Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theologicalOf the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall
Of the nature and use of lots a treatise historical and theological; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolns Inn, and now pastor of Rotherhith.Of the nature and vse of lots a treatise historicall and theologicall; written by Thomas Gataker B. of D. sometime preacher at Lincolnes Inne, and now pastor of Rotherhith.
Thomas Gataker 1574–1654London: printed by Edward Griffin, 1619
[12], 360 p. · 94k words · STC 11670 · ESTC S102922
Modern spelling is a reading aid: the words are the author’s, only the spelling is modernized. Original shows the page as printed, with the transcription marks.
It is true indeed that Gods providence is more manifested in things casually befalling us for good or evil, than in things that befall us contingently by means of men and their forecast and affection to us, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessary. Howbeit the providence of God ordinarily extendeth it self to all of them alike, and is more special sometime in some things not casual than in others that are such. Yea in the same event either casual or other may a more special providence of God be justly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man travelling over Salisbury plain to find a pitcher of water left occasionally there, having no need of it or use for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a special providence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as hSampson sometime, and ready to die for want of water to drink, to light on the like booty casually, as iHagar was directed by Gods Angel to a Well, he would have just cause to esteem it to ⟨p. 24⟩have a special providence of God in it, and might well term the place where he should so find it, as she did an other place where Gods Angel found her, kBeer lachai roi, or the Well of the living God that looked after me when I was near lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossly impious but would judge so of the other: yet both equally casual: the casualty of events therefore doth not of it self simply adjudge them to either.
It is true indeed that Gods prouidence is more manifested in things casually befalling vs for good or euill, than in things that befall vs contingently by meanes of men and their forecast and affection to vs, or their hatred and malice; as more in things that fall out contingently, than in things that are necessarie. Howbeit the prouidence of God ordinarily extendeth it selfe to all of them alike, and is more speciall sometime in some things not casuall than in others that are such. Yea in the same euent either casuall or other may a more speciall prouidence of God be iustly deemed to be at some time than at other in regard of circumstances concurring: as for a man trauelling ouer Salisbury plaine to finde a pitcher of water left occasionally there, hauing no neede of it or vse for it, no man, I suppose, would expound as a speciall prouidence of God: But for a man exceedingly vexed with thirst, extremely distressed, as
Hagar was directed by Gods Angell to a Well, he would haue iust cause to esteeme it to
⟨p. 24⟩
haue a special prouidence of God in it, and might well terme the place where he should so finde it, as shee did an other place where Gods Angell found her,
Beer lachai roi, or the Well of the liuing God that looked after me when I was neere lost. No man not fondly superstitious would account so of the one; and no man not grossely impious but would iudge so of the other: yet both equally casuall: the casualtie of euents therefore doth not of it selfe simply adjudge them to either.
§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casual to one that is not casual to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsel foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seem such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiving hereof we are to consider that in casual events two things do concur, lignorance or want of fore-knowledge foreseeing them, and inconsiderateness, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the event of them uncertain to us: & uncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that mIgnorance of causes forged the term of Chance or Fortune: and that nChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or means whereby it is effected, is hid from us. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casual; but some of them are necessary, as that the Load-stone should attract iron and steel, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no known cause or certain reason can be rendered of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and natural, not casual events: some only contingent, as the return of Ague fits in an ordinary course is not casual, to speak properly, but contingent only at the most, even to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Again many things there are and come to pass daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casual to us, because they were not foreseen by us: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man travailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his own journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casual to him that an Hare then and there should cross him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casual unto him. Thus then may the same thing be casual to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseen and fore-known by the one and not by the other:
§ 6. A third conclusion: That may be casuall to one that is not casuall to another; where there is forecast and fore-knowledge and counsell foreseeing or directing and disposing it in the one, and not in the other: and that may seeme such, which indeed is not. For the better conceiuing hereof we are to consider that in casuall euents two things do concurre, lignorance or want of fore-knowledg foreseeing them, and inconsideratenes, or want of fore-cast directing them: for these things make the euent of them vncertain to vs: & vncertainty breedeth casualty. Yet is not that all out true here that some say, that mIgnorance of causes forged the terme of Chance or Fortune: and that nChance is nothing but that, the cause whereof, or meanes whereby it is effected, is hid from vs. For many things we know not the cause of, which yet we ascribe not to chance, neither indeed are they casuall; but some of them are necessarie, as that the Load-stone should attract yron and steele, and direct the needle touched with it Northward, &c. no knowne cause or certaine reason can be rendred of either; and yet are they necessary ⟨p. 25⟩and naturall, not casuall euents: some onely contingent, as the returne of Ague fits in an ordinarie course is not casuall, to speake properly, but contingent on•ly at the most, euen to such a one as out of ignorance of the true cause and ground of its recourse in that manner, suspecteth it to be some kind of spirit. Againe many things there are and come to passe daily, which we know the causes of, and yet are they casuall to vs, because they were not foreseene by vs: as when an Hare started by hounds crosseth a man tra•ailing on some other occasion; though he be neither ignorant of the cause of his owne journey that way, nor of the cause of the Hares crossing the way at that instant, yet may it be casuall to him that an Hare then and there should crosse him: whereas if a man knew before-hand what would fall out or befall him on the way, nothing then that did betide him should be casuall vnto him. Thus then may the same thing be casuall to one, that is not so to another; because it was foreseene and fore-knowne by the one and not by the other:
l[Greek or Hebrew] Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. divinat: l. 2.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Aristot: physic: l. 2. c 4. Fort•ita quae sunt, •ulla nec arte nec sapientia praevideri p•ssunt. Cic. diuinat: l. 2.
mIgnoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.Ignoratio •ausarum confinxit fortunā. Lactant: instit: l. 3. c. 29. & Ram: dialect: lib. 1. c. 5. ex Cicer: quast. Academ: l. 1.
nNihil aliud in rebus casum vocamus, nisi cuius ratio & causa secreta est. Aug: contra Academ: l. 1. •. 1.
as oSauls meeting them that Samuel had foretold him of before, was casual to them he met, not casual to Samuel and Saul himself, the one that foresaw it by revelation from God, the other that fore-knew by relation from him.
as oSauls meeting them that Samuel had foretold him of before, was casuall to them he met, not casuall to Samuel and Saul himselfe, the one that foresaw it by reuelation from God, the other that fore-knew by relation from him.
Again, all counsel and fore-cast is excluded from casual events. Nothing that is done by advice, counsel or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. pWhat is done casually is done unadvisedly, saith Augustine. And qTemerity swayeth in casualty, not reason or advice, as we have formerly ⟨p. 26⟩showed. In regard whereof we use to say of those that speak inconsiderately and deal unadvisedly and unconstantly, that rthey deal as if they dealt by casualty, sor went by Lottery; that they speak• as tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus again may that be casual to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was uAhab's meeting Elijah casual to Ahab, but not casual to Elijah, who went of purpose to meet Ahab: thus *Jephthah's meeting his daughter and she him, was casual to him who expected her not, not casual to her whose purpose was to meet him.
Againe, all counsell and fore-cast is excluded from casuall euents. Nothing that is done by aduice, counsell or fore-cast, is done casually in regard of him that so doth it. pWhat is done casually is done vnaduisedly, saith Augustine. And qTemeritie swaieth in casualty, not reason or aduice, as we haue formerly ⟨p. 26⟩shewed. In regard whereof we vse to say of those that speake inconsiderately and deale vnaduisedly and vnconstantly, that rthey deale as if they dealt by casualtie, sor went by Lotery; that they speak• as tif they drew cuts what they should say. And thus againe may that be casuall to one that is not so to another, because it is beside the intent and purpose of the one and not of the other. Thus was uAhabs meeting Elias casuall to Ahab, but not casuall to Elias, who went of purpose to meete Ahab: thus *Iephtaes meeting his daughter and shee him, was casuall to him who expected her not, not casuall to her whose purpose was to meete him.
pQuiequid cas• fit, te••rè fit. Aug: 83 q••st. 24.
qIn cas• temeritas, non ratio […] consiliu• vali•, C••: divin: l. 2.In cas• temeritas, non ratio 〈…〉 consiliu• vali•, C••: diuin: l. 2.
rReliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, ut noncommittamus ut •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, ut quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: [Greek or Hebrew].Reliqua sic à me aguntur & agentur, vt noncommittamus vt •a quae gessimus, fortuitò gessif•e videamur. Ci•: ad Attic: l. 1. ep. 15. Non c•mmittam, vt quae gessi, casu m•gu & foelicitate quam virtute & consilio gesta videantur. Idem pro Sylla. Et And•cid: de myster: 〈non-Latin alphabet〉.
s[Greek or Hebrew]. Xenoph. paed l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Xenoph. paed l. 1.
