •at &c. Vis illum Naturam vocare? no• peccabū est enim ex quo nata sunt omnia; tuius spiritu vinimus. Vis illum vocare Mundum? non faelleris, ipse enim est totum quod vides; totus suis partibus inditus, & se sustinens vi sua, Idem quest: n•tur: lib. 2. cap. 45.
*Stultitia, & error, & ca•itas, & ut Cicero ait (Academ: quest: l. 1.) ignoratio causarum Natura ac Fortuna nomina ind•xit, Lactant: instil: l. 3. c. 29.Stultitia, & error, & ca•itas, & vt Cicero ait (Academ: quest: l. 1.) ignoratio causarum Natura ac Fortuna nomina ind•xit, Lactant: instil: l. 3. c. 29.
xHae• Religionis evers•• Natura nomen invenit. &c. Ibid. c. 28.Hae• Religionis euers•• Natura nomen invenit. &c. Ibid. c. 28.
yNaturam esse rerum omnium matrem, quasi sua sponte nata sint. Ibid.
zNatura (remotae providentia & potestate divina) prorsu• nihil est. Lactant. ibid.Natura (remotae prouidentia & potestate diuina) prorsu• nihil est. Lactant. ibid.
bFortunā insanā esse & cacam & brutam perhibent Philosophi, saxoque illam instare globoso praedicant volubili. Ideò quo saxū impulerit fors, cadere eo fortunam autumant. Caecam ob cam rem esse iterant, quia nihil cernit quo sese applicet. Insaenā autem ai•nt, quia atrox, incerta, instabilisque fit. B•utam, quiae dignum atque indignum nequeae• internoscere. Pacuv: apud Cornif: ad Heren: l. 2. § 41.Fortunā insanā esse & cacam & brutam perhibent Philosophi, saxoque illam instare globoso praedicant volubili. Ideò quo saxū impulerit fors, cadere eo fortunam autumant. Caecam ob cam rem esse iterant, quia nihil cernit quo sese applicet. Insaenā autem ai•nt, quia atrox, incerta, instabilisque fit. B•utam, quiae dignum atque indignum nequeae• internoscere. Pacuv: apud Cornif: ad Heren: l. 2. § 41.
cTam facilè deleri quam pingi potest. Ibid. quemadmodum de Homero Aristot: Tò [Greek or Hebrew]. Strab: georg: l. 13. Murum Poeta, qui finxit, delevit.Tam facilè deleri quam pingi potest. Ibid. quemadmodum de Homero Aristot: Tò 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Strab: georg: l. 13. Murum Poeta, qui finxit, deleuit.
d[Greek or Hebrew]. Philemon Com: apud Clem: Alex: Strom: l. 5.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Philemon Com: apud Clem: Alex: Strom: l. 5.
⟨p. 21⟩
〈…〉
⟨p. 22⟩
by some naturall cause or other:) there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence: which two things, the act of the creature, and Gods prouidence accompanying it, though neuer sundred or seuered, yet are to be distinguished and distinctly considered, and not to be confounded the one with the other.
Hoc no• est confiderare, sed quasi sortiri quid loquare. Cic: de nat: De•r: l. 1.
dFortuna in ignorantia nostra fu• datur. Mor•: de verit: rel: Chr: c▪ 13. Tolle ignorantia•• è personis, fortunā à rebus, éque reru•• natura t•ll••. Ibid.Fortuna in ignorantia nostra fu• datur. Mor•: de verit: rel: Chr: c▪ 13. Tolle ignorantia•• è personis, fortunā à reb•s, éque reru•• natura t•ll••. Ibid.
eQu• mi••• scimus, •• plus fortuna; quo plus, […] fortune minus. Morn: ibid. Quippe intellectus ubi major inest, minus illuc est de fortuna. Gerson super Magnif.Qu• mi••• scimus, •• plus fortuna; quo plus, 〈…〉 fortun• minus. Morn: ibid. Quippe intellectus vbi maior inest, minus illuc est de fortuna. Gerson super Magnif.
We are as men on the way, that see who go before them or with them, but see not who come behind them: God is as one standing aloft on a sentinell, that seeth all both before and behind vnder one view at one instant. That which the Psalmist seemeth to allude vnto when he saith, that
God looketh downe from heauen and seeth all Adams sonnes; from his place of abode he viewes all the inhabitants of the world: and as he framed and fashioned the hearts of each of them, so he taketh notice of all their works.