Yea thus many things seem casual when indeed they are not; xbeing thought to come by adventure, when they are done by art and advice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ystate to couple persons together by a slight and semblance of lottery, that they might seem to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had been with lately before in that place, seemed casual to his competitors, who before zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himself, or at least ato his groom who had laid the train before for it. bThus a man sendeth his servant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meet his mistress coming from market laden with meat; they meet accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meet casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. cThus the servant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honesty withal, whether he will restore it or retain it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conveyance used in Lots to make that seem casual that indeed is not, but is carried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be grown to a by-word, In Lottery is Bovery, that is, knavery or cozenage. Now howsoever in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seem casual that indeed are not so; yet to speak properly, it is rather the ignorance of events, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casual unto any; by means whereof it cometh oft to pass, that the same events are casual to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casual to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that dCasualty dependeth upon our ignorance; which therefore ethe more we know, the less we are subject unto.
Yea thus many things seeme casuall when indeed they are not; xbeing thought to come by aduenture, when they are done by art and aduice: as Plato counselleth the rulers of his imaginary ystate to couple persons togither by a slight and semblance of lotery, that they might seeme to light either on other by lot or by chance, when indeed it was done by their cunning and slight. Thus Darius his horses neighing after the mare which he had bene with lately before in that place, seemed casuall to his competitors, who before zhad agreed to settle the Empire on him whose horse should first neigh at their next meeting in that place; but neither was so ⟨p. 27⟩indeed, nor seemed so to himselfe, or at least ato his groome who had laid the traine before for it. bThus a man sendeth his seruant on an errand through such a lane, where he knoweth that he shall meete his mistres comming from market laden with meat; they meete accordingly the one not expecting the other, and suppose they meete casually, when indeed it is no casualty, but the good mans care forecasting it for the ease of his wife. cThus the seruant lighteth on money, that his master hath laid of purpose as a bait to try his honestie withall, whether he will restore it or retaine it, and thinketh it came there casually, where it was purposely disposed. And of this kind, in a word, is all co•en and cunning conueyance vsed in Lots to make that seeme casuall that indeed is not, but is caried by slight; a thing so common in such courses, that among the Dutch it is reported to be growne to a by-word, In Lotery is Bouery, that is, knauery or cosenage. Now howsoeuer in such cases the ignorance of causes maketh those things seeme casuall that indeed are not so; yet to speake properly, it is rather the ignorance of euents, as in the former cases, that maketh things indeed casuall vnto any; by meanes whereof it commeth oft to passe, that the same euents are casuall to some that foresaw them not, and yet not casuall to others that foresaw them before: and so it is true, that d
x[Greek or Hebrew]. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. ut tectè legit Casa•b:〈non-Latin alphabet〉. de Crespbont• Polyae•. stratag: l. 1. vt tectè legit Casa•b:
y[Greek or Hebrew]. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Plato de repub: l. 5. Id•m & in Timaeo.
z[Greek or Hebrew]. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se judicium Religioni & Fortune committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse• Justin: •ist: l. 1.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Herodot: l. 3. Viam invenerunt, qua de se iudicium Religioni & For•un• committerent: p•cti inter se, cuius equ•• ant• solis ortum (an•• regiam couveni•• tium) hinni•um pri••us e•idissit, is Rex esse Iustin: ist: l. 1.
§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casual unto him; yea nothing cometh contingently, but gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to pass necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his prescience and providence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to pass necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is uncertainty: but hall things are certain with him, who hath done already what he will do or will have done; and with whom whatsoever ever shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For iThere is no wisdom, nor understanding, nor counsel against God. kHe disannulleth the devices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsel shall ever stand, and his purposes shall always take place. Nothing casually; because he lseeth all, and mknoweth all; yea nhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that ever shall be. For ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternity, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and prescience being coeternal with himself and his own essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well known to him as his own are. For ⟨p. 29⟩pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholly knowest it, saith David: and thou understandest my thoughts long before. And qThou alone knowest all mens hearts, saith Solomon. And again, rAll things are naked and broken up to him with whom we have to do. Yea as he foreseeth and foreknoweth all things ere they are; so she seeth and knoweth all things past, present and future at once. tWe are as men on the way, that see who go before them or with them, but see not who come behind them: God is as one standing aloft on a sentinel, that seeth all both before and behind under one view at one instant. That which the Psalmist seemeth to allude unto when he saith, that uGod looketh down from heaven and seeth all Adams sons; from his place of abode he views all the inhabitants of the world: and as he framed and fashioned the hearts of each of them, so he taketh notice of all their works.
§ 7. And hence followeth the fourth and last Conclusion: That there is fno casualty with God; ⟨p. 28⟩because no ignorance in God. There is nothing, I say, casuall vnto him; yea nothing commeth contingently, but gall things necessarily in regard of him and his decree. If we respect indeed the creature, and its manner of working, some things come to passe necessarily, some contingently, some casually. But if we respect Gods will and purpose, his praescience and prouidence, nothing falleth out contingently or casually, but all things come to passe necessarily. Nothing contingently: for in contingency is vncertainty: but hall things are certaine with him, who hath done already what he will do or will haue done; and with whom whatsoeuer euer shall be, is as sure as if it were done already. For iThere is no wisdome, nor vnderstanding, nor counsell against God. kHe disanulleth the deuices of Nations, and defeateth peoples purposes: But his counsell shall euer stand, and his purposes shall alwaies take place. Nothing casually; because he lseeth all, and mknoweth all; yea nhe foreseeth and foreknoweth all that euer shall be. For ofrom the beginning of the world, yea from all eternitie, God knew all his works; his fore-knowledge and praescience being coeternall with himselfe and his owne essence: and all the thoughts, and words, and works of all his creatures are as well knowne to him as his owne are. For ⟨p. 29⟩pThere is not a word in my tongue, but thou, Lord, wholy knowest it, saith Dauid: and thou vnderstandest my thoughts long before. And
fDeo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) ut•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• provid: c. 5.Deo nihil fortuitum. Gerson super Magnif: (Deo) vt•iunt cuncta, no• incidunt. Sen: d• prouid: c. 5.
gDeus necessariò & immutabiliter novit & praenovit universa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.Deus necessariò & immutabiliter nouit & praenouit vniuersa, •tiam futura contingentia. Lomb: s•ntent: l. 1. d. 38. & 39. Thom sum: part: 1. q. 14. art: 13. Scot: super 1. d. 29. q. 5. & •oeth: cons•l: philos: l. 5. pros. 6.
hApud Deum quippe jam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futur•m est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in Psal. 104. In D•i dispositione jam facta sunt, quaecunque, futura sunt, qui nō aliter novit facienda quā facta. Id•m de civit: Dei l. 10. •. 12. Omnia enim quaecunque voluit, non solum praeterita, vel praesentiae, sed etiam futura jam fecit. Ibid. l. 22. c. 2. Et ideò tanquā praeterita dicuntur quae futura sunt, quia Deo & futura tam certa sunt, tamquā praeterita sint. Id •• in Psal. 43.Apud Deum quippe iam factam est, quod ei•• dispositione futurm est, qui fecit quae futura sunt. Aug: in
God therefore foreseeing all things ere any of them are, there can none of them fall out casually in regard of his Majesty. But needs must he foresee all things even ere they are, when there is nothing that he doth not ever see: and *there is nothing but he ever seeth it, that seeth all things at once.
God therefore foreseeing all things ere any of them are, there can none of them fall out casually in regard of his Maiesty. But needs must he foresee all things euen ere they are, when there is nothing that he doth not euer see: and *there is nothing but he euer seeth it, that seeth all things at once.
*Omni• fi••• videt, quorum nullum est quod non semper vid•t. Aug: trinit: l. 15. c. 14. Deus omnia semp•• videt & simul. Lomb: sent: l. 1. d. 39. D.
Again, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his providence and eternal counsel all things are guided and governed, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himself. So ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 28⟩[…] ⟨p. 29⟩[…] ⟨p. 30⟩that even xthose things that seem most disorderly in themselves, yet are ordered with him. For not only ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but even zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternal counsel and unsearchable wisdom, that 1even by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore coming to pass but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknown, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that 2Nothing was casual with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; 3whatsoever is done by casualty, is done unadvisedly: whatsoever is done unadvisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to pass casually, the whole world is not administered by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered 4might exclude as well all contingency in regard of uncertainty, as all casualty in events, but must of necessity be understood of the events of things only as they regard God; with whom, because he fore-seeth all things before they fall out, and fore-determineth all things how they shall fall out, none of those events are casual, that are most ⟨p. 31⟩casual unto us, none contingent of those many that are contingent unto us.