. In D•i dispositione iam facta sunt, quaecunque, futura sunt, qui nō aliter nouit facienda quā facta. Id•m de ciuit: Dei l. 10. •. 12. Omnia enim quaecunque voluit, non solum praeterita, vel praesentiae, sed etiam futura iam fecit. Ibid. l. 22. c. 2. Et ideò tanquā praeterita dicuntur quae futura sunt, quia Deo & futura tam certa sunt, tamquā praeterita sint. Id •• in
lProu. 15.3 [Greek or Hebrew]. Hesiod. oper. l 1. [Greek or Hebrew]. Eurip: apud Clement: pr•otrept.Prou. 15.3〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Hesiod. oper. l 1. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Eurip: apud Clement: pr•otrept.
n[Greek or Hebrew]. Xenoph: Cyr: ped: l. 1. Deus omniae deprehe•dit antequam •ant. Ambr: epist: 12. Futura omnia divinus prae•urrit intuitus. Both: consol: lib. 5. pros. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Xenoph: Cyr: ped: l. 1. Deus omniae deprehe•dit antequam •ant. Ambr: epist: 12. Futura omnia diuinus prae•urrit intuitus. Boeth: consol: lib. 5. pros. 6.
oAct: 15.18. Nota ergò fetit, non facta cognovit. Aug: de Gen: ad lit: l. 5. c. 1•.Act: 15.18. Nota ergò fetit, non facta cognouit. Aug: de Gen: ad lit: l. 5. c. 1•.
sDeo in cousp•ctu praesto simul sunt universa, praes•ntia, praeterita, futura Aug: de trivi•: lib. 15. cap. 7. Nec sigill•tim videt o••, sed simul. Ibid. cap. 14. Simul, non luccessivè omniae visit. Thom. sum: part: 1. q. 14. a. 7.Deo in cousp•ctu praesto simul sunt vniuersa, praes•ntia, praeterita, futura Aug: de triui•: lib. 15. cap. 7. Nec sigill•tim videt o••, sed simul. Ibid. cap. 14. Simul, non luccessiuè omniae vi•et. Thom. sum: part: 1. q. 14. a. 7.
tThom: sum: part. 1. quaest: 14 a. 13. Jun: de peccato Adae q. 1. cap. 4. Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti, Nulla terra mole resistun•; Non nox atris nubibu• obstat. Vu• menti• cernit in ictu, Qua sint, quae fu•riut, veniantque Quem, quia respicit o•nia soiu•, Ver•m possis dicere Solē. Both: consol: l. 5. mere. 2. Itaque si praescientiam pen••r• velis, qua cuncta dinos••t, non esse praescientiam quas• futuri, sed scientiam nunquam de fi•ientis instantiae r•ctius existima••s. •nde non praevidentia, s•d providentia potius d•citur, quòd porrò à re••• infimi• constituta, quasi ab excels• rerum cacumine c•ncta pro▪ spitiat. Ibid. pros: 6.Thom: sum: part. 1. quaest: 14 a. 13. Iun: de peccato Adae q. 1. cap. 4. Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti, Nulla terra mole resistun•; Nō nox atris nubibu• obstat. Vu• menti• cernit in ictu, Qua sint, quae fu•riut, veniantque Quem, quia respicit o•nia soiu•, Ver•m possis dicere Solē. Boeth: consol: l. 5. me•r. 2. Itaque si praescientiam pen••r• velis, qua cuncta dinos••t, non esse praescientiam quas• futuri, sed scientiam nunquam de fi•ientis instantiae r•ctius existima••s. •nde non praeuidentia, s•d prouidentia potius d•citur, quòd porrò à re••• infimi• constituta, quasi ab excels• rerum cacumine c•ncta pro▪ spitiat. Ibid. pros: 6.
might exclude as well all contingencie in regard of vncertainty, as all casualty in euents, but must of necessitie be vnderstood of the euents of things onely as they regard God; with whom, because he fore-seeth all things before they fall out, and fore-determineth all things how they shall fall out, none of those euents are casuall, that are most
⟨p. 31⟩
casuall vnto vs, none contingent of those many that are contingent vnto vs.
Qaicquid casu fit, temerè fit. quicquid temerè fit, non fit prouidentia. si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non prouideniia vniuersus mundus administratur. Aug: 83. quaest. 24.
4Tam contingentiam q•àm cas•m excludit. Calvin: justit: l. •. c. 16. § 9.Tam contingentiam q•àm cas•m excludit. Caluin: iustit: l. •. c. 16. § 9.