Againe, in regard of God can nothing come casually, because by his prouidence and eternall counsell all things are guided and gouerned, and ordered by him to such ends as he seeth best himselfe. So ⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉⟨p. 28⟩〈…〉⟨p. 29⟩〈…〉⟨p. 30⟩that euen xthose things that seeme most disorderly in themselues, yet are ordred with him. For not only ythe best things are all effected and wrought by him; but euen zthe worst and the wickedest are all so ordered and disposed by his eternall counsell and vnsearchable wisdome, that 1euen by those that do what he willeth not but forbiddeth, he fulfilleth what he willeth. Nothing therefore comming to passe but what God foreseeth, what God foredecreeth, what he hath foreknowne, and what he hath fore-ordained, there can nothing come casually in regard of God; casualty necessarily excluding all fore-knowledge and forecast. That which the Heathen man of old foresaw when he said, that 2Nothing was casuall with God, though many things were with man. In which sense are we to take Augustine, where he reasoneth thus against casualty; 3whatsoeuer is done by casualtie, is done vnaduisedly: whatsoeuer is done vnaduisedly, is done without forecast or foresight: if ought therefore in the world come to passe casually, the whole world is not administred by forecast or foresight. Which argument or ground of his simply considered 4
xApud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata video tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.Apud Deum ordinata sunt, eti•m quae in se maximè inordinata vide• tur. Vise Aug: de ordin: l. 1. c. 4, 5. & 83. quaest. 27.
yEph: 1.11. Heb: 13.2•.
zAct: 2.23. & 3.18. & 4 27, 28.
1Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, implevit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.Per candē creaturae voluntatem qua factū est quod creator noluir, impleuit ipse quod voluit. Aug: enchir: c. 100. Deus de eis qui faciunt quae nō vult, facit ipse quae vult. Idem de corrept: & grat: c 14.
2[Greek or Hebrew] Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Calvin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque divini necessariò fiunt universa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eveniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.〈non-Latin alphabet〉 Hippocr; apud Stob: Omnia Deo certa, nobis multa fortui•a. 1 Caluin: instit: lib. 1. cap. 16. § 9. Respectu Dei ordinisque diuini necessariò fiunt vniuersa, respectu verò nostricontinge•tia, casu, fort•na eueniunt infinita. Zanch: de natur: Dei l. 5 c. 1. Thes. 2. § 4. rat: 3, 4.
3Qaicquid casu fit, temerè fit. quicquid temerè fit, non fit providentia. si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non provideniia universus mundus administratur. Aug: 83. quaest. 24.
§ 1.Thus much then shall suffice to have spoken of the definition of a Lot, and of Casual Events, whereof a Lot is one, in general: we will now proceed to consider of the several Sorts and Kinds of it.
§ 1.THus much then shall suffice to haue spoken of the definition of a Lot, and of Casuall Euents, whereof a Lot is one, in generall: we will now proceed to consider of the seuerall Sorts and Kinds of it.
In the division of Lots therefore I find much diversity among Writers, some referring all to two heads, some to three, some to four, some to more, uncertain how many.
In the diuision of Lots therefore I finde much diuersitie among Writers, some referring all to two heads, some to three, some to foure, some to more, vncertaine how many.
aLyra maketh but two sorts of Lots, divisorie, used for the dividing of something between divers; and consultory, for the determining of somewhat to be done. The former, saith he, lawful and free from offence, if without greedy desire of gain the event be committed to the chance or the casual motion of the creature: the latter unlawful, if the event of it be expected from any created power beside the casual act of the creature, as from the motion of Planets, or the operation of evil Spirits; not unlawful if it be expected from God or good Angels, so it be done in case of necessity, with due reverence, and out of Ecclesiastical Elections.
aLyra maketh but two sorts of Lots, diuisorie, vsed for the diuiding of something betweene diuers; and consultorie, for the determining of somewhat to be done. The former, saith he, lawfull and free from offence, if without greedy desire of gaine the euent be committed to the chance or the casuall motion of the creature: the latter vnlawfull, if the euent of it be expected from any created power beside the casuall act of the creature, as from the motion of Planets, or the operation of euill Spirits; not vnlawfull if it be expected from God or good Angels, so it be done in case of necessitie, with due reuerence, and out of Ecclesiasticall Elections.
aLyra in Numb c. 34. & in •rou•. c. 16. & in Jome. 1. divisoria ad aliquid inter plu•es di•idendum; consultoria ad aliquid determina•è agendū.Lyra in Num• c. 34. & in •rou•. c. 16. & in Iome. 1. diuisoria ad aliquid inter plu•es di•idendum; consultoria ad aliquid determina•è agendū.
bLavater likewise, and *Schlinder make two sorts, but in different terms, divisorie and divinatory: divisorie, used (as before) for division of possessions, legacies, spoils, offices, exercises, employments, and the like, and these lawful and commendable: divinatory, used for the finding out of hidden and unknown truths, and the foretelling of future events, and these unlawful and damnable. The consultory Lot they think to be included in the two former, though not the same simply with either.
bLavater likewise, and *Schlinder make two sorts, but in different termes, diuisorie and diuinatorie: diuisorie, vsed (as before) for diuision of possessions, legacies, spoiles, offices, exercises, imployments, and the like, and these lawfull and commendable: diuinatorie, vsed for the finding out of hidden and vnknowne truths, and the foretelling of future euents, and these vnlawfull and damnable. The consultorie Lot they thinke to be included in the two former, though not the same simply with either.
bLavat: in Prou. c. 16. divis•riae, licitae, qusbus hereditares, possessions, praedae, &c. dividuntur; divinatoriae illicitae, quibus occulta investigantur, quisue rerun aut personaris futuru• fit exitus.Lavat: in Prou. c. 16. diuis•riae, licitae, qusbus hereditares, possessiones, praedae, &c. diuiduntur; diuinatoriae illicitae, quibus occulta investigantur, quisue rerū aut personaris futuru• fit exitus.
cSerarius again maketh two sorts another way, consultory, and divinatory: For that, saith he, that by a Lot is sought out, is either the bare knowledge of things past, present or future; or beside the knowledge of something any action whatsoever that may come within compass of deliberation and counsel; that is done by a divinatory, this by a consultory Lot: the divisorie Lot may be referred, he thinketh, to this latter.
cSerarius againe maketh two sorts another way, consultorie, and diuinatorie: For that, saith he, that by a Lot is sought out, is either the bare knowledge of things past, present or future; or beside the knowledge of something any action whatsoeuer that may come within compasse of deliberation and counsell; that is done by a diuinatorie, this by a consultorie Lot: the diuisorie Lot may be referred, he thinketh, to this latter.
cSerar: in Josh: •om: 2 c 7. q. 17. Sorte vel cognitio quaeritur sola praeteritorum, praesentium, futurorum; & est divinatoria; vel actio eti•m quaecunque subconsilium & deliberationē cadere potest; & est consultoria: ad quem divisoria revocari potest.Serar: in Iosh: •om: 2 c 7. q. 17. Sorte vel cognitio quaeritur sola praeteritorum, praesentium, futurorum; & est diuinatoria; vel actio eti•m quaecunque subconsilium & deliberationē cadere potest; & est consultoria: ad quem diuisoria revocari potest.
§ 2. dThomas Aquinas maketh three sorts, divisorie, consultory, and divinatory: divisorie, determining what each one shall have; consultory, inquiring what were best to be done; and divinatory, searching what shall hereafter ensue. In these, saith he, the event is expected, either from the stars, and that false and vain; or from chance alone, as in the divisorie, and that not wholly free from some vanity; or from some spiritual cause directing it, and that either the Devil, and that wicked, or God, and that of it self not evil; yet such as may become sinful, if Lots be used, upon no necessity, without due reverence, with abuse of divine oracles, or in Ecclesiastical offices: otherwise in case of necessity it being lawful with due reverence to ⟨p. 33⟩implore by Lot a divine sentence. In his steps tread most of your ePopish Writers; save that some of them, as fCaietan, and gTolet restrain these cautions to the consultory Lot only; some of them with hMalderus, and iDelrio condemn utterly all both consultory and divinatory Lots, save in case of special either command or instinct, kallowing the divisorie wheresoever, being used without wrong or injury to any. And of ours, lPeter Martyr, as he setteth down the same sorts, so he passeth in a manner the same censure upon them: that to expect the event of them from Chance or Fortune is frivolous, from evil spirits superstitious, from planets ridiculous, from God alone religious, and only lawful, so that used in case of necessity, reverently and religiously, without superstition, without fraud or collusion, and without abuse of divine oracles.
§ 2. dThomas Aquinas maketh three sorts, diuisorie, consultorie, and diuinatorie: diuisorie, determining what each one shall haue; consultorie, inquiring what were best to be done; and diuinatorie, searching what shall hereafter ensue. In these, saith he, the euent is expected, either from the starres, and that false and vaine; or from chance alone, as in the diuisorie, and that not wholy free from some vanity; or from some spirituall cause directing it, and that either the Deuill, and that wicked, or God, and that of it selfe not euill; yet such as may become sinfull, if Lots be vsed, vpon no necessitie, without due reuerence, with abuse of diuine oracles, or in Ecclesiasticall offices: otherwise in case of necessitie it being lawfull with due reuerence to ⟨p. 33⟩implore by Lot a diuine sentence. In his steps tread most of your ePopish Writers; saue that some of them, as fCaietan, and gTolet restraine these cautions to the consultorie Lot only; some of them with hMalderus, and iDelrio condemne vtterly all both consultorie and diuinatorie Lots, saue in case of speciall either command or instinct, kallowing the diuisorie wheresoeuer, being vsed without wrong or iniurie to any. And of ours, lPeter Martyr, as he setteth downe the same sorts, so he passeth in a manner the same censure vpon them: that to expect the euent of them from Chaunce or Fortune is friuolous, from euill spirits superstitious, from planets ridiculous, from God alone religious, and onely lawfull, so that vsed in case of necessitie, reuerently and religiously, without superstition, without fraud or collusion, and without abuse of diuine oracles.
dThom: sum part: 2•. 2 •.q. 95. art 8. & de sortib: cap. 2, 3, 4. Divisoria qua quaeritur, quid cui fit exhibendum; Consultoria, qua quaeritur, quid sit agendum; Divinatoria, qua quaeritur, quid fit futurum.Thom: sum part: 2•. 2 •.q. 95. art 8. & de sortib: cap. 2, 3, 4. Diuisoria qua quaeritur, quid cui fit exhibendum; Consultoria, qua quaeritur, quid sit agendum; Diuinatoria, qua quaeritur, quid fit futurum.
mPeucer and nKrakevitz make three sorts also, but in another sort: Lots divine, guided and governed immediately by God; such as godly men used upon Gods special command, not warranted now to us: Civill or politic used for the ending of strife and lawsuits, or the parting of goods, gifts, and legacies, or the collation of some honours and offices; which may lawfully be used with mutual consent, and without coven and fraud: and Divinatory or superstitious, whereby men presume upon idle grounds, neither warranted by Gods word, nor founded on natural reason, to find out hidden truths, and guess at future events; a course Satanical, and in Scripture expressly forbidden.
mPeucer and nKrakevitz make three sorts also, but in another sort: Lots diuine, guided and gouerned immediately by God; such as godly men vsed vpon Gods speciall commaund, not warranted now to vs: Ciuill or politike vsed for the ending of strife and lawsuites, or the parting of goods, gifts, and legacies, or the collation of some honours and offices; which may lawfully be vsed with mutuall consent, and without couen and fraud: and Diuinatorie or superstitious, whereby men presume vpon idle grounds, neither warranted by Gods word, nor founded on naturall reason, to find out hidden truths, and guesse at future euents; a course Satanicall, and in Scripture expressely forbidden.
mPaucer: de divinat: c. de sort.Paucer: de diuinat: c. de sort.
nKr•kevitz in Jon. c. 1. Sortilegium triplex; divinum, divinitus rectum & directum; civile, seu politicū; divinatorium & superstitiosum.Kr•kevitz in Ion. c. 1. Sortilegium triplex; diuinum, diuinitus rectum & directum; ciuile, seu politicū; diuinatorium & superstitiosum.
•
an illegible letter
〈…〉
illegible words
〈non-Latin alphabet〉
Greek or Hebrew the transcribers did not key
▪
illegible punctuation
⟨p. 12⟩
a page break in the printed book
Hoc no• est confiderare, sed quasi sortiri quid loquare. Cic: de nat: De•r: l. 1.
dFortuna in ignorantia nostra fu• datur. Mor•: de verit: rel: Chr: c▪ 13. Tolle ignorantia•• è personis, fortunā à rebus, éque reru•• natura t•ll••. Ibid.Fortuna in ignorantia nostra fu• datur. Mor•: de verit: rel: Chr: c▪ 13. Tolle ignorantia•• è personis, fortunā à reb•s, éque reru•• natura t•ll••. Ibid.
eQu• mi••• scimus, •• plus fortuna; quo plus, […] fortune minus. Morn: ibid. Quippe intellectus ubi major inest, minus illuc est de fortuna. Gerson super Magnif.Qu• mi••• scimus, •• plus fortuna; quo plus, 〈…〉 fortun• minus. Morn: ibid. Quippe intellectus vbi maior inest, minus illuc est de fortuna. Gerson super Magnif.
We are as men on the way, that see who go before them or with them, but see not who come behind them: God is as one standing aloft on a sentinell, that seeth all both before and behind vnder one view at one instant. That which the Psalmist seemeth to allude vnto when he saith, that
God looketh downe from heauen and seeth all Adams sonnes; from his place of abode he viewes all the inhabitants of the world: and as he framed and fashioned the hearts of each of them, so he taketh notice of all their works.
. In D•i dispositione iam facta sunt, quaecunque, futura sunt, qui nō aliter nouit facienda quā facta. Id•m de ciuit: Dei l. 10. •. 12. Omnia enim quaecunque voluit, non solum praeterita, vel praesentiae, sed etiam futura iam fecit. Ibid. l. 22. c. 2. Et ideò tanquā praeterita dicuntur quae futura sunt, quia Deo & futura tam certa sunt, tamquā praeterita sint. Id •• in
lProu. 15.3 [Greek or Hebrew]. Hesiod. oper. l 1. [Greek or Hebrew]. Eurip: apud Clement: pr•otrept.Prou. 15.3〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Hesiod. oper. l 1. 〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Eurip: apud Clement: pr•otrept.
n[Greek or Hebrew]. Xenoph: Cyr: ped: l. 1. Deus omniae deprehe•dit antequam •ant. Ambr: epist: 12. Futura omnia divinus prae•urrit intuitus. Both: consol: lib. 5. pros. 6.〈non-Latin alphabet〉. Xenoph: Cyr: ped: l. 1. Deus omniae deprehe•dit antequam •ant. Ambr: epist: 12. Futura omnia diuinus prae•urrit intuitus. Boeth: consol: lib. 5. pros. 6.
oAct: 15.18. Nota ergò fetit, non facta cognovit. Aug: de Gen: ad lit: l. 5. c. 1•.Act: 15.18. Nota ergò fetit, non facta cognouit. Aug: de Gen: ad lit: l. 5. c. 1•.
sDeo in cousp•ctu praesto simul sunt universa, praes•ntia, praeterita, futura Aug: de trivi•: lib. 15. cap. 7. Nec sigill•tim videt o••, sed simul. Ibid. cap. 14. Simul, non luccessivè omniae visit. Thom. sum: part: 1. q. 14. a. 7.Deo in cousp•ctu praesto simul sunt vniuersa, praes•ntia, praeterita, futura Aug: de triui•: lib. 15. cap. 7. Nec sigill•tim videt o••, sed simul. Ibid. cap. 14. Simul, non luccessiuè omniae vi•et. Thom. sum: part: 1. q. 14. a. 7.
tThom: sum: part. 1. quaest: 14 a. 13. Jun: de peccato Adae q. 1. cap. 4. Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti, Nulla terra mole resistun•; Non nox atris nubibu• obstat. Vu• menti• cernit in ictu, Qua sint, quae fu•riut, veniantque Quem, quia respicit o•nia soiu•, Ver•m possis dicere Solē. Both: consol: l. 5. mere. 2. Itaque si praescientiam pen••r• velis, qua cuncta dinos••t, non esse praescientiam quas• futuri, sed scientiam nunquam de fi•ientis instantiae r•ctius existima••s. •nde non praevidentia, s•d providentia potius d•citur, quòd porrò à re••• infimi• constituta, quasi ab excels• rerum cacumine c•ncta pro▪ spitiat. Ibid. pros: 6.Thom: sum: part. 1. quaest: 14 a. 13. Iun: de peccato Adae q. 1. cap. 4. Huic ex alto cuncta tuenti, Nulla terra mole resistun•; Nō nox atris nubibu• obstat. Vu• menti• cernit in ictu, Qua sint, quae fu•riut, veniantque Quem, quia respicit o•nia soiu•, Ver•m possis dicere Solē. Boeth: consol: l. 5. me•r. 2. Itaque si praescientiam pen••r• velis, qua cuncta dinos••t, non esse praescientiam quas• futuri, sed scientiam nunquam de fi•ientis instantiae r•ctius existima••s. •nde non praeuidentia, s•d prouidentia potius d•citur, quòd porrò à re••• infimi• constituta, quasi ab excels• rerum cacumine c•ncta pro▪ spitiat. Ibid. pros: 6.
might exclude as well all contingencie in regard of vncertainty, as all casualty in euents, but must of necessitie be vnderstood of the euents of things onely as they regard God; with whom, because he fore-seeth all things before they fall out, and fore-determineth all things how they shall fall out, none of those euents are casuall, that are most
⟨p. 31⟩
casuall vnto vs, none contingent of those many that are contingent vnto vs.
Qaicquid casu fit, temerè fit. quicquid temerè fit, non fit prouidentia. si ergo casu aliqua fiunt in mundo, non prouideniia vniuersus mundus administratur. Aug: 83. quaest. 24.
4Tam contingentiam q•àm cas•m excludit. Calvin: justit: l. •. c. 16. § 9.Tam contingentiam q•àm cas•m excludit. Caluin: iustit: l. •. c. 16. § 9.
